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This study investigates the impacts of neoliberal and environmental regulation policies 
introduced recently to improve sustainable development challenges in the growing Nigerian 
cement industry. It argues that as the extractive industries have become a new Frontier for 
foreign and private investment in developing countries, the devolution of economic 
responsibilities and the rising poverty despite their resource wealth present a research gap. 
This gap I argue requires a multilevel environmental governance perspective to understand 
and explain the process at play. The application of multilevel governance framework is novel 
in this case because of its emphasis on a panoply of systems of coordination and negotiation 
among formal and informal institutions. I have applied the framework to identify and analyse 
the roles and relations of state and non-state actors in the new Nigerian cement industry. 
Based on in-depth, qualitative research, the study examines the ways the privatisation of the 
Nigerian cement industry and environmental policy reforms affect the roles of central and 
subnational governments in the governance of the sector. It also articulates the new 
governance actors’ roles and relations in the devolved sector as well as the interactions 
between these groups of actors due to these changes. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted among government, business and society stakeholders grouped into two - state and 
non-state actors. Findings reveal that the institutional and political relationships governing the 
interactions between state and non-state actors in the extractive sector historically indicate a 
multiscalar governance approach with persistent dysfunctional institutional arrangement. As 
evident from the Nigerian cement industry case study, changes in economic development and 
environmental policies over time reflect attempts to include subnational government and civil 
society organisations, aside from private sector actors, in the management of the sector. It is 
argued that the changes fail to improve structures for actors’ participation in the governance 
of the sector to avoid fragmentation of actions. The study has also shown that legitimate 
power still resides with the central government in the development of mineral resources in 
Nigeria. While the subnational governments have actively been involved in environmental 
regulation, the relationships of the state actors lack coordination and coherence because of the 
absence of a legitimate structure to integrate their actions. Although, actors in the industry 
transcend national governments, the political lessons of neoliberal governance as experienced 
in this study have shown that many issues are still left unresolved with the government 
continuing to act as the arbiter of legitimate power. The political will to decentralise and 
devolve political roles to subnational government actors in particular and civil society 
organisations has hindered governance for sustainable development in the new Nigerian 
cement industry. While the role of central government as the ‘gate keeper’ remains important 
in any development process, the Nigerian government has not learned from its past 
development planning and environmental history to adequately address sustainable resource 
governance policies. The application of multilevel governance framework in this study has 
illuminated the complex interrelation of actors in neoliberal resource governance and the need 
for inclusive resource development strategies in developing economies like Nigeria. Evidence 
also revealed the growing relationship between community-based organisations and corporate 
actors without non-governmental organisations. The framework has contributed to the body of 
knowledge on the importance of society-centred resource governance in low and medium 
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     GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Collaborative governance Collaborative governance as used in this study relates to the 
interrelationship between different actors to achieve set 
development goals 
Development (In)action As applied in this thesis, development (in)action explains the partial 
policy reforms of the federal government which allows the 
involvement of society actors in the governance of the cement 
industry but fail to provide a formidable template for 
implementation 
Ecogovernmentality Ecogovernmentality refers to the use of government resources to 
manage the environmental impacts of society and nature 
relationships 
Environmental governance The concept is used to express the formal and informal 
relationships of state and non-state actors in the development and 
management of the impacts of a environmental resources 
Federalism This is a system of government where subnational governments 
share some constitutional powers with the federal government 
Governance Governance as used in this study depicts the involvement of non-




Following the conceptualisation by Hooghe and Marks, the concept 
is used to describe the different scales of governments and non-
governmental actors as well as the dimension of interactions 
Neoliberal governance Neoliberal governance expresses the increasing devolution of 
economic and political roles to business and society following 
changes in development approach to free market 
Neoliberal obsession The term refers to the undue attention given to economic gains of 
free market to the detriment of other factors of sustainable 
development 
Neoliberalisation of natures The application of neoliberal instruments such as privatisation to 
exploit natural resources 
Privatisation It is taking over of public owned industries by businesses and 







CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction and background to the study 
The Nigerian government’s privatisation and environmental planning policies reforms in 
recent past present a neoliberal transition experience and significant build-up of multilevel 
resource governance capacity. But what are the implications of the changes on state and non-
state actors’ roles and relations for resource governance and sustainable development? A thick 
analysis of the implications of these trends is identified as a novel research gap by this study. 
This study therefore focuses on neoliberal transition and natural resource governance in a 
developing country context by identifying with the debates on agency of natural resources in 
neoliberal governance (Bridge & Jonas, 2002; Bridge & Perreault, 2009; Castree, 2006, 
2008a, 2008b; McCarthy, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Peck & 
Tickell, 2002; Perreault, 2005, 2006). The study recognises the rising neoliberalisation of 
nature (Castree, 2008a, 2008b; Bebbington, 2013) and reallocation of development 
responsibilities and coordination (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Bridge & Perreault, 2009; 
Mansfield, 2007) in extractive economies. It argues that the neoliberal transition coupled with 
development challenges faced by these economies contrary to their resource wealth present a 
research gap requiring multilevel environmental governance explanations, social and 
organisational learning for sustainable development. I therefore assess the changing economic 
development and environmental policies, polity and the shifting roles of state actors to make 
sense of neoliberalisation of nature and governance for sustainable development debate using 
the Nigerian cement industry experience. I also articulate the emerging roles and relations of 




illuminate social and organisational learning and policy implications of multilevel governance 
practice for sustainable development in a developing, extractive economy context as 
exemplified by the growing Nigerian cement industry. Having adopted a case study approach, 
the study is focused on Ogun state in southwest Nigeria. Ogun state is major cement 
producing state in Nigeria which plays host to the two major cement producing companies in 
the country. 
 
Transformations in economic development policies, politics and polity since the 1980s 
coupled with rising concerns of environmental degradation, environmentalism and 
environmental movement at about the same period brought about a ‘putative shift’ (Bridge & 
Perreault, 2009, p.476) in the coordination and control of the development-environment 
processes worldwide (Hague, 1999; Peet & Hartwick, 2009; Sonnenfeld & Mol, 2002; Lemos 
& Agrawal, 2006; Agrawal & Lemos, 2007; Perreault, 2009). The significance of social 
relations in economic development and environmental sustainability has been argued to have 
manifested from the series of events on socio-economic development and environmental 
movements beginning from the 1960s (Perreault, 2009). The rise in environmental concerns 
due to the consequences of humans’ social and economic development activities in the 1960s 
led to environmentalism and environmental movements. Consequently, national governments 
began incorporating environmental concerns into development policies and industrial 
activities (UNCED, 1993; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2000; Adil, 
Mihaela & Nadaa, 2006). Also, attempts to evolve economic development approaches that 
can address sustainable use of natural resources with minimal damage to the environment led 




in the 1980s (Castells, 1996; Held et al., 1999; Kettl, 2000; Clark, 2005). Further from the 
above, series of social, economic and environmental issues to achieve sustainable 
development culminate to the gross importance of governance in sustainable development 
(UNCED, 1993; De Wit & Verheye, 2007).  
 
Although governance has been defined in many ways, (Commission on Global governance, 
1995; Rhodes, 1997; Rosenau, 1995, 2002) the common denominator in the definitions is that 
governance discourse is about social and economic change (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). The 
commission on Global governance define governance as the “sum of the many ways 
individuals and institutions, public and private manage their common affairs”. Governance 
has since been a key term to conceptualise the crossroads of environment and development 
contentions in the 21st century (Perreault, 2009). Perreault (2009, p.442) contends that:  
"Environment and development has long been a cornerstone of environmental 
geography. It is an inherently integrative field that incorporates a broad diversity of 
theoretical and methodological approaches ...  At its core, the field of environment and 
development geography is concerned with two fundamental realities: (I) Social groups 
– households, rural communities, cities or nation states are dependent upon nature and 
natural resources for their survival and welfare and (II) the practices and institutional 
arrangements social groups employ to ensure survival and welfare in turn impacts 
environmental quality and the functioning of geo-ecological systems".  
 
Perreault's contention above also resonates in Paavola’s (2008) explanation of multifunctional 
relevance of multilevel environmental governance. Paavola (2008, p. 151) explains that “The 




governance solutions are needed: to organize transfers between beneficiaries and providers of 
ecosystem services flows that are appropriated at different spatial scales”. This change in 
political economy of development-environment illuminates the shift in roles of non-state 
actors such as market and society alongside the state in the path to sustainable development 
under the frame of governance (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Agrawal & Lemos, 2007; Reed & 
Bruyneel, 2010). As such governance recognises the multi-layered and –scalar nature of the 
political authority of the state with the growing influence of regional state actors and new 
modes of governance (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). 
 
It has thus been argued that for the effectiveness of any mode of governance, it requires a 
well-functioning state as the custodian of jurisdictional power and authority setting the 
policies and polity where market and society actors come to play (Kettl, 2000; Lambin, 2005; 
Duit, 2016). Recognising the transition to neoliberal governance in Nigeria, it is however not 
yet clear how new strategies to coordinate and manage public programmes effectively in the 
country has been devised. This is more important considering the increasing level of poverty 
and environmental degradation in what is the seventh most populous nation in the world 
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015). 
This study hopes to make sense of the neoliberalisation of nature and governance for 
sustainable development debate using the Nigerian cement industry experience. 
 
Geography has a leading role to play in the changing environment, actors and scales of 
coordination and relations as a discipline which centres on human-environment relations and 
regional differences (Gray & Moseley, 2005; Castree et al., 2009). The strong association of 




mainstreaming in environment and development discourse by geographers (Liverman, 2004; 
Bridge & Perrault, 2009; Castree et al., 2009; Perreault, 2009; Perreault, Bridge & McCarthy, 
2015). The purpose of this research is to explore this problematic in transition economies as it 
relates to natural resources exploitation and environmental reregulation resulting from 
Nigeria’s neoliberal transition. Important questions are therefore raised in this study about 
socio-economic and political rationalities of neoliberal policies and the environment in 
transition economies. The economies are believed to be suffering from ‘resource curse’ 
despite their rich natural resource endowment (Auty, 1993; Sachs & Warner, 1995; Jewellord, 
2012; Bebbington, 2013) yet becoming a ‘new frontier’ for foreign investment (Hilson, 2014). 
In effect, what are the goals of neoliberal economic policies in Nigeria and has the Nigerian 
state adopted privatization of industries to the detriment of the environment and society at 
large?  
 
1.2 Research Relevance and context  
The development-environment-governance crossroads has become a frontier of research for 
environmental geographers recently (cf. Bridge & Perreault, 2009; Perreault, 2009; Perreault, 
Bridge & McCarthy, 2015). Institutional and organisational coordination of social relations is 
crucial to achieving socially, economically and environmentally sustainable development of 
any human project (Jordan, 2008; Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008). It is quite well established 
that governance as a term has been used pervasively to address issues confronting sustainable 
development (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). But the analytical strength of the concept provides a 
compelling frame to address rising environmental concerns of modernization due to human 




on the crossroads of environment, development and governance and the plurality of 
approaches to promoting social relations recognizing interdependence of actors and their 
actions in relation to spatial and historical factors (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Bulkeley & Mol, 
2003; Bulkeley, 2005; Bell & Hindmoor, 2009). Van Zeijl-Rozema et al., (2008) submit that 
the problems associated with sustainable development are inherent in governance through 
miscommunication between stakeholders and mismatch of approaches with the instruments 
thus hampering linking the elements of sustainable development meaningfully.  
 
Like many other states (Kettl, 2000; Budds, 2004; Lockie & Higgins, 2007; Perreault, 2009; 
Harris & Islar, 2013), Nigeria has institutionalised environmental regulation and devolved 
economic and regulatory responsibilities to the market actors and subnational governments 
respectively in response to rising international debt profile and public outcry over 
environmental problems nationally (Adegoroye, 1994; Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006; 
Fagbohun, 2012; Amokaye, 2012; Ekanade, 2014). Successive governments introduced the 
controversial neoliberal policies as mandated by the global financial institutions (Aigbokhan 
& Ailemen, 2006; Ekanade, 2014). These events, though reactive and unstructured, strengthen 
the involvement of non-governmental actors in governance in Nigeria. This is evident in the 
rising number of non-governmental organisations and their networks within and outside the 
country (Ogunyemi, Tella & Venditto, 2005). It thereby exposes an arena of socio-spatial 
relations and coordination implicated by power shift and reallocation of responsibility to new 
actors in governance in Nigeria.  
 
Considering the above argument, this thesis explores the effects of neoliberal policy of 




thesis addresses the challenges related to governance through ‘nature’ for sustainable 
development by exploring the shrinking roles of government and new roles of non-state actors 
which have increased rapidly since the 1980s. The suggestion of governance through nature 
rather than governance of nature (Bridge & Perreault, 2009) pinpoints the relevance of this 
study particularly in developing countries. Bridge and Perreault (2009) suggest that the 
application of the ‘intellectual credentials’ of governance that does not omit or conceal the 
concept’s social and spatial relevance should consider nature as an agency in the analysis of 
governance from geography.   
 
Nigeria is predominantly an extractive economy; the country relies heavily on crude oil 
drilling and processing to meet its development needs. Aside from oil and gas, Nigeria has 
over 34 economically viable mineral resources some of which are yet untapped while some 
are illegally mined at the detriment of the host communities (Ogundipe, 2017). Privatization 
in Nigeria began in the late 1980s under the military regime and by 1999 the democratically 
elected administration continued with the transition process. Since then, significant changes 
have occurred in political economy and public administration, but there has been less 
improvement in environmental well-being and livelihoods of the citizens. As part of the 
transition process, Nigeria’s cement industry, one of its major non-oil extractive industries, 
was privatized. 
 
Nigeria’s cement industry has become one of the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, hosting the 
largest cement plant in this region and now is the first significant exporter of cement in Africa 
(Oluwakiyesi, 2010, Industry update, 2010). Appreciating these changes in the context of 




contributors to global environmental challenges (CSI, 2002). The industry is resource, capital 
and energy intensive and thereby a significant flash point for environmental pollution, 
ecosystem degradation and climate change as well as socio-environmental conflicts (CSI, 
2002). The society-economy-environment intricacies of institutional reforms and 
transformations in the industry make a strong case for a pioneering analysis utilising 
multilevel governance of this natural resource-based industry.  
 
1.3  Aim and Objectives 
The general aim of this study is a ‘thick analysis’ of the effects of privatization as a 
neoliberalisation process on the state-business-society relations in the Nigerian cement 
industry using a multilevel governance framework. The nature of the study required me to 
interact with a wide spectrum of actors within and across different scales beyond the central 
state as significant sources of primary data. This material was then triangulated with extensive 
secondary data, primarily grey literatures (Government policy documents, NGO reports, 
community strategies) and academic (theoretical and empirical) studies. These combined with 
leading academic studies on neoliberalisation of nature, multilevel governance and extractive 
economies informed my exploit to analyse multilevel environmental governance as implicated 
by the privatization of Nigerian cement industry. Three specific objectives evolved from the 
engagement with debates on Neoliberal governance for sustainable development in extractive 
economies to achieve the aim of the study: 
 
1. Recognising the devolution of economic responsibilities to the private sector and 
attempted improvement of environmental protection by successive governments, the 




governance of the cement industry and the roles sub-national tiers of government play 
in this governance process. Consequently, the historical and evidential perspectives of 
central state efforts at evolving coherent environmental governance institutions and 
instruments are examined. Further from that, the implications of the changing roles of 
the state actors as facilitator and regulator were articulated using the Nigerian cement 
industry example.  
2. The second objective is to examine the responses and roles of non-state actors and 
stakeholders in the political and economic transition process and the emerging 
configuration of governance in the cement sector. Considering the introduction of 
neoliberal policy in the Nigerian cement industry, the goals of emerging non-state 
interests such as private sector actors and civil society organisation, and how they 
complement government efforts are critically articulated in this objective.  
3. Finally, in the third objective, the study attempts to understand and provide evidence 
of how the state actors’ jurisdictional authority to promote governance has influenced 
the actions and interactions of business and society in the Nigerian cement sector. 
This is to illuminate how the state and non-state actors' relations and responses to 
privatization can be understood as contestations to achieving sustainable development 
in the Nigerian cement industry. 
Three questions thus raised through these objectives are: 
1.  How has the state configured environmental governance of the cement industry and 




2. How have the non-state actors and stakeholders’ roles and relations in environmental 
governance been affected by privatization in the cement industry? 
3. How can the multilevel governance practices in the Nigerian cement industry be 
understood and explained as contestations to achieving sustainable development of 
natural resources? 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
Following from this introduction, the rest of the thesis consists of literature review, national 
context, methods, three empirical chapters informed from a MLG perspective, and 
conclusions. In chapter two I present a review of literature on the conceptual framework 
adopted in the study. The chapter begins with a discussion of the origins and meaning of 
governance as well as its multilevel perspectives as an analytical concept. It explores the 
multilevel and scalar arguments and criticisms of governance, unpacks the mainstreaming of 
governance perspective in development and environmental geography and its relevance to this 
study. Key issues for empirical investigation are also highlighted. The multilevel perspective 
of the concept of governance informed its application to resource governance in a developing 
country in transition. This is to illuminate how paradigm shift in thinking, ways of working 
and coordination of society (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003; Davidson & Frickel, 2004; De Loe et al., 
2009; Gisselquist, 2012, Jordan, 2001) associated with neoliberal governance has manifested 
in this case study.  
 
To apply the multilevel governance framework discussed in chapter two in a developing 
country context, I have charted the history of development and environmental planning in 




the country’s development efforts have led to reconfiguration and the reallocation of policy 
roles from the central state to other scales of government and non-state actors and informal 
institutions exemplified in the case study sector. It was concluded that the political, 
environmental and economic history of the country indicates that Nigeria is an extractive 
economy. Its economic backbone is the environmental resources spread across the country. 
There has been significant increase in the number of economic and environmental actors 
based on political and economic freedom associated with neoliberal governance. The human 
and natural resources endowment of Nigeria and the changing institutional arrangement for 
development provide an avenue to explore the implications of governance-centric 
development approach for sustainable development in strategic priority sectors of global 
environmental concern. The study can be focused on the Nigerian cement sector, a significant 
non-oil extractive industry in a major cement producing state, Ogun state in southwest 
Nigeria.  
 
Chapter four sets out the methodology used to carry out the study as well as other contextual 
and ethical issues that affected the research process. The chapter describes the Nigerian case 
study context by outlining the areas selected for in-depth study and the rationale for its 
selection. It also provides justification for the choice of qualitative research methodology and 
the case study approach used herein. The chapter discussed the methods of data collection and 
analysis in detail followed by ethical issues and the narrative of the research experience. 
 
Having analysed the qualitative data, Chapter five thoroughly evaluates the advent of a 
coherent environmental governance arrangement in the country and its configuration by state 




governments’ as it relates to power sharing and distribution for effective processes in the 
industry. The chapter discusses emerging issues and implications for sustainable development 
in the Nigerian cement sector as implicated by the findings and grey literature. 
 
Chapter six is the second of the empirical chapters; it presents a detailed analysis of how non-
state actors and stakeholders’ roles and relations have been affected by privatization of the 
cement industry. It discusses extensively how the new governance actors’ roles compensate 
for state actors’ roles politically and economically, the prospects and challenges associated 
with their new roles particularly in relation to extractive industries based on the findings of 
the study. 
 
After critically examining the state and non-state actors’ roles in the new Nigerian cement 
industry in the last two chapters as implicated by the recent policy reforms, chapter seven 
focuses attention on the assessment of the capacity and practices of multilevel governance in 
the Nigerian cement sector. This is a with a view to understanding and explaining multilevel 
governance practices evident in the cement sector. The neoliberal governance of the cement 
sector is expected to manifest in the practice of corporate values and strategies by the private 
sector actors as the new governance actor in the cement sector. The chapter engages 
collaborative governance as framework to inform the partnerships experienced between actors 
in the sector. It also critiques comparatively corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibilities of the corporate governance actors. The implications of the findings for 
governance through nature in developing and extractive economies context are then 





Chapter eight presents the conclusion of the study. In the chapter, I critically reflect on the 
knowledge and social learning attributable to this study beginning with reflection on the 
objectives of the study. I then discuss methodological, conceptual and theoretical as well as 
the policy contributions of the thesis to knowledge in the governance for sustainable 
development discourse. Bearing in mind the developing country context, methodological, 














  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Building on the first chapter, here I present a review of literature on the conceptual framework 
adopted to analyse governance through nature in a neoliberal context in the Nigerian cement 
industry. As discussed in chapter one, the study’s aim is an analysis of the effects of 
privatisation on social relations in the Nigerian cement industry. To be able to achieve the 
aim, a multilevel framework that brings together all the governance elements discussed here is 
needed because of its robustness to frame and assess the different modes of governance 
emerging in the Nigerian cement industry case study. I begin by discussing the meaning and 
history of the term Governance as a theoretical concept in section 2.2. I also discuss the 
multilevel perspectives of the concept as well as the central issues of concern in the 
governance discourse. This is followed by theoretical propositions and orientations of the 
concept affirming its “intellectual credentials” (Bridge & Perreault, 2009, p. 475) in section 
2.3. A critical review of the empirical application of governance approach in environmental 
geography and why its multilevel perspective as a ‘compelling metaphor’ (Rosamond, 2000, 
p.197) informed my conceptual and analytical framework in this study are discussed in 
sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. Although, traces are evident in institutional analysis and 
development (IAD) framework (Paavola, 2008, 2016), application of multilevel framework to 
governance analysis became prominent through the seminal works of Hooghe and Marks on 
multilevel environmental governance in the European Union (Piattoni, 2010). In section 2.6, I 
discuss the context by which the multilevel and scalar perspective of governance is applied in 




2.2 Governance: Meaning, History and Features 
The governance perspective emerged to challenge the so-called traditional policy paradigm 
(TPP) (Johnson, 2009) of hierarchical/command and control institutions. The term has drawn 
attention to the increasingly changing condition of ordered rules and new ways of state-
society steering (Rhodes, 1997), resulting in outcomes different from the traditional 
institutions of government (Stoker, 1998). Most steering and development responsibilities that 
were exclusive to states are now shared between the public, the private and the voluntary 
sectors in more flexible governing arrangements (Rhodes, 1997). As an analytical concept, 
governance offers ways to analyse how various modes of governing have implications for 
policy outcomes by capturing the implementation and outcome side of the process among 
other uses (Kjær, 2011).  
 
The Commission on Global Governance (1995, p.4) define governance as “the sum of the 
many ways individuals and institutions, public and private manage their common affairs.” 
Kooiman (2003) believes that a governance perspective indicates that public governing is not 
only carried out by one set of actors such as only the state but rather a shared set of 
responsibilities through ‘self-governing’; co-governing, as well as authoritative or hierarchical 
governing’. Though governance remains arguable as to whether it constitutes a theory or not, 
its virtues as a theoretical concept lie in its framing to explore changing boundaries between 
state and society and its compelling scope to explore state authority as an empirical question 
(Kjær, 2011). Governance has since been used to capture a paradigm shift in thinking, ways 




2004; De Loe et al., 2009; Gisselquist, 2012, Jordan, 2001; Kooiman, 2003; Leach et al., 
2007; Liverman, 2004; Rhodes, 1997, Petschow et al., 2005).  
 
Academic debate on governance began to appear in the 1980s through the advocacy for good 
governance by civil society organisations (Ghaus-Pasha, 2004; Ives, 2015). Over time, the 
concept became a buzzword to describe a specific form of management indicating dispersion 
of authority from traditional government to new governance (Pierre, 2000a; Rosenau, 2002) 
and improvement from the traditional idea of ‘shareholders to stakeholders’ (Ives, 2015). The 
substance of governance as a concept lies in Pierre’s (2000a) distinction between state-centric 
and society-centric governance. Pierre describes state-centric as “old governance” focusing on 
how the political-institutional system steers society and public policies. The society-centric is 
the “new governance” centring on the ability of society to govern itself (Pierre, 2000a; 
Capano, Howlett & Ramesh, 2015). 
Evidently, between 1980 and 1990, national governments were busy introducing 
managerialism and service contracting to the private sectors implied the proliferation of non-
state actors in achieving public goals (Kjær, 2011). Through the pioneering works of Rod 
Rhodes and James Rosenau governance became more prominent as it opened-up new research 
agenda (Kjær, 2011; Coleman, 2012). Kjær (2011) describes Rhodes as one of the most 
influential in British political science in the development of governance approach. By 
pointing to the many simultaneous processes of ‘hollowing out’, Rhodes’ demonstrated that 
the central state was losing steering capacity, and his works gave us the conceptual tools with 




Parallel to Rhodes’ contribution, James Rosenau’s observations of international relations in 
1995 presents another remarkable contribution to the governance perspective. One of his 
major contributions is the argument that an irreversible process is underway wherein authority 
is increasingly disaggregated and associated with diverse spheres of governance (Coleman, 
2012). Rosenau distinguished "government" from "governance" - consisting of rule systems 
and steering mechanisms by which authority is exercised and desired goals are realized. He 
argued that the rule systems of governments can be thought of as structures and those of 
governance as social functions or processes that can be performed or implemented in a variety 
of ways at different times and places by a wide variety of organizations (Rosenau, 2002). The 
key distinction between government and governance lies in the spheres of authority which can 
either be formal or informal forms (Coleman, 2012), this is necessarily multilevel and multi-
actor in nature.  
 
The characteristic of any site of authority is a capacity to generate compliance on those 
persons or organization towards which objectives are being issued (Coleman, 2012). Rosenau 
and Rhodes’ contributions reflect the view of governance as a bifurcated system comprising 
of an interstate system of states and their national governments that has long dominated the 
course of events (Coleman, 2012). Alongside the bifurcation system is the multi-centric 
system comprising of diverse types of other actors that sometimes cooperate or compete but 
endlessly interacting with the state (Coleman, 2012). Since the 1990s, the governance concept 
has continued to feed back into public policy and political practice. 
 
The governance perspective has since become the option to navigate the dilemmas of the 




as: wicked problems, social complexity and weak institutionalization. In the context of 
development content, ‘wicked’ problems are ill-defined and unstructured problems (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973; Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008). Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., (2008) contend that 
addressing wicked problems affecting the traditional governing style requires new thinking, 
tools and methods. The dilemma of social complexity is viewed in terms of developmental 
processes, and the plurality of actors and parties involved in these processes. Social 
complexity dilemma is addressed through governance approach considering the need for 
interdependencies between competent actors and agents (Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008). The 
institutional setting remains the platform at which the content and processes of addressing 
issues are laid (Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008. In a development process, the institutional 
setting for development initiatives under the traditional government is unidirectional and 
weak to tackle multijurisdictional and multidirectional development issues, hence the 
governance approach (Kemp, Parto & Gibson, 2005; Kemp & Martens, 2007; Van Zeijl-
Rozema, et al., 2008). The governance framework addresses traditional government style 
dilemmas through its ability to govern without necessarily involving the central state or idea 
of governance as a shared responsibility of representatives from the state and non-state actors, 
in other words, multilevel governance processes. 
 
Multilevel credentials and characteristics of the concept of governance can be traced back to 
the emergence of neoliberal practices in the 1980s by the conservative politicians such as 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the UK and US respectively (Harvey, 2005). Saad-




growing manifestation of practical implementation of both political and economic ideas 
related to governance ideology (Thorsen & Lie, 2007). Harvey (2005, p. 2) explains that:     
 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to 
create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state 
has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up 
those military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required to secure 
private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of 
markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, 
health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by 
state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State 
interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, 
according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to 
second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will 
inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their 
own benefit” (Harvey 2005, p. 2).   
 
 
Harvey argues that the turn toward neoliberal ideas in political economic practices not only 
emerged in the 1990s but has been building up since the 1970s (Thorsen & Lie, 2007). He 
also identified the vanguards of neoliberalism to include anti-liberal autocrats namely Deng 
Xiaoping and Augusto Pinochet; neoliberals with liberal identity: Hayek and Friedman as 
well as nominally conservative politicians such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. 
The emergence and ascendancy of neoliberal policies in the 1980s could be understood as 
reactions to failures of the welfare state on one hand and the advocacy for good governance 
by the civil society (Ghaus-Pasha, 2004). Governance has been the buzzword in academia and 
public policy used in relation to the changes associated with neoliberal policies (Brenner, 
1997; De Angelis, 2003; Castree, 2008). Neoliberal governance in essence entails “a 
purposive act, usually by state actors, aiming at providing stability in socio-economic flows, 




networked active participation and self-management of non-state actors such as NGOs and 
other civil society groups as well as business” (De Angelis, 2003, pp.3-4).  
 
Further from the emphatic influence of neoliberal policies on the governance perspective 
explicitly discussed above, Hooghe and Marks (1993) is a significant reference point to the 
multilevel perspectives of governance (Jordan, 2001; Paavola, 2008; Piattoni, 2009). 
Although the multilevel framework has been traced back to the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework (Paavola, 2008; Abimbola, et al., 2014), the application from 
governance perspective became more compelling and prominent since its use by Hooghe and 
Marks in 1993. Multilevel governance (MLG) was used in the 1990s by Liesbet Hooghe and 
Gary Marks in their study of the sub-national policy structures that were put in place by the 
European Union Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Piattoni, 2009, 2010; Stephenson, 2013). In the 
context of European integration, multilevel governance raises new questions regarding the 
roles, powers and authority of states, and incorporates the usual separate domains of domestic 
and international politics directing attention to the blurred distinction between these domains 
(Marks, Hooghe & Blank, 1996; Bache & Flinders, 2004). At the European Union level, the 
principles of multilevel governance are reflected in the combination of communal decision 
making over wide swath of policy and the entanglement of the member states’ national 
administration with the European policy level (Jordan, 2001; Jordan, Wurzel & Zito, 2005).  
 
The interconnected institutions that exist at multiple levels with unique policy features make 
the European Union a sui generis (unique) political construction constituted from different 




include European Commission, European Council, European Parliament; the national scale of 
its member states, and the subnational or regional and local scales (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). 
The emerging multiple scales interact with each other in two different vertical and horizontal 
dimensions (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The vertical dimension interacts across different levels 
of government, while the horizontal dimension refers to cooperation arrangements between 
regions or between municipalities (Hooghe & Mark 2003, Piattoni, 2009).  
 
Hooghe & Marks (2003) describe multilevel governance (MLG) as the ‘dispersion’ of 
decision-making authority away from the central state with new modes of governing 
alongside traditional hierarchical modes. According to Hooghe and Marks (2003), these 
consist of two types of governance: Type 1 and Type 2. They explain Type 1 MLG as a 
jurisdiction with a limited number of levels such as international, national, regional, meso and 
local. Every citizen is in a nested jurisdiction with only one relevant jurisdiction at any 
territorial scale (nation/country) (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 
2010). The jurisdiction is usually stable for periods of several decades or more while the 
allocation of policy competences across jurisdictional levels is flexible (Hooghe & Marks, 
2003). Type II MLG on the other hand composes of specialized jurisdictions unlike Type 1 
MLG (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). It is fragmented into functionally specific pieces such as 
solving a specific common resource problem (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Type II jurisdictions 
operate at different scales finely with no great fixity in their existence; they tend to come and 
go as demands for governance change (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2009). The Type II 
MLG crosses and highlights the blurred distinctions between domains of domestic and 




the central state makes the governance concept a “compelling metaphor” useful in 
understanding social relations (Rosamond, 2000, p.197).  
 
Although MLG has been criticized on many grounds, its intellectual credential and analytical 
capability in framing and understanding the complexity of social relations remain appreciated 
in fostering social learning towards sustainable development (Newell, Pattberg & Schroeder, 
2012; Bebbington, 2013; Bixler, 2014). Bekemans’ (2009) criticism is that MLG is not a 
proper theory but an approach because it is descriptive in nature. Rosenau (2002) argues that 
MLG does not address the question of integrating loyalty and sovereignty which makes it 
hierarchical in nature. Rosenau claims that issues of loyalty and sovereignty may lead to the 
clash between fragmentation and integration termed ‘fragmegration’. He submits that specific 
issues of loyalty and sovereignty between levels and their future need to be properly 
addressed (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Baker, Hudson and Woodward, (2005) however do not see 
the emerging international regulatory networks as separate sources of authority but a 
representation of the reconstituted state authority pursuing state level governance through 
another means. They argue for the need to address the sovereignty of the state (Tengku-
Hamza, 2011).  
 
Despite the criticisms, MLG has remained a widely used governance system framework 
decision-making issues and competences at multiple scales and levels. It has been applied to 
understanding consequences of different policies involving a variety of actors where common 
institutional solutions are proposed at different scales to manage diversities (Bekemans, 2009; 
Paavola, 2008). Similar related organizing concepts such as multi-tiered governance, 




decades. However, MLG as framework offers a way to move beyond the limits of rigid 
distinctions between and within domestic and international politics by advancing the different 
territorial scales at which government operates and the implications of an increased 
interdependence between governments and non-state actors across the various scales 
(Rosamond, 2000; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Paavola, 2008).   
 
Two central issues of constant debate in governance include power and legitimacy. Different 
schools of thought abound on how power and legitimacy affect the dispersion of power under 
the frame of governance. One school of thought opines that the new governance modes 
hollow out power of the state (Rhodes, 1997; Jessop, 2004). Another school argues that 
multilevel governance further strengthens the role of states in the governance process (Bell, 
Hindmoor & Mols, 2010; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Others such as Pierre (2000b); Rosenau and 
Durfee (1999) and Karkkainen (2004) believe authority of the state is only being transformed 
and their dominance reduced rather than hollowed out. In the case of legitimacy, governance 
approach has been closely linked to democracy (Tengku-Hamza, 2011) and Non-state actors 
and informal institutions are not democratically elected and as such they do not possess the 
substantive legitimate authority like elected actors of the state (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). But on 
the ground of territorial interest and functional/professional roles, non-state actors and 
informal institutions have continued to create spaces of governance parallel to the state 
(Piattoni, 2009).  
 
Multiplicity of scales, actors and modes of governance gives a significant degree of 
intellectual agreement in the academic and policy literatures (Paavola, 2008; Bridge & 




power distribution among various scales of authority from bottom up or from outside the 
sovereign state (Piattoni, 2010). Contrary to power sharing between tiers of authority in a 
state-centric mode of governance, the governance perspective acknowledges emphatically the 
dispersion of power beyond the sovereign state (Stoker, 1998; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache 
& Flinders, 2004). Alongside the multilevel perspective, the multi-actor perspective is the 
other important feature of the multilevel governance approach. Multi-actor refers to the 
involvement of both state and non-state actors in governance. Three main strands of actors 
have been identified in the literature: the state-centric actors- most clearly government 
officials and bureaucrats; society-centric actors are the non-state actors such as the NGOs, 
civil society groups, interest groups among others and the hybrid of both state and society-
centric actors (Pierre, 2000a; Rosenau & Durfee, 1999; Karkkainen, 2004; Tengku-Hamza, 
2011). 
 
Another distinct and important feature of multilevel governance is the mechanism by which 
governance is carried out, that is the mode of governance (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). The 
multiplicity and flexible character of the concept of governance as a framework signifies the 
emergence of different governance approaches which allows for options that suits a specific 
situation or context (Kjær, 2011). Different modes of governance have been identified in the 
literature (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). For example, Kooiman (2003) identifies self-governing, co-
governing and authoritative or hierarchical governing as the major modes of governance. Bell 
and Hindmoor (2009) presents hierarchy, persuasion, market, community engagements and 
associations as modes of governance from state-centric perspectives. Kooiman’s self-




Bell and Hindmoor’s classification possess similar features with Kooiman’s co-governing. 
Markets classified separately as a mode of governance by Bell and Hindmoor was also 
discussed by Kooiman under self-governing (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Having contrasted the 
differences and similarities, Tengku-Hamza (2011) identified four types namely: hierarchical, 
persuasion, self-governance and co-governance, these four modes of governance are 
discussed in the next section.   
 
2.2.1 Modes of governance: The Hierarchical, Persuasion, Self-Governance and Co-
governance modes  
The hierarchical mode of governance is characterized by top-down control where governing 
entities determine how policy should be conducted and implemented to achieve set objectives 
(Kooiman, 2003; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). In this mode, the behaviour of other participants is 
influenced by government authorities in a formal and vertical structure with sanctions 
(Kooiman, 2003). Hierarchical governance is typically a type I multilevel governance 
characterized by steering and control. It is closely related to the implementation of good 
governance concept which deals with issues of efficient, accountable and transparent delivery 
of public services (Jordan, 2008; Gisselquist, 2012; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). In persuasive 
governance, actors seek to change two things in the society being governed; the behaviour and 
mind-set to achieve specific policy objectives (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009). This is done through 
education and extension programs with much stress on information to motivate and influence 
public behaviour and mind-set about certain issues. Examples in this case includes different 
awareness campaign of government and non-governmental organizations on social and 




clean energy programmes across the world. Unlike the hierarchical mode, persuasive 
governance is voluntary and could be done in many ways, it is a mode that can be practised by 
either state actors or non-state actors. 
 
Self-governance is described as the capacity of societies to govern selves autonomously 
(Kooiman, 2003). It is a situation described as when non-state actors take care of themselves 
outside the purview of government (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Deregulation and privatization of 
public corporations mark the beginning of the interests in self-governance. The emergence of 
this mode of governance could be due to two reasons; firstly, in search of ways to strengthen 
self-steering capacity of the society and secondly in search for other actors of governance 
other than the state, in certain areas where the state cannot fulfil its governing promises 
(Kooiman, 2003; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Self-governance is considered a mode of governance 
because it is not created by government though sometimes it is operating under the shadows 
of state actors (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Corporate bodies now adopt self-governance modes to 
play their new political roles in neoliberal governance, this is evident in the changes in 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility strategies (Brammer, Jackson & 
Matten, 2012).  
 
Co-governance is one of the most prominent defining characteristics of the new governance 
modes which has manifested in multiple forms. Co-governance expresses partnership and 
collaboration among governance actors to relate and pool resources in achieving common 
goals (Zadek & Radovich, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008). Some of the major ways of co-
governance include co-management, public-private partnerships (PPP) and networks 




identifies Public-Private Partnership as one of the extensively applied and preferred mode of 
governance in many states in recent years in environmental governance because of the ways it 
overlaps with another important aspect of governance. PPP involves the sharing of risks and 
benefits among partners; it depends on a great degree of interdependency, trust, co-operation, 
common goals and the division of responsibilities and authority among partners (Kooiman 
2003; Tengku-Hamza 2011). Multi-stakeholder partnerships have been argued to be one of 
the most important institutional innovations in the 21st century (Zadek & Radovich, 2006). 
Collaborative governance has significantly changed relations and interaction between state 
and non-state actors in achieving common objectives (Ansell & Gash, 2008). This section and 
the preceding section have discussed extensively the origin and types of governance as an 
expression of changes in the ways of thinking and coordinating society. In the next section, 
theoretical arguments about governance as a conceptual fit rather than a theory are discussed. 
 
2.3 Theoretical arguments of Governance 
The theoretical roots of governance have been traced to involve several theories which have 
helped to inspire and influence its emergence as an organizing framework. Stoker (1998) 
notes that the contribution of governance as a theoretical concept is (1) its value as an 
organizing framework for understanding changing process of governing; (2) as a language 
and frame of reference for empirical understanding of state-society complexity and social 
learning. Stoker identifies five complimentary propositions for the consideration of 
governance as a theory as follows. He also discusses the related dilemma to each of the 





Stoker’s first proposition is that governance identifies a set of institutions and actors drawn 
from and beyond the state that are crucial to public administration. This implies that in a 
unitary state there is only one scale of power. However, there exist many scales and diverse 
links between many agencies of government at local, regional, national and supranational 
scales. This complex architecture to systems of government is what the new governance seeks 
to emphasize and focus attention on (Stoker, 1998). The governance perspective further draws 
attention to private and voluntary sectors increasing involvement in decision-making which 
previously was the exclusive responsibility of government and a deviation from the norm of 
formalities and a concern for “what should be” to pay attention to “what is”. However, 
exercise of power by the informal actors under the guise of governance needs to be legitimate; 
this poses a major challenge as it creates confusion and uncertainty of its successful 
application (Stoker, 1998). As such, legitimacy is an issue to be considered in enhancing 
governance as it lacks the legitimising myths of traditional governance.  
 
Secondly, Stoker posits that governance identifies the blurring boundaries and responsibilities 
for tackling social and economic issues. The governance perspective draws attention to the 
shift in responsibility but not necessarily stepping back of the state (Jordan, 2001) rather 
pushing back of responsibilities to private, voluntary and the citizen. This proposition 
emphasises response and reaction to a welfare system which stimulates dependence on the 
state to more emphasis on citizens’ right and responsibilities. This shift in responsibilities 
Stoker explains, finds its expression in the blurring of boundaries between the public and 
private which in turn gave rise to a range of third-sector agencies. The governance perspective 




concerns without total formal reliance on government. An important cause for concern in this 
perspective is the question of ambiguity and uncertainty the blurring creates in the mind of 
policy-makers and public about who is responsible and can lead to blame shifting (Stoker, 
1998). 
 
In the third proposition, Stoker relates that governance also identifies power dependence 
involved in relationships between institutions involved in collective actions. Governance as a 
social coordination and an interactive process means no single actor either public or private 
has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally (Kooiman, 2003; 
Stoker, 1998). Governance involves various forms of partnership which can be in three 
different forms viz: principal-agent form which rests on two actors; one principal the other 
agent working together and undertake a task (Broadbent, Dietrich & Laughlin 1996) (cited in 
Stoker, 1998). Second is the inter-organisational negotiation which involves organisations 
negotiating joint projects to blend their capacities to achieve better goals (Jessop, 1996) (cited 
in Stoker, 1998). The systemic coordination is the third form of partnership which is a step 
further from the other forms because it involves ‘games about rules’ rather than ‘games under 
rules’. This is expressed in its ability to produce designed, intentionally chosen and adopted 
governance orders or structures (Stoker, 1998). The systemic coordination is greatly involved 
in the new governance perspective in that no actor or organization can easily command, 
although one may dominate, persistent tension arises between the various actors. The 
dilemma that may be faced in this case relates to opportunistic behaviour of actors which may 
add to the complexity and uncertainty of outcomes (Stoker, 1998). The governance 




open-endedness than the command and control style (Stoker, 1998). The goal of governance 
in the fourth proposition is the partnership activity resulting in self-governing networks. 
Stoker argues that the ultimate action in this case is the establishment of a viable regime 
where actors and institutions blend their resources to gain capacity to act in long term 
coalition. The resultant coordination is the formation of informal regime which not only 
involve just influencing government policy but taking over the business of government. The 
emphasis here is that normatively, various institutional arrangements can evolve to enable 
people to co-operate over issues concerning them. Stoker submits that, self-organized systems 
of control among the key participants are seen as more effective than government-imposed 
regulation but the question of accountability brings to fore the key challenge of this 
proposition. Issue of accountability may arise from within or outside the network but this can 
be better managed by bringing back the government in some form not in a sovereign position 
but to indirectly steer the networks (Stoker, 1998).  
 
Stoker in the last proposition identifies that governance perspective sees government as being 
able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide as actors in the emergent style of 
governing. In this case, government needs to be involved in the task of managing the 
opportunities the new governing styles offer by redirecting the task of government in the task 
of governance (Kooiman & Van Vliet, 1993) (cited in Stoker, 1998) through the adoption of 
‘system management’ (Stewart, 1996; Stoker, 1998). ‘The system management involves 
thinking and acting beyond the individual sub-systems, avoiding unwanted side effects and 
establishing mechanisms for effective co-ordination’ (Stoker, 1998, p. 24). This means that 




with the governance perspective and the traditional governing style, the ways of bridging the 
gap of governance failure starts with retooling and experimentation of emerging approaches 
(Stoker, 1998).  
 
In a related research, Bevir (2011) identifies five theories believed to have arguably 
influenced the formation of governance theory: Policy network theory, rational choice theory, 
interpretive theories, Organization theory, and system theory. Policy network theory rose out 
of pluralism in its attempts to disaggregate the state and focus on groups and how network 
modifies our grasp of interdependence, coordination and pluralism (Bevir, 2011). Bevir 
explains that rational choice theory plays an important role on the issue of welfare state and 
principal-agent relations. The theory inspired some of the managerial reforms associated with 
the new governing style (Bevir, 2013). Rational choice theory emphasizes the need for policy 
actors to pay more attention to rational choice analyses of the chaos and instability associated 
with weak institutions rather than superficial support public choice theory gave to ‘choice’ 
and markets (Bevir, 2011, 2013).  
 
Interpretive theories of governance have contributed immensely to the discourse of 
governance by focusing on decentred views of governance and the need to adopt a more 
people-centred approach rather the positivism approach to governance. The theory insists that 
social life is inherently meaningful and that people remain intentional agents capable of acting 
for reasons (Bevir, 2011). These people-centred social actions cannot properly be explained or 
grasped through positivist approaches. Governance consists of contingent practices that 




dilemmas against the background of conflicting traditions (Bevir, 2011). Organization theory 
in its contribution, Bevir reiterates emphasizes the voluntarism and collective action as they 
determine the nature of governance. Institutionalist theory meanwhile focuses attention on 
institutionalizing the new governance mode by developing its culture and inner functioning 
(Bevir, 2013).  
 
Finally, system theory emphasizes locating the new governance within the narratives of 
modernity which consists of functional differentiation over time (Bevir, 2010). The systems 
perspective conceives of governance as coordination and a property of systems. Using the 
language and idea of General System Theory (Von Bertalanffy, 1968), social system theory 
emphasizes the study of interactions, organizations and societies. The main argument here is 
that modernity is an embodiment of increased functional differences in spatial and temporal 
terms. These differences may evolve to self-governing specialized organizations within and 
without the state best understood through decentred approach (Bevir, 2013). The system 
thinking explores how interdependencies and relationships are made sustainable considering 
the historical and human differences. 
 
The governance perspective as understood above has been used in a variety of contexts and 
approaches to theorise shifting roles and power relations between state and non-state actors 
(Gisselquist, 2012, Griffin, 2012). Griffin (2012) argues that in order to gain greater insight 
into governance arrangements and their limitations, it is better not to predetermine our 
theoretical models but rather articulate the geographies of power relations operating in 
practice. This she argues will enhance visualising the diverse and multiple modes of 




is a good conceptual frame for understanding the spaces of multiple, overlapping and 
sometimes competing power relations and capabilities in a neoliberal process. These 
governance credentials have been applied in advanced capitalist countries however its 
application in developing countries like Nigeria is the main objective of this study. In this 
context, I have adopted the concept of governance to explore state-society relations in 
neoliberal resource governance in Nigeria. The next section discusses the engagement with 
governance concept in environmental geography. This is to broaden our understanding on the 
conceptual and analytical strength of the concept and how this has informed sustainable 
resource development in recent past. 
 
2.4 Governance mainstreaming in geographic research: Environmental governance 
Geography’s conceptualisation of human activities as a subset of the environment presents an 
interesting relevance of the concept of governance in man-environment sustainability. 
(Fellman, Getis & Getis, 2005). Environmental governance has consistently been used to 
illuminate decision-making approaches in the development and management of environmental 
resources and their impacts (Bridge and Perreault, 2009). Environmental governance defines 
the elements needed to achieve sustainability of environmental resource (Adger et al., 2003; 
Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). It refers to both formal and informal actors’ relations to govern 
both environmental resources development and environmental sustainability. In deviation 
from the traditional top-down mechanisms used by state actors to ensure regulatory 
compliance, environmental governance emphasises the involvement of non-state actors such 
as civil society groups, scientific community, businesses and the public in the management of 




governance also emphasises providing information, enhancing participation of non-
governmental organisations, communities in governance and decision-making activities 
affecting the use of natural resources sustainably (Wingqvist et al., 2012). Paavola (2008) 
opines that avoidance of environmental conflicts through the establishment, reaffirmation and 
change of institutional arrangements is one of the core objectives of environmental 
governance. 
 
Environmental governance has become a broad analytical framework for addressing the 
institutional arrangements, spatial scales, organizational structures and social actors involved 
in decision making around different environment and resources (Bulkeley 2005, Mehta, Leach 
& Scoones, 2001; Petschow, Rosenau & Weizsäcker, 2005; Reed & Bruyneel 2010). The 
concept of environmental governance drew its analytical strength from the governance 
concept as discussed in the preceding sections. Environmental governance has been 
mainstreamed in geographic analysis to address scalar relations and fill the complex 
spatialities of environmental degradation and ecological interdependence (Bridge & Perreault, 
2009). The concept adopts a processual view of scale as the outcome of deliberation and 
social cohesion but looks to natural systems for guidance on the geographical scale of 
governance regimes (Adger et al., 2003, Bulkeley, 2005). In this way, the concept provides a 
credible frame for a ‘thick analysis’ of natural resource governance (Adger et al., 2003). 
 
It has also been used in the coordination of exchanges within and between firms and 
distribution of power among competing actors such as between producers and consumers 
along a production chain (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). Much of the work in this framework is 




influence the environmental consequences of production and consumption in ways that 
exceed the reach of formal state regulation. Product boycotts, public campaigns and social 
activism are systems of the emergence of alternative or parallel regulatory mechanism that 
often articulate with state but are not of the state (Bridge & Perrault, 2009). 
 
Environmental governance has also been applied to frame collective action for resource 
management. Bridge and Perrault (2009) relates that the expansion of the political realm from 
the formal arena of representative democracy to include a range of other actors and political 
spaces is a major example. Another area of application of environmental governance is the 
regulation of capitalist accumulation focusing on the institutional arrangement of state, market 
and civil society in relation to capitalism (Bridge & Perrault, 2009). The Most visible and 
similar issue is the proliferation in number and variety of political actors on environmental 
issues evidenced by the rapid and the diverse arenas in which politics is practiced with core 
questions of whose voices get heard and who makes decision as well as questions about right, 
obligations and responsibilities of political actors (Bridge & Perrault, 2009).  
 
Environmental governance has been conceptualized as a problematic of rule closely linked to 
the core concerns of regime theory. The problematic Bridge and Perreault argue emerged in 
the early 1990s as a way of thinking about relations between states in the absence of a clear 
hegemonic power through bargain-based co-operation. It aimed to overcome collective action 
challenges and produce socio-natural order (Bridge & Perrault, 2009). Much of the work in 
this area assume that addressing various international environmental crises requires an 




collaboration, recognition of multi-level/actors and hybridized environmental governance 
(Bulkeley, 2005, Reed & Bruyneel, 2010). 
 
Environmental governance as currently characterised has slightly influenced and improved 
governance process in the global north (Jordan et al., 2005; Piattoni, 2010). However, in most 
developing countries environmental governance is still characterised by integration problems 
and inadequate institutional capacities among others (Najam, 2005; Muller, 2007; Perreault, 
2009). The increasing social conflicts and unrest evident in developing countries can be traced 
to structurally defective and centralized governance system which results in deprivation, 
neglect, and poverty (Kjær, 2014). This system of governance and politics of exclusion 
heighten violent reactions, militancy among others (Akinola, 2010). Continuous innovative 
experiments with new hybrid and plurilateral forms of governance along with the 
incorporation of non-state actors are taking place in area of economic development and 
environmental protection. This involves multilevel, multi-scalar and multi-actor governance 
approaches particularly in neoliberal philosophy.  
 
Multilevel environmental governance is a compelling framework where the dispersion of 
decision-making regarding use of resources and management of the environment can be best 
explored and understood for better transformation (Jordan, 2001; Jessop, 2004; Bulkeley, 
2005; Paavola, 2008; Newig & Fristch, 2009). As applied in this study, multilevel 
environmental governance is conceptualized to examine what new roles are emerging for the 
state, how the non-state actors are responding to the changing ownership of a resource-based 
industry (Cement industry) and what implications the changes have on the roles and relations 




mainstreaming of the concept of governance in the management of environmental resources 
and environmental protection. In the next section, I review studies where environmental 
governance has been applied exclusively on environmental resources from multilevel 
perspectives.  
 
2.5 Studies on Multilevel Environmental Governance (MLEG) 
The concept of MLEG has been applied extensively in the analysis of environmental decision-
making in different contexts. Examples from climate change, waste management and natural 
resources management issues have shown that the focus of environmental governance has 
transcended the commonly accepted geographical and political boundaries (Adger et al., 
2005; Bulkeley, 2005; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). MLEG as a useful framework for analysing 
social and spatial relations in environmental resource use has manifested in three different 
dimensions (Bache & Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010) namely: 
1. Study of the reconfiguration of the central state and subnational governments in 
environmental regulation 
2. The study of the emergence of non-state actors and informal institutions in 
environmental resources development and environmental management sometimes 
parallel to the state and  
3. The study of the different collaborations, partnerships and interrelations between the 
formal and informal institutions for resource governance and environmental 
management.  
For example, Bulkeley and Betsill (2003) argue that the ‘urban’ governance of climate 




which challenge traditional distinctions between local, national and global environmental 
politics. Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) in their study of cities and multilevel governance of 
global climate change contend that it is only by taking a multilevel perspective that we can 
fully capture the social, political, and economic processes that shape global environmental 
governance. Similarly, Gustavsson, Elander, and Lundmark’s (2009) study of Multilevel 
governance, networking cities, and the geography of climate-change mitigation in Sweden 
resonate the works of Betsill and Bulkeley (2006). This shows that local level interventions 
should be part of global politics alongside supra-national negotiations, agreements and policy 
development (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Bulkeley et al., (2005) used a municipal waste case 
study to develop a conceptual framework based on an understanding of the multiple modes of 
governing through which policy is constructed and contested. They argue that the approach is 
much relevant for other areas of environmental policy and planning which have only partially 
engaged with broader debates about the changing nature of the state and governance. An 
analysis of waste governance in New Zealand by Davies (2009) also shows that the supra-
national actors are significantly influencing policies and governance at the local level. Other 
significant studies grounded in neoliberal governance to show the changing relations of state 
and society in resource governance have also contributed to the discourse of multilevel 
environmental governance immensely (Bridge, 2002; Robertson, 2004; Bakker, 2005; 
Perreault, 2005, 2006; McCarthy, 2006). These studies commonly exhibit how privatisation as 
neoliberal tool was used to express a ‘shift in social relations to the non-human world’ 




Johnson (2009) investigates how new governance policies and arrangements are being 
introduced to overcome problems associated with China’s sizable environmental protection 
‘implementation deficit’. The study focused on state agencies and their policies, civil society, 
incorporating environmental protection NGOs, citizen activists, and the media within China’s 
environmental state. As against implementation success, implementation deficit is the absence 
of willingness and capacity to put policy into practice successfully (Weale, 1992; Johnson, 
2009). Johnson contended that there are significant obstacles to the establishment of a more 
inclusive ‘governance’ approach to environmental protection in China that goes beyond Party-
state institutions and actors. A sense making study of E-waste governance in Malaysia by 
Tengku-Hamza (2011) shows that multiple levels perspective highlights the reducing control 
of the state actors at national level in decision-making but not weakening the state rather a 
‘redefinition of scope and scale of state activity and a reorganization of social relations 
between actors as avenue to possibly strengthen the state’s power.  
More recent studies have continued to explore resource issues using the Multilevel 
Governance perspectives. Minsuk (2013) investigates the California Marine Life Protection 
Act (MLPA) implementation process widely publicized as a successful case of a science-
based stakeholder-driven process through Public-Private Partnership. That is the interrelation 
of ‘the market’, ‘the people’ and ‘the state’. His findings suggest that finding the ‘right’ 
combination for the MLPA implementation process remains a difficult task, an indication of 
the complexity of resource governance particularly driven by stakeholders. His opinion of 
multilevel governance emphasized that state control of such projects is more pertinent with 




Bixler (2013) assessed bottom up evidence of transition from Community Forest Management 
to Polycentric Governance in British Columbia, Canada. The empirical evidence suggests that 
viewing community forestry through a polycentric governance network is necessary to 
theorize complex cross-scale dynamics. And that by incentivising policies, the development 
of polycentric systems for natural resource governance is encouraged to maintain local 
benefits while increasing adaptive capacity to deal with complex social–ecological challenges. 
Bebbington (2013) addresses institutional and political relationships that govern the 
interactions between natural resource extraction, economy and society focusing on the mining 
and hydrocarbon sectors. He admits that any effort to understand the governance of extraction 
and its relationships to development must be spatially and historically explicit. He suggests 
institutional arrangements under which resource extraction is more likely to foster inclusive 
development. 
Laing (2015) studied territory, resistance and struggles for the plurinational state in Bolivia. 
He developed an analytical framework for understanding the changing relations between the 
state and left-indigenous movements in Latin America. This he used to explore the ways in 
which a self-defined ‘indigenous movement’, and urban solidarity networks broadly 
associated with the ‘left’, re-articulated notions of territoriality, the nation-state, democracy 
and development during the Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) 
conflict in Bolivia. Also, Rodon and Therrien (2015) mapped the formal and informal powers 
and the interaction of the different regulatory institutions from the local to the federal level 
tasked with different resource governance responsibilities in the Canadian Arctic Region. 




Plan to Improve Northern Regulatory Regimes and assess how it impacts the MLG scene in 
the Canadian Arctic.  
In light of the burgeoning literature, the dispersion of governing authority from nation states 
and non-state actors and regional level in developed nations reflects the application of 
multiple level perspective of environmental governance in spatio-temporal contexts regarding 
a specific environmental issue. Similarly, multilevel perspective environmental governance 
has been adopted in developing countries of the world. However, it is still at the emergent 
stage particularly as it relates to privatization of nature-based industry which happens to be 
main economic hub of many third world nations (Hilson, 2014; Bebbington, 2013). My novel 
contribution will be to apply this framework to this under-researched and under-represented 
developing country context. 
 
Several countries in the global south are part of many international agreements such as 
Agenda21 among others. However available facts indicate that most developing countries are 
inherently combining their existing governance system mostly state-centric with the new 
forms of environmental governance of the global North (Campbell, 2008; Bebbington, 2013). 
This combination is contrary to the normative stance of neoliberal governance (Harvey, 
2005). It is expected that neoliberalism as philosophy, a policy discourse and a set of policy 
measures should ‘responsibilise’ and ‘autonomise’ more actors in decision-making apart from 
the central government (Castree, 2010).  
 
For example, Harashima (2000) in his work on environmental governance in selected Asian 




governance of the continent. He submitted that environmental governance in Asian countries 
have not developed satisfactorily at the national level. Also, Duffy (2006) examines the 
politics of environmental governance through networks of actors focusing on transnational 
networks and its effects in Madagascar specifically and developing world generally. Her 
findings indicate that the concept is a useful framework for understanding environmental 
politics in the developing world in general. And that complex network of actors has developed 
to carry out multilevel environmental governance at the national and international levels. The 
network of donors, international environmental NGOs along with the central government 
have redefined sovereignty to be neither exclusively national nor wholly global (Duffy, 2006). 
A related study by Agrawal and Chahtre (2007) on environmental co-governance in the Indian 
Himalayas suggests that close involvement of government officials is negatively associated 
with efforts to manage forests sustainably due to centrality of authority. They submit that 
decentralized, inclusive governance enables local actors to apply local environmental 
knowledge in local environmental decision-making.  
 
Multilevel environmental governance framework as evident above, allows the proactive 
analysis and understanding of environmental decision-making in any context of human-
environmental activity. The framework also encourages engaging in a mutually constitutive 
social relations analysis (Bulkeley, 2005). The shift from government to governance I have 
argued so far is strongly influencing development and environmental policies worldwide with 
little evidence in the developing countries. While acknowledging the adoption particularly in 
natural resource sector, empirical studies on the implication of the adoption in developing 




affected relations between and within state and society and what lessons for better state-
society relations? These among other questions prompted the adoption of the intellectual 
credential and compelling multilevel analytical strength of governance framework to make 
sense of the effects of privatization on social relations in the Nigerian cement industry.  
This section presents the empirical applications of the multilevel environmental governance 
framework in understanding resource governance and the significance of the framework to 
this study. The following section unpacks how the study engages the multilevel environmental 
governance framework in this study.   
 
2.6 Framing the application of MLEG to the neoliberal Nigerian cement industry 
Recalling the main issues discussed about governance in the preceding sections, the neoliberal 
inclination of governance as a concept and the multilevel characteristics constitute the 
‘intellectual credentials’ of governance (Bridge and Perrault, 2009). It is these credentials I 
intend to apply to frame the conceptual and analytical approach of this study. Governance is 
necessarily a multilevel, multi-actor and multimode in nature, therefore its conceptual and 
analytical application should recognise its multi-scalar nature (Piattoni, 2010). Considering 
the above, I have adopted Piattoni’s (2009, 2010) MLG conceptual and analytical space. 
MLG as a concept connects different analytical planes and raises different types of questions 
(Piattoni, 2010, p. 26). As elaborated further by Piattoni, MLG must first be understood to be 
connected by territorial levels such as the supranational, national and subnational and these 
levels command certain degree of authority. She argued that the need to study both the 
empirical and normative implications of these levels is because of the challenges of asserting 




normative questions that the development of the framework can help address. Following the 
adoption of Piattoni’s conceptual space in this study, I will briefly discuss how the events in 
the Nigerian cement industry in recent past triggered one or more of the elements of 
neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Castree, 2011). I will also identify the governance process in the 
sector using the typology of resource governance (Van Alstine et al., 2014) to identify the 
dimensions of relations, and then identify the governance stakeholders involved in the 
dimensions in the sector. Having done that, I apply the conceptual and analytical space 
framework to the study at the instance of multilevel environmental governance. 
Bridge and Perrault (2009) identify the two broad areas of enquiry in geographical research 
which environmental governance has manifested as an analytical framework as neoliberal 
modes of environmental governance and eco-governmentality. Neoliberalism is a political and 
economic project that seeks to liberalise trade through processes such as privatization and 
introduce market oriented management practices as well as social relations (Jessop, 2002; 
Castree, 2008; Bridge & Perreault, 2009). Castree (2010, p. 8) admits that neoliberalism 
‘signifies a range of related meanings that can be applied to a plethora of real-world 
referents’. He (2010, pp.8-9) contends that neoliberalism summarily denotes one or more of 
the following: 
1. As a worldview- body of normative principles, goal, and aspirations amounting to a 
philosophy of life  
2. A policy discourse- a set of specific values, norms, ambitions and associated policy 
proposals professed by those who control, or realistically seek to control the formal 




3. As a set of policy measures- concrete regulations and procedures that make both the 
worldview and the policy discourse evident in some tangible way. 
These views, Castree describes as philosophy, program and policy (three Ps), explain the 
various ways by which social relations between state and non-state actors have changed in 
recent time. 
Neoliberal environmental governance essentially is a fundamental shift towards private sector 
and civil society norms and institutions competition, markets and efficiency indicators. 
Geographers' interest in neoliberal environmental governance has been attributed to the multi-
scalar politics and institutional processes embedded in neoliberal policies to focus on the 
putative shift in actors and spaces of decision-making (Liverman, 2004; Bridge & Perrault, 
2009). The neoliberal processes as employed in neoliberal environmental governance 
facilitate the necessity of activist state rather than neoliberal conceit of self-regulating markets 
(Bridge & Perrault, 2009). Studies on Neoliberal environmental governance focus on the 
implications of privatization and commercialization of properties while considering the scale 
re-creation and restructuring through resource user group, environmental non-governmental 
organizations, among other interest groups.   
On the contrary, while neoliberal environmental governance emphasizes shift in structure of 
governance, Eco-governmentality focuses on rationality of government as an analytical and 
historical problem through which governable subjects and objects are produced. Eco-
governmentality draws its root from Foucauldian understanding of government to analyse the 
micro-politics of power, discipline and subject formation in relation to the administration of 




government have come to centre on environmental phenomena through calculative procedure 
and practice of codification (Bridge & Perrault, 2009). Many studies in the area of eco-
governmentality by geographers were conducted in the mid-1990s as reflected in the works of 
Rutherford, 1994; Darrier, 1996 and Agrawal, 2005 and Goldman, 2005 (discussed explicitly 
in Bridge & Perrault, 2009). These studies reflect among others how geographers have re-
tooled Foucault’s concept of “bio-power”. The concept was used to express the ways in which 
discourses about strategies toward the management of biological, ecological and 
biogeochemical processes are a key part of how social order is produced and maintained 
(Rutherford, 1994; Darrier, 1996). Governmentality as employed here focuses more explicitly 
on the mechanisms of power and the specific question of how people and things have been 
aligned in ways that enable their administration and rule (Bridge & Perrault, 2009).  
By inference, studies on eco-governmentality have been more state-centric emphasizing 
power-knowledge nexus as to how power is exercised over, within and through nature. Major 
examples include technical/hard management structures such as conservation, environmental 
impact assessment as well as environmental audits. Neoliberal environmental governance on 
the other hand takes more holistic approach to understanding power shift and relations for 
governance of an environmental issue (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). I have employed the 
MLEG framework to explore how neoliberal environmental governance and environmental 
governmentality as two overlapping areas have developed in a bid to foster sustainable 
development particularly in the Nigerian cement industry.  
In the last 17 years neoliberalisation processes have impacted on the economic development 




Nigerian cement industry, the eco-governmentality coupled with the normative political roles 
associated with neoliberal policies has also affected environmental regulation in the sector. It 
is therefore acknowledged that the Nigerian cement industry transition demonstrate the 
practice of neoliberalism as a set of policy measures. The multilevel environmental 
governance (MLEG) approach is a suitable analytical framework to assess the neoliberal 
governance characteristics emerging in the sector.  
Multilevel governance framework as applied to the Nigerian cement industry can improve our 
academic insights on the different levels, scales and systems of governance in which 
economic, social and political processes interact (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Nugent, 2003; 
Piattoni, 2009, 2010; Hooghe & Marks 2001). It is also useful in illuminating transition and 
the management of transitions for sustainable development (Kemps et al., 2007; Loorbach, 
2010) especially when focusing attention on the qualitative dimension of transition for well-
functioning markets and effective regulations rather than the quantitative dimension (Adger et 
al., 2003; Besley et al., 2010). As introduced earlier in the chapter, the two types of multilevel 
governance identified by Hooghe and Marks (2003) include Type I, an approach which 
focuses on the ways in which competences and authority are shared between different levels 
of government (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; 
Piattoni, 2010). And Type II, a polycentric model with multiple overlapping and 
interconnected horizontal spheres of authority involved in governing issues (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2003; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003).  
The application of multilevel environmental governance framework in this study involves 




construction and contestations of spheres of governance in the neoliberal Nigerian cement 
industry. The Nigerian cement industry as an extractive sector is recognised as mutually 
constitutive of scale (Territorial and functional) and multilevel/actors (Networks) helpful in 
socio-spatial learning of governance relations (Bulkeley, 2005; Reed & Bruyneel, 2010). 
Multilevel environmental governance is employed to frame the analysis of natural resource 
governance in Nigeria as affected by the privatization policy. The multilevel governance 
framework provides a good starting point to explore and understand how the central state has 
nested authority with power to effect policy change (Hooghe and Marks, 2003), sub-national 
governments and non-state actors relate in a neoliberal policy setting either across levels or 
within levels. The framework provides the flexibility to understand relationships forged 
between private and public actors in a neoliberal setting. The MLEG framework allows for an 
approach by which the multi-actor roles and relations are coordinated to influence policy 
practice (Piattoni, 2009). The application of the MLEG framework to the cement sector 
suggests that because of the scale and context, relationships in the cement industry span 
multilevel governance involving configurations and symbolic actors which need to be 
explored (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003). 
Having considered MLEG as the conceptual and analytical frame of this study, my study 
objectives include understanding: 
● the reconfiguration of the state and subnational government roles in environmental 
regulation of resource-based industry,  




● The relations between and within both group of actors.  
Engaging multilevel environmental governance framework to explore the above objective is 
important to better understand environmental resource policy in resource-rich developing 
countries context. It will also contribute to state-business-society relations by mapping out 
spaces of multilevel governance in the sector and implications for sustainable development in 
developing countries in a neoliberal context. 
Governance typology and stakeholders in the Nigerian cement industry 
As it becomes pertinent to explore emergent arena of roles and relations of state and non-state 
actors in environmental governance within the growing Nigerian cement sector, multi-scale 
and multi-actor spatial structure is implicit to achieve this aim in the above context. The 
resource governance typology which identifies the mandatory and voluntary channels and 
scales through which resource extraction may be governed (Van Alstine et al., 2014) is 





State/non-state actors Mandatory Voluntary 
International EIA/IFC EITI/CSI 
National  EIA/EA/CDA Voluntary initiatives/projects/ NEITI 
State   EIA/EA/CDA Voluntary initiatives/partnership projects 
Local                        EIA/EA/CDA Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Figure 2.1: A resource governance typology for the Nigerian cement sector (Van Alstine et 
al., 2014)  
Key: CDA: Community Development Agreement, CSI: Cement Suntainability Initiatives, 
CSR: Corporate social responsibility, EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment, Environmental 
Audit, EITI: Extractive industry Transparency Initiatives, IFC: International finance 
corporation, NEITI: Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
Relating the governance typology above to the multilevel environmental governance 
framework adopted in this study, two different dimensions of action and influence that 
warrant attention emerge- the vertical and the horizontal dimensions. In these dimensions, two 
sets of actors are inherent- territorial and functional interest actors (Piattoni, 2009).  
The trend of neoliberalisation which is now apparent with the presence of a variety of 
different actors that was not there in the past. New government agencies/parastatals have 





indigenous company/investors have taken new economic roles devolved by the central 
government. Normatively civil society organizations have increased in number with varying 
interests as stakeholders, community development associations, local and international non-
governmental organizations are major examples here. Everyone is taking up roles as 
concerned citizens or local stakeholders affected by the activities of the new governance 
actors. These different actors’ roles and relationships towards the goal of environmental 
governance require a multilevel analysis. The actors identified as participant to gain insights 
into what roles and relational networks are emerging on the precept of neoliberal policy for 
environmental governance in the Nigerian cement industry is shown in Figure 2.2 below. 
The vertical dimension of multilevel governance recognizes that the central state cannot 
effectively implement National Environmental policy without the sub-national governments. 
Also, sub-national governments and local governments cannot effectively operate outside the 
national policy set by the central government. Sub-national government action is directed by 
legal and institutional frameworks at higher scales (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). In the case of 
the extractive industry in Nigeria, the industry by nature is connected to remote but sensitive 
environments of various sub-national governments but usually guided by the national 
development policies and priorities made by the central government as the nested authority 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2010). This means that a two-way relationship between 
central and sub-national government exists which have significant implications on policy 
implementation. Cordial and improved coordination between levels of government in the 




changing roles and relations will give insight to the state of practice of neoliberalism either as 
a program for sustainable development or a patch work (Haque, 1999).  
The horizontal dimension emphasizes the multilevel patterns of governance of both local and 
transnational networks on environmental policy and governance where actors relate across 
organizational boundaries to influence outcomes. Within the MLG framework, horizontal 
coordination may occur at national level-within ministries or countries, at the sub-national 
levels within ministries and departments as well as between state and non-state actors. It may 
be between cement manufacturers, NGOs, Civil societies, hosting communities among others 
at different scales. All these actors hold unique potentials to work closely with each other to 
address socio-economic and environmental issues in the sector. The need to understand the 
implications of privatization on the design and implementation of environmental policy in the 
cement sector using the MLG framework will go a long way in promoting 'what works' as 
there is 'no one cap fits all' governance approach. It will also contribute to the growing 
literature on neoliberal environmental governance from environmental geography perspective. 
Within the framework, sector scale actions on environmental resource policy implementation 
is considered to focus on the questions of how governance has been reconfigured by the 






Figure 2.2: Actors Involved in Nigeria’s cement industry governance (Source: Author) 
So far, I have identified a typology of resource governance and relate same to the Nigerian 
cement industry to identify key governance actors and stakeholders that could be involved in 
the governance of the Nigerian cement industry in a neoliberal context. The clarification of 
the multidimensional nature of MLG above is applied to make sense of neoliberal governance 
through nature in the Nigerian cement industry (Figure 2.3). Applying Piattoni’s (2010) 
analytical space framework to the Nigerian cement industry will illuminate the understanding 
of governance through nature spatially and historically (Bebbington, 2013). Using the 
example of the EU, Piattoni states that exploring and testing multilevel governance relations 












2.7 Conclusion  
Evidently, the governance perspective has drawn attention to the increasingly changing 
condition of ordered rules and new ways of state-society steering which have led to parallel 
actions to that of traditional institutions of government. The intellectual credentials of 
governance have proved significantly important in development-environment studies in recent 
past. The pluralist and flexible characteristics of the governance approach such as multiple 
scales, actors and modes have significantly aided social learning and understanding of 
development and environmental issues from different perspectives. This review attests to the 
intellectual credentials of governance which provide insights on the variety of mechanisms by 
which governance actions can take place either as formal or informal. The multilevel 
environmental governance concept has become a framework useful to understand the 
dynamism of government and governance actors’ interrelations both within and between 
scales. 
 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the emergence of the concept of governance and how it has 
become a useful term drawn upon to understand state-society relations. I have also explored 
its empirical application in environmental geography to understand and explain the power 
devolution and relations between and within state, business and society. This aim was attained 
by reviewing the historical evolution of governance concept considering the reasons for its 
emergence, and pioneer contributors to the governance discourse. Further from the above, I 
explored the multilevel perspectives of the governance concept with specific reference to 
Hooghe and Marks seminal studies of the new territorial policy structures in the European 




the concept intellectually flexible and robust, as well as the types of governance along with 
the criticisms of the concept. Thereafter, I reviewed extensively the application of governance 
approach to environmental studies from multilevel perspectives. Obviously, there have been 
dispersions of authority from between state actors and from state to non-state actors over time. 
The multilevel perspectives of governance have also been applied both in the global north and 
south to explore environmental issues and the emerging spaces of multilevel governance. 
Thus, MLEG can be used to explore the emergent spaces of contestation in the Nigerian 
cement industry as it relates to governance for sustainable development.  
 
A multilevel perspective on governance brings to fore the indistinct political boundaries 
apparent in development and environmental governance. The governance of environmental 
resources in this case is made more explicit by adopting the multi-level approach because 
issues regarding environmental resources transcend political boundaries. The issue of 
environmental resources development and governance is multi-actor in nature and as such can 
benefit from the application of the multilevel governance perspective. Therefore, the study of 
policy reforms in the Nigerian mining sector is arguably incomplete without considering other 
levels of government and the legal roles they play in the process. Similarly, the multi-actor 
perspective provides the platform for consideration of non-state actors as important 
governance actors aside from the state actors. Also, multiple modes of governance will 
facilitate an understanding of the various mechanisms used in governance as well as the actors 
in the processes. Therefore, based on the above literature, I have found multilevel 
environmental governance suitable to conceptualise, analysis and understand state-society 




light of that I have situated the Nigerian non-oil industry transformation in the context of 
neoliberal reforms; I also identified the processes indicating the dimensions of multilevel 
relations. After that, I identified the state and non-state actors that could be involved in the 
processes identified. Having done that, I then explained the conceptual and analytical space of 
multilevel governance adopted to frame the application of multilevel environmental 
governance in the study. In the next chapter, I explicitly discuss the historical dynamics of the 
development of the Nigerian non-oil extractive industry to situate the sector in a neoliberal 
transition context. I also illuminate the context at which the Nigerian cement industry 



























THE DYNAMICS OF NIGERIA’S NON-OIL EXTRACTIVE SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW ON THE CEMENT SECTOR 
 
3.1 Introduction 
According to Peet and Hartwick (2009, p.1) development is the founding belief of the modern 
world. This according to Perreault (2009) connotes progress, modernity and democratic 
values, and at the same time carries the aspirations of the poor and the designs of corporate 
elites. Development as a concept is invariably used either at the scale of societies, nation state 
and regional economies (Perreault, 2009) or to denote specific practices at the scale of the 
local and the personal (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Perreault, 2009). Often these practices arise 
from public policy projects that have important environmental implications (Perreault, 2009). 
This chapter articulates how transitions in the Nigerian non-oil extractive industry tick the 
boxes of the above submissions through neoliberal processes and situate the Nigerian cement 
industry at the instance of multilevel environmental governance. This is to chart the necessary 
historical and temporal background of the sector to enhance the needed understanding of past 
efforts toward natural resources governance at the instance of multilevel governance in a 
neoliberal context (Bebbington, 2013). To achieve this, the chapter begins with a review of 
Nigeria’s development planning in history as it affects the extractive industry and the multi-
functionality of the environment (Paavola, 2008). This is followed by an attempt to explain 
how the country’s development approaches might have led to reconfiguration and the 
dispersion of authority (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). First, from the central government to 
subnational governments, then from state actors to non-state actors and informal institutions 




The chapter is in five sections, section 3.1 is the introduction. Section 3.2 discusses the history 
of regional and economic development plans in Nigeria and the evolution of the Nigerian 
non-oil extractive sector (NNOES). Section 3.3 focuses on the Nigerian cement industry, it 
discusses the socio-economic and environmental implications of the industry in the country. 
Section 3.4 reviews the legal and regulatory framework for the sector and its multilevel 
governance perspectives- that is how it involves the multiple scales and actors within and 
beyond the state. The section discusses how the reforms in the Nigerian cement sector sets out 
the multilevel governance scenario requiring the need for this study. Conclusions are 
presented in section 3.5 where I reprise the social and spatial perspectives of relations inherent 
in this primary industrial sector in Nigeria. 
3.2 Nigeria’s Development Planning experience  
In the history of Nigeria, regional and economic development planning experience predates 
the country’s independence (Ojo, 2012; Marcellus, 2009). Considering the pre-independence 
period and other times when no actual plan documents existed due to socio-political upheaval 
and economic crisis, the Nigerian development planning experience has been into four broad 
phases (Marcellus, 2009). The eras namely Colonial Era, the Era of Fixed-Term planning 
(1962-85), the Era of Rolling Plans (1990-1998), and the New Democratic Dispensation 
(1999 onwards) are adopted in this study to highlight how political instability bred poor 







Colonial Era development plan (1946-1960) 
The first development plan ever made was a 10-year plan prepared in 1946 till 1956, however, 
due to the introduction of the federal structure in 1954, the plan was revised (Ojo, 2012). This 
led to a new development plan to last for four years 1951-1956 but by 1953, another plan was 
made which resulted to the 1955-1960 economic programmes. This was claimed to have been 
recommended by the World Bank economic mission invited by the then colonial 
administrators (Ojo, 2012). The plan was noted for its focus on the need of the colonial 
masters rather than the needs of the Nigerian people. The plan failed to include the public 
whose livelihood would be affected in the planning process as the plan’s objectives were not 
properly defined (Ojo, 2012).  The national economic development plan concentrated on a 
limited range of cash crops such as cocoa, palm products, cotton, groundnut and timber (Moti, 
2012). The focus on the development of transport and communication system at that time was 
mainly to serve the interest of the colonial masters rather than that of the colony (Moti, 2012).  
 
The Era of Fixed- Term Planning (1962-85) 
This era marks the beginning of independence and the plans at the period were made by 
Nigerians rather than the colonial masters. Unlike the pre-independence plans, one would 
expect plans that are truly committed to the development of the Nigerian state. True to the 
above expectation, four comprehensive national development plans were conceived and 
formulated within the framework of improved national accounts (Moti, 2012). These include:  
● First National Development Plan (1962-1968),  




● The Third National Development Plan (1975-1980) and  
● the Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985)  
The plans covered the operations of both the public and private sectors of the economy and 
many well-articulated overall economic targets (Moti, 2012). At that time, it was reported that 
the focus of each plan and objectives had far-reaching effects on the nation’s development 
(Marcellus, 2009). This was so because the concept of development planning was a common 
planning tool for social, economic and sustainable development in Nigeria (Marcellus, 2009; 
Ojo, 2012). 
 
The First National Development Plan launched in April 1962 covered a period of six years 
(1962-68). However, the execution of the plan was disrupted by the military coup in 1966 and 
the 1967-70 civil wars. Irrespective of these disruptions, landmark achievements were 
recorded during that period (Ojo, 2012). Some of the notable achievements during this period 
include the construction of Oil Refinery in Port Harcourt, Rivers state, Nigeria; The Paper 
Mill; The Sugar Mill; The Niger Dam; The Niger Bridge; Extension of Ports and the 
construction of trunk ‘A’ roads. Also, five first generation universities were established across 
the country by the federal government and regional governments during this period.  
The achievement made so far was made possible by the existence of a development blueprint 
which provided guidelines for meaningful and co-coordinated development during the plan 
period (Moti, 2012).  
 
As a post-war development plan, the Second National Development Plan was launched in 
1970 (Moti, 2012). The plan focused on the reconstruction of a war-battered economy and the 




Development Plan also made remarkable social and economic impacts across the country. 
Some of these include construction of many federal roads; the successful inauguration of the 
National Youth Service Corps Scheme; the introduction of federal scholarship and loan 
schemes for Nigerian students among others (Moti, 2012). 
 
The Third National Development Plan covered a five-year period starting from April 1975 to 
March 1980. The cardinal objectives of the plan at that time was to increase Per capital 
income during the plan period, promote more even distribution of income, reduce the level of 
unemployment, diversify the economy and enhance balanced development through 
indigenization of economic activities (Marcellus, 2009; Ojo, 2012).  
 
Because of the focus of the plan, it was described as a watershed in the evolution of economic 
planning in Nigeria. This is so because the plan involved extensive consultation with the 
private sector of the economy in the course of its preparation. It was also revealed that priority 
was given to the multi-functionality of development (Olaniyi, 1998). However, the plan was 
short-lived as it was disrupted by the military coup of 1975 barely three months after its 
launch (Moti, 2012). 
 
Unlike the other plans since independence, the Fourth National Development Plan, (1981-85) 
launched in 1981 was the first plan to be formulated by a democratically elected government 
(Moti, 2012).  The plan was intended to further the process of establishing a solid base for the 
long-term economic and social development of Nigeria (Ogunjimi, 1997; Moti, 2012). The 




government in 1983 and 1985 respectively (Moti, 2012). This seriously disrupted the 
implementation of the plan and the economy during that period.  
 
The Era of Rolling Plans (1990-1998) 
By 1986, the failure of third and fourth plans was apparent with huge external debts accrued 
during this period (Marcellus, 2009; Ojo, 2012; Moti, 2012). The debts were accrued by 
successive governments mainly because of the failed plans and the practice of a 
developmental state (Mkandawire, 2001; Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006; Amuwo, 2008). The 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced as an economic emergency 
programme (Kieh, 2015). SAP, meant to reform the economy and clear the huge external 
debts began as a ‘reform therapy’ from the Word Bank and International Monetary fund 
(IMF) (Mkandawire, 2001; Marcellus, 2009). SAP is a policy-based planning system with 
emphasis on private-sector-led economy (Mkandawire, 2001; Kieh, 2015) rather than the 
prevailing public sector-led philosophy that inspired previous plans (Moti, 2012). SAP 
presented an opportunity for revaluating the country’s planning system (Moti, 2012). Because 
the fixed medium term planning system seems to have failed, rolling plans where annual 
budgets will derive their medium and short term programmes were introduced. This led to the 
first rolling plan, a 20-year perspective plan for the period 1989-2008. In the same way that 
the tradition of five-year development plan was jettisoned by the military administration of 
General Ibrahim Babangida, the idea of rolling plan was also shelved in 1996 by General Sani 
Abacha. General Abacha then introduced another plan tagged ‘Vision 2010’ (Moti, 2012) on 




citizens through systematic improvement in the quality of life of Nigerians in fourteen years 
(Moti, 2012). The rolling plan also suffered a usual setback like many other plans- the death 
of the military dictator. The era of rolling plan lasted between 1990 and 1998.  
 
After a year of transition, a new democratic dispensation began in the country in 1999. 
However, the introduction of structural adjustment programmes marked the beginning of 
transition to neoliberal development practices which was a global norm at that period 
(Mkandawire, 2001; Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006; Ekanade, 2014). The main instrument of 
the programme was free market economic policies such as privatization and 
commercialization of the state-owned enterprises (Harvey, 2005; Castree, 2011). While 
Nigeria embraced neoliberal policies in the 1980s (Ekanade, 2014), the country also 
witnessed heightened environmental concerns during this period (Adegoroye, 1994; 
Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006). These two social and economic development issues brought a 
strong tide of reforms to governance in Nigeria. Successive governments in Nigeria have 
continued to reconfigure social and economic relations to reflect neoliberal policy measures 
and devolved regulatory approaches in recent past. This has significantly impacted the 
transformation of the Nigerian cement industry. 
 
The New Democratic Dispensation (1999 onwards) 
Nigeria witnessed the much-desired transition to democratic governance in May 1999 when 
the military handed over to a democratically elected government. Since then, the era of 
democratic government - often referred to as a basic requirement of good governance - began 




administration started development planning in 1999 on a clean slate with the initiation of a 
four-year medium-term plan document, the National Economic Direction (1999-2003). The 
plan had the aim of developing a strong, virile and broad-based economy. The plan was also 
aimed to adequately absorb externally generated shocks following the already laid down 
structural adjustment programmes (Moti, 2012). Since 1999 to date, several development 
plans and visions have been launched all in a bid to harness Nigeria’s human and natural 
resources sustainably. Despite 18 years of democratic governance, sustainable livelihood is 
still elusive in Nigeria (Olu-Adeyemi, 2012). Nigeria possesses the ‘five capitals of 
sustainable livelihood’ (Scoones, 1998) but fails to sincerely use for the development of the 
country. Privatization objectives of the 1980s began to manifest during the new democratic 
dispensation. Thus, leading to the privatization of key industries earlier owned in full or 
jointly by the government. One of the major industries that were privatised was the Nigerian 
cement sector, a major non-oil extractive industry (Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006). The 
Nigerian cement sector has grown to be a major economic force over the last 17 years.  
 
This section shows that development plans in Nigeria predates the country’s independence, 
economic plans has begun early enough to become a norm for sustainable development in the 
country. But it was also revealed that the problem of economic development in Nigeria is not 
the development plan itself. Rather the main obstacle to development in Nigeria has been 
political and governmental instability which has led to poor planning. The country has been 
under military rule more than democratic government since independence which greatly 
hampered continuity of economic development plans implementation. Over the almost 




economy the country depended heavily on crude oil to the detriment of other sectors. The 
over-dependence on oil and gas has significantly hampered the country’s economic 
development and growth (Marcellus, 2009). Despite the forced shift to policy-based system of 
neoliberalism in the 1980s, development policies have not done better than the developmental 
policies approach (Amuwo, 2008; Ekanade, 2014).  
 
The implementation of neoliberal oriented structural adjustment programme in Nigeria by 
successive governments as revealed above has led to the privatisation of the Nigerian cement 
industry. The Nigerian cement industry has since grown impacting the social, economic and 
environmental landscapes of the country. It is therefore argued that for effective and 
sustainable resource development, the principle of social equity needs to be adhered to 
strictly. It is then important to understand how the political stability or otherwise over the 
years transforms the institutional and political relationships governing the interaction between 
resource extraction, economy and society (ESID, 2014). This is deemed necessary to prevent 
the mistakes of the past such as in the Niger Delta region that can further aggravate the 
stability and unity of the country already being witnessed because of the past governance 
failures. In the next section, the transition in the non-oil extractive sector of the country 
situating the reforms in the sector in a neoliberal context and at the instance of multilevel 
governance is elaborated.  
 
3.3 History of non-oil mineral resources development in Nigeria  
Nigeria is endowed with numerous mineral resources; the process of development of these 
resources and how the impacts are managed has been subject of major concerns (Gotan, 2004; 




minerals have been identified in over 500 regions in Nigeria (VenmynDeloitte, 2015; 
Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016). With proper planning and development, mineral-rich regions 
can be sustainably developed to meet their socio-economic needs. Metallic minerals found in 
Nigeria include iron ore, gold, tantalite and tin. Major non-metallic minerals include 
limestone, marble, barite among others. Tin ore was the earliest recorded mineral mined in 
Nigeria in 1902 (Usman, 2001; Ladan, 2014; Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016). Mining has been 
a significant driver of economic development in Nigeria (Chindo, 2011). For example, Coal 
mining gave birth to the railway industry while the first power plant in the country was 
established during tin ore mining and processing. The discovery of iron ore was reported to 
have led to the establishment of steel plants and steel rolling mills in the country (Nigeria’s 
mining sector, 2016). 
 
Nigeria’s mining industry has witnessed several stages of development from traditional 
mining during which there were no policies or legislation governing the industry (the so-
called ‘Pre-colonial era’) to the colonial period marked by proper documentation of all mining 
activities in the country (Gyang, Nanle & Chollom, 2010; Filani, 2014). According to Gyang, 
Nanle and Chollom, (2010) the post-colonial era witnessed various government policies and 
programmes on the mineral sector as well as increasing instability. The advent of petroleum at 
that time brought about a drastic shift in labour and government attention from the solid 
mineral industry and agriculture to the petroleum industry (Gyang, Nanle & Chollom, 2010). 
This led to a rapid decline in the mineral industry up to 1980s and 1990s when the industry 












Table 3.1: Mineral resources in Nigeria by state 
States name                                          Mineral Deposits 
Abia Glass Sand, limestone, Salt, Shale, Ball Clay, Granite, Galena, marble, 
laterite, bentonite, phosphate, kaolin, pyrite, feldspar, petroleum, lignite, gypsum, sphalerite, clay 
Adamawa  Granite, clay, gypsum, limestone, uranium, kaolin, coal, trona, 
barite salt, marble, magnesite, laterite 
Akwa Ibom Clay, glass sand, salt, silica sand, granite, coal, petroleum, Natural Gas, Kaolin, limestone, lignite 
Anambra clay, iron Stone, Natural Gas, petroleum, sand stone, Kaolin, pyrite,lignite 
Bauchi  kaolin, Trona, gypsum, cassiterite, mica, clay, tantalite, galena, iron 
ore, gemstone, sphalerite, silica sand, Barite, columbite, Zinc, Lead, Muscovite, 
Quartz, Tin, glass sand, monazite, Feldspar, Graphite, Wolfram, Coal, Agate, Tantalum, Rutile, 
Tungsten, Copper, Talc, Limenite, Zircon 
Bayelsa  salt, petroleum, Natural gas, Silica Sand, Bentonite, crude Salt, 
petroleum, limestone, glass sand 
Benue Gemstone, Barites, Feldspar, Marble, Mica, silica Sand, quartz, Galena, 
lead, zinc ore, silica sand, clay, crushed and dimension stone, fluorspar, wolframite, 
bauxite, shale, magnetie, Limenite, Brenite 
Borno  Silica Sand, Natural Salt, sapphire, topaz, mica, quartz, gypsum, 
uranium, iron ore, megnesite, fedspar, Granite Aquamarine, Nepheline, Limestone, 
Kaolin, bentonite, laterite, Refractory Clay, Trona, Gold, Tin, Potash 
CrossRiver Salt Limestone, Coal, Manganese, Mica, Limenite, Gold, Quartz, Glass sand, tourmaline, petroleum, 
Natural Gas, Kaolin, Tin ore, Sharp Sand, spring water, salt deposit, Talc, Granite, Galena, Lead, 
Zinc, Muscovite, Uranium, Barite 
Delta Kaolin, Lateritic Clay, Gravel, Silica Sand, Natural Gas, Petroleum, Ball Clay, Bauxite, Granite, River 
Sand, Clay, Spring Water 
Ebonyi Lead, Zinc ore, Salt, Limestone, Ball Clay, Refractory Clay, Gypsum,Granite 
Edo Chamockite, Copper, Gold, Marble,Granite,Gypsium,Petroleum,Dorite,Lignite,Limestone,Ceramic 
Clay 
Ekiti Clay, Chamockite, Quartz, Lignite, Limestone, Granite, 
Gemstone,Bauxite,Cassiterite,Columbite,Tantalite,Feldspar,Kaolin 
Enugu Laterite Clay, Crude oil, kaolinitic clay, iron ore, glass sand, petroleum, 
Imo Crude oil, Shale, Natural Gas, Kaolin, Laterite Sand, Limestone, Salt, Marble 
 
Jigawa Glass Sand, Granite, Laterite Clay, Silica, Kaolin, Iron 
Ore, Quartz, Potash, Talc, Limenite, Gemstone, Columbite 
Kaduna Muscovite,Granite,Gold,Manganese,Clay,Graphite,Sand,Zircon,Kyanite,Tin 
Ore, Limenite, Gemstone, Columbite 
Kano Clay, Laterite, Cassiterite, Columbite, llmenite Galena, Phyrochlorite, Kaoline, Gemstone, Silica, Tin 




Kastina Gold, Manganese, Lateritic Clay,Feldspar, Black Tourmaline, Amethyst, Quartz, Kaolin, Mica, Gypsu
m,Silimanite, Clay, Granite, Sand, Uranium Asbestos, Tourmalin, Serpentine (Chresolite 
Asbestos), Chromites, Limenite, diamond, graphite, Iron Ore, Potash, Silica Sand 
Kebbi Salt, Iron Ore, Gold, Feldspar, Limestone, Quartz, Bauxitic Clay, Manganese, Kaolin, Mica. 
Kogi Clay, Iron Ore, Gemstone, Marble, Limestone, Feldspar, Dolomite, Phosphate, Mica, Cassiterite, 
Granite, Ornamental Stone, Coal, Kaolin 
Kwara Clay, Kaolin, Silica Sand, Quartz, Dolomite, Marble, Feldspar, Gold, Tantalite, Cassiterite, Granite, 
Limestone 
Lagos Silica Sand, Bitumen, Sharp Sand, Gravel, Petroleum, Laterite 
Nassarawa  Cassiterite, Gemstone, Amethyst, Beryl, Chrysolite, Emerald, Garnet, Sapphire, Topaz, Barites, 
Galena, Monazite, Zircon, Glass sand, Coal 
Niger Bell Clay, kaolin, limestone, Granite, Glass Sand, iron ore, red clay, feldspar, silica sand, Quartz, 
Asbestos, marble, Talc, Gemstone 
Ogun kaolin, Feldspar, Silica sand, Mica, Granite, Clay, phosphate, gypsum, limestone, quartz, Tar sand 
Ondo Marble, Gold, Gemstone, Diorite, lignite, Bitumen 
Osun Clay, Granite, Talc, Dolomite, Feldspar, Quartz, Limestone, Mica 
Oyo Clay, Feldspar, Granite, Limonite, iron ore, Kaolin, Quartz, Talc, Marble, Dolomite, Tourmaline, 
Aquamarine, Amethyst 
Plateau Monazite, columbite, Feldspar, Clay, Cassiterite, Gemstone, Kaolin, Dolomite, Mica, Zircon, Marble, 
Limonite, Barite, Quartz, Talc, Galena 
Rivers Petroleum, Natural gas, Silica sand, Glass sand, clay 
Gombe Graphite, Kaolin, Limestone, Silica sand, Uranium, Coal, Halites, Clay, Gypsum, Diatomite, Granite. 
Taraba Flurspar, Gamet, Tourmaline, Sapphire, Zicron, Tantalite, Columbite, Cassiterite, barite, Gelena, 
Limestone, Laterite, calcite, Bentonitic clay 
Yobe Salt, Trona, diatomite, clay, gypsum, kaolin silica sand, limestone, Epsomite, iron ore, shale, uranium, 
granite, bentonic Clay 
Zamfara Gold, Alluvia Gold, Granite, Chromites, chamorckite, clay, Feldspar, spring water 
FCT, Abuja  Limestone, Kaolin, granite, marble, feldspar, mica, dolomite, clay, sand, talc 
Sources: F.O. Akinrele (2012), Nigeria’s mining sector (2016)   
 
Recognizing the viability of the solid mineral industry, the federal government established 
Nigeria Mining Corporation (NMC) in 1973 but due to the dominance of the petroleum 
products, Nigeria Mining Corporation could not achieve much (Gyang, Nanle & Chollom, 
2010). Further from this, the Federal Ministry of solid minerals development was created in 
1995 to tap into the abundant solid mineral resources endowment and reverse the over-




Steel development. New policy brief was also put in place to attract investment to the sector. 
Gyang, Nanle and Chollom, (2010) highlight some of the problems bedevilling the Nigerian 
mining industry as follows  
● policy inconsistency and lack of adequate legislation 
● high risk and health hazards,  
● weak regulation, lack of well-equipped laboratories 
● unwholesome practices of stakeholders and  
● inadequate number of trained personnel,  
● access to capital, lack of appropriate technology and machinery, and  
● Environmental degradation and pollution. 
 
The development of the mining sector has been a major focus of successive governments 
since the country returned to democracy in 1999. In a bid to reform the sector, the Nigerian 
Minerals and Mining Act was enacted by the National Assembly in 2007. By 2008 another 
policy brief, the National Minerals and Metals Policy was launched. Three years later, a new 
legislative framework to drive the development of Nigeria’s Mining sector was further 
launched. The 2011 Regulation seems to meet the yearnings and aspirations of all 
stakeholders, prospective indigenous and foreign investors because it reflects the impacts of 
wider consultations (Ladan, 2014; Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016). To further attract foreign 
and private investors to the sector, neoliberal policy measures were introduced (Akinrele, 
2012; VenmynDeloitte, 2015). These include privatization and liberalization of the sector; 
introduction of tax incentives such as reduction of Companies Profits Tax from 35% to 30%; 




from 20% and 10% to 30% and 20% respectively and 3-year tax holiday for new mining 
companies. More recently, seven key strategic minerals have been identified for development 
through free market policy (Oladunjoye & Okonkwo, 2015; Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016). 
One of the sectors affected by the reforms is the Nigerian cement industry. 
 
Table 3.2: Seven strategic minerals 
Mineral  Quantity (reserve) 
Barites  15 million tonnes 
Bitumen 27 billion barrels 
Coal 2.7 billion tonnes 
Gold 200 million ounces 
Iron Ore 10 billion tonnes 
Limestone 3 trillion tonnes 
Zinc 5 million tonnes 
Source: Nigeria’s mining sector, 2016 
Mineral and mining is within the sole regulatory ambit of the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
This is because mineral resources are among the seven items that are of relevance to 
environmental issues on the exclusive legislative list of the Constitution of the country 
(Anyogu and Ikoni, 2012). The key legislations related to the Nigerian mining sector are 
presented in table 3.3 below. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is the major 
environmental instrument used in initiating environmental regulations in the country. The EIA 





Table 3.3: Keys legislations in Nigeria’s mining sector 
Key Legislations Functions 
Minerals and Mining Act, No. 34 of 1999 Main legislation governing the solid 
mineral sector of Nigeria. It consolidated 
all other pieces of legislation like the 
Mineral Act, 1990, the Quarries Act and 
Regulation, 1990, the Tin Act 1990, the 
Gold Trading Act, 1990 
Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act of 2007 Passed into law on March 16, 2007 repeal 
the Minerals and Mining Act, No. 34 of 
1999 
Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations 2011 Consolidates 2007 Act 
Guidelines on Mineral Titles Application 2014 Provides general guidelines for the 
industry 
Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act Cap N142 
LFN 2004 
 
National Environmental (Mining and Processing of 
Coal, Ores and Industrial Minerals) Regulations (SI No 
31 of 2009) 
This Regulation seeks to minimize 
pollution from mining and processing of 
coal, ores and industrial minerals and 
encourage the application of up-to-date 
efficient cleaner production technologies.  
Environmental Impact Assessment Act (Cap E12 LFN 
2004) 
This Act sets out the general principles, 
procedures and methods of environmental 
impact assessment in various sectors. 
 
Land Use Act 1978 This Act vests the ownership and control 
of land and the mineral on the 
Government of either the federation or the 
state. This has made the 
acquisition of land for mining easier and 
less cumbersome for a foreign 
Investor. 
National Environmental (Non-Metallic Minerals 
Manufacturing Industries Sector) Regulations, S. I. No. 
21 of 2011:  
 
This Regulation provides the regulatory 
framework for the control of all activities 
of this sector in order to protect the 
Nigerian environment from their negative 
impact.  





3.3.1 The EIA processes 
Environmental impact assessment has been described as a decision-making tool used to 
prevent and mitigate adverse environmental concerns associated with major development 
projects (Cashmore, 2004; Glasson et al, 2005). EIA aims to inform decision-making process 
and promote sustainable development by identifying significant effects of a project on the 
environment and ensuring that critical functions of ecological resources are not compromised 
(UNEP, 2002). This is because of the importance that ecological resources play in 
maintaining human well-being and livelihoods.  EIA as a policy tool was first introduced in 
the United States of America in 1969 (NEPA ACT) in response to the growing prevalence of 
new technologies and rising public health concerns (Li, 2008). EIA later became 
internationally recognised as Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development and official tool to inform decision-making about sustainable development 
(Sanches & Croal, 2012). Since then, EIA has become widespread in many developed 
countries as well as international financial institutions across the world (Ogunba, 2004). It has 
been argued that the objectives of EIA transcend accepting or rejecting a project but making 
sure that likely social and environmental problems are addressed, and effective management 
plans put in place (Kakonge, 1998; Morison-Sanders & Bailey, 2009). 
 
Though EIA has been criticised for being political in nature because the outcome of the 
process in most cases provides advice to decision-makers rather than making final decisions, 
the tool remains the main instrument informing sustainable development of projects. While 
the application of EIA seems to be difficult in practice across the world, the situation seems 




such as technical expertise, poor participatory framework and political will to allow its 
successful application (Li, 2008; Marara et al., 2011). Despite shortcomings in its application 
in some low and middle-income countries, the tool remains the main instrument used to 
support decision-making in major projects such as mineral mining in Nigeria. The stages of 
EIA process include project definition stage; preparation of EIA report, decision and 
implementation stages (Glasson et al., 2005). The systematic integration of the stages in the 
EIA process is shown in the following figure and summarised in the table that follows.    
 






Table 3.4: Summary of EIA process 
Project screening narrows the application of EIA to those projects that may have significant 
environmental impacts. Screening may be partly determined by the EIA regulations operating 
in a country at the time of assessment.  
Scoping seeks to identify at an early stage,all project’s possible impacts and the alternatives 
that could be addressed, those that are the crucial, significant issues.  
The consideration of alternatives seeks to ensure that the proponent has considered other 
feasible approaches, including alternative project locations, scales, processes, layouts, 
operating conditions and the “no action” option.  
The description of the project/development action includes a clarification of the purpose and 
rationale of the project, and an understanding of its various characteristics— including stages 
of development, location and processes.  
The description of the environmental baseline includes the establishment of both the present 
and future state of the environment, in the absence of the project, taking into account changes 
resulting from natural events and from other human activities.  
The identification of the main impacts brings together the previous steps with the aim of 
ensuring that all potentially significant environmental impacts (adverse and beneficial) are 
identified and taken into account in the process.  
The prediction of impacts aims to identify the magnitude and other dimensions of identified 
change in the environment with a project/action, by comparison with the situation without that 
project/action.  
The evaluation and assessment of significance assesses the relative significance of the 
predicted impacts to allow a focus on the main adverse impacts. 
Mitigation involves the introduction of measures to avoid, reduce, remedy or compensate for 
any significant adverse impacts.  
Public consultation and participation aim to ensure the quality, comprehensiveness and 
effectiveness of the EIA, and that the public’s views are adequately taken into consideration 
in the decision-making process.  
EIS presentation is a vital step in the process. If done badly, much good work in the EIA may 
be negated.  
Review involves a systematic appraisal of the quality of the EIS, as a contribution to the 
decision-making process.  
Decision-making on the project involves a consideration by the relevant authority of the EIS 
(including consultation responses) together with other material considerations.  
Post-decision monitoring involves the recording of outcomes associated with development 
impacts, after a decision to proceed. It can contribute to effective project management.  
Auditing follows from monitoring. It can involve comparing actual outcomes with predicted 
outcomesand can be used to assess the quality of predictions and the effectiveness of 
mitigation. It provides a vital step in the EIA learning process 





According to the Nigerian Minerals and mining Regulations, 2011 which consolidates the 
2007 mining Act and the guidelines on the mineral titles application 2014, the legal procedure 
for mining licence approval is as follows. Before commencing operation, it is mandatory that 
a prospective mineral title holder must submit an Environmental Impact Assessment 
statement approved by the Federal Ministry of Environment to the Environmental Compliance 
Department in the mines and steel Ministry. This must provide information on the mining 
operations and Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation Programme of the prospective 
company. The Programme must provide for rehabilitations and reclamation actions along with 
an estimate of the cost. It should also provide a timetable for the duration of restoring the 
mineral title area back to a safe environmental state suitable for future economic development 
or recreational uses. To guarantee the rehabilitation of the mineral title area, the applicant is 
required to make prescribed financial contributions to an Environmental Protection and 
Rehabilitation Fund (Akinrele, 2012). 
 
More importantly, a Community Development Agreement must be reached with the local 
community that will host the mining activities. The agreement usually centres on the social 
and economic contributions of the project to the host community. This agreement must be 
submitted along with the approved EIA plan to the line Ministry that is the Ministry of Mines 
and Steel development (MMSD). The contributions of the company to the host community 
must be directed to the areas of educational scholarships, apprenticeship, technical training, 
employment of indigenes, support for infrastructural development, improved health care, 
support to SME’s, and agricultural improvements. The Community Development Agreement 




found across many regions in Nigeria. The exploitation of limestone in the country has been 
on the rise and the application of the policy framework discussed above is evident.  
 
 
Limestone is unlike many other solid minerals (tantalite and precious stones) found in the 
country which their nature does not allow for organized mining processes. Limestone as a 
resource involves large scale production and organized processes which are highly 
environmentally damaging especially in the production of cement (CSI, 2002). Cement is a 
fine grey powder, a strong, critical and important material used to make concrete and mortars 
(CSI, 2002). It is a critical part of human civilization needs for housing and basic 
infrastructure such as bridges, roads, water treatment facilities, schools and hospitals among 
others. Cement is made by heating limestone with small quantities of other materials such as 
clay to a temperature of high extreme in a kiln to produce clinker which is then ground with 
small amount of gypsum into a powder to make Ordinary Portland Cement (OPC) the most 
commonly used type of cement. It is a global commodity which remains the key constituent 
of concrete, the second most consumed material on the planet after water (CSI, 2002).  
 
The cement industry is a capital intensive extractive industry. Cement production involves 
three major stages: (1) quarrying and raw materials preparation; (2) clinker Production and (3) 
cement grinding and distribution. The cost of a new cement plant can be equivalent to about 3 
years of revenue (CSI, 2002). It is also an energy intensive industry which requires the 
equivalent of 60-130 Kilograms of fuel oil and 110 Kilowatt hours (KWh) of electricity to 
produce one ton of cement depending on the cement variety and the process used (CSI, 2002). 




relationships with local communities and the need for good environmental practice. The 
cement industry is perceived to produce 5% of global man-made CO2 which is a major gas 
contributing to climate change (CSI, 2002; WBCSD, 2005; Industry Update, 2010).  
 
In this section, I have discussed the history of the reforms in the Nigerian non-oil extractive 
industry and how the neoliberal policy measures relate to the Nigerian cement industry. I 
briefly touched on the institutional arrangement for the approval of operational licences for 
prospective companies. The next section discusses how the reforms in the sector have 
transformed the socio-economic and environmental landscape of cement production in 
Nigeria.  This is to illuminate the necessity to assess transformations in the sector at the 
instance of multilevel environmental governance. 
 
3.4  A Brief discussion of the Nigerian Cement Industry 
Nigeria’s economy is primarily an extractive economy (Orogun, 2010; Chindo, Naibbi & 
Abdullahi, 2014). The bulk of the population rely on the land and its resources for survival in 
their peasant farming activities. Oil and gas and the solid mineral exploitation activities also 
spread all over the country (Orogun 2010; Chindo, Naibbi & Abdullahi, 2014). Though the oil 
and gas remain the main revenue source for the country, the cement industry has over the 
years grown astronomically to a major Non-Oil Extractive Industry (NOEI) in sub-Sahara 
Africa. By its nature this has significant socio-economic and ecological implications for the 
country especially considering its spread over the country.  
 
Manufacturing of cement in Nigeria was suggested by Lord Lugard as pioneer industry in 




bulky nature (Hay, 1971). In this regard, the availability of cement took centre stage in the 
industrial development history in Nigeria (Mojekwu, Ademola & Sode, 2013). Prior to 1957, 
all cement products used in Nigeria were imported, non-integrated plants were initiated at 
Lagos and Port Harcourt and all materials needed for production imported (Hay, 1971). This 
tied the plants to port locations leading to high cost of production (Hay, 1971). It was reported 
that rising demand for cement was met with import until 1960 (Makoju 2010; Mojekwu, 
Ademola & Sode, 2013). Estimated imports of 80,000 tons in 1946 grew to 626,500 tons by 
1960 (Mojekwu, Ademola & Sode, 2013). With the desire to float indigenous plant peaking in 
1955, the first cement industry was established in 1957 (Hay, 1971; Makoju 2010).  
 
Because of the presence of coal and limestone in the area, the first plant was constructed at 
Nkalagu in the eastern part of Nigeria by NigerCem.  By the early 60s, establishment of the 
new plant owned by the then Western Region government in Ewekoro, Ogun state, south west 
Nigeria became the second in the country. Bendel Cement Plant in Ukpilla in the then Bendel 
State (150,000mt) established in 1964 was the third. Calabar Cement was commissioned in 
1965 to make the fourth cement plant in the country. Then Cement Company of Northern 
Nigeria (CCNN) in Sokoto a 100,000mt plant was commissioned in 1967. Subsequently, 
Sagamu Plant in 1978, Ashaka in 1979 as well as Benue Cement Company (BCC) in 1980 
came on board making eight plants in the country by 1980 (Makoju, 2010). Interestingly, all 
the companies had strong government ownership and control. Also, most of the cement plants 
built before the eighties were wet process rather than dry process plants which are more 
economical and fuel efficient than the wet process (Mojekwu, Ademola & Sode, 2013). 




2000 to the detriment of local production (Makoju, 2010; Mojekwu, Ademola & Sode, 2013). 
Local production was reported to have crashed from a peak of 3.5m in 1986 down to 2.28m 
by 2000 while imports grew from 0.8 tons in 1986 to 3.34 m tons in 2000 (Mojekwu, 
Ademola & Sode, 2013).  
 
The survival of the Nigerian cement industry at that time was grossly affected by ownership 
nature of the companies and civil war of the late 1960s. The companies could not meet up 
local cement demand, this led to liberalization of cement importation and heightened 
privatization of the existing plants creating a major growth in the industry (Makoju, 2010). As 
reported by Mojekwu, Ademola and Sode, (2013) local production rose from its thirty-year 
low of 1.9 (Million metric Tonnes) MMT in 2003 to 8.1 MMT in 2009, an increase of over 
300% in 6 years. It further rose to 21.2 MMT in 2013 (Oxford Business Group, 2016) due to 
the introduction of privatization policy. New cement plants and expansion of some existing 
plants have also taken place between 2011and 2013. 
 
The Global Cement Report (2007) shows that Nigeria was the fourth largest cement importer 
in the world with 7 MT imported in 2006, after the USA, Spain and Bangladesh. This 
demonstrates the important gap between national supply and the country’s demand. The 
market is driven by a growing demand in the residential construction sector, urbanization, 
demographic growth and the regional demand. Nigeria has the largest number of cement 
facilities in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) with about 15 cement works mostly located in the 
eastern and central regions of the country. These reasons prompted the federal government to 





Available data reveals that domestic cement production was about 3.5 Metric tonnes in 2006 
(Oluwakiyesi, 2010). This represented only 35% of the total market of 10.1 Mt. Dangote 
Cement, a subsidiary of the Dangote Group, is the industry’s giant with a market share 
estimated at 70%. Dangote Cement has significantly invested in the Nigerian market through 
acquisitions and expansion projects. For example, after investing over USD 1 billion in Phase 
1, Obajana Cement, which was commissioned in 2007, became the largest cement plant in 
SSA – with a total production capacity of 5 million tonnes (“Dangote Cement”, 2016).  In an 
independent report by Industrial Update (2010), the Nigerian cement industry grew rapidly 
from about #26 billion in 2004 to an estimated value of #134 billion in 2008. Over the last six 
years the total consumption has grown approximately 10.5 % annually (Industrial Update, 
2010). Despite its rise in consumption, local production of cement was low due to so many 
production challenges faced by the industry. As at 2008, Nigeria imported an annual average 
of 10 million tonnes of cement over the past five years (Industrial Update, 2010). However, 
the fast-growing local production by 2009 brought down the volume of imports significantly. 
This development is not unconnected with the federal government intervention in the 
industry. 
 
In 2002, the Federal Government introduced the backward integration policy (BIP) and the 
import substitution policy (ISP) in the cement manufacturing sector. It was projected that by 
2011–2013 the domestic production of cement could reach 27.6 million metric tonnes per 
annum (MMTPA), thus exceeding the national demand of 21.7 MMTPA (Ohimain, 2014). 
Farlex Financial Dictionary (2012) defines backward integration as a business model whereby 




licenses were allocated only to importers who could show proof of building factories for local 
cement production in the country. Government also included waiver of VAT and custom duty 
for importation of cement production equipment (Ohimain, 2014). Between 2002 and 2004, 
federal government privatized all the government owned cement plants including WAPCO 
(Ewekoro), WAPCO (Shagamu), NigerCem (Nkalagu), Cement Company of Northern 
Nigeria, Benue Cement Company, Ashaka Cement Company, Edo Cement Company 
(Ohimain, 2014). 
 
In addition, the Nigerian government attached incentives to the waivers earlier granted to 
promote local production of cement. The major incentives are two to three-year duty free 
period for the importation of machinery, equipment and spare parts to cover the initial stages 
of setting-up cement production businesses. Secondly, tariff incentives for imported spare 
parts and machinery for cement production was reinstated. Thirdly, the time it took to obtain 
exploratory and mining licenses from the relevant government agencies was reduced 
significantly. Additionally, cement production was granted pioneer tax status with lucrative 
exemptions. Further to that, duty on imported cement was hiked to 35% to pave way for local 






Table 3.5 Major Cement companies and locations in Nigeria  
Companies Location  
Lafarge Africa PLC 
 
Ewekoro I, Ogun state   
Sagamu, Ogun state 





Ashaka Cement Nigeria PLC (Lafarge Group) Ashaka, Gombe state 1979 
Dangote Cement Gboko, Benue state  
Obajana, Kogi state 




Cement company of Nothern Nigeria (CCNN) Sokoto 1967 
United Cement Company (UNICEM), Calabar, Cross River 
state 
Mfamosing Cross River 
state 
2008 
Purechem Industries Limited, Ogun state Itori , Ogun state  2001 
Nigerian Cement Company (NIGERCEM) (Ibeto Group)  Nkalagu, Enugu state 1957 
 
 
Most of the bagging plants in Nigeria are also owned by the key players in the operational 
plants such as Dangote group, Lafarge group and other small-scale investors. This 
development in the Nigerian cement industry is an indication of economic development to the 
detriment of sustainable modern development (Peet & Hartwick, 2009; Perreault, 2009). As 
government promises investors express approval of licences, this normatively portends danger 






Figure 3.3: Major Limestone deposit regions in Nigeria (F.O. Akinrele 2012; Nigeria’s 
mining sector, 2016) 
 
3.4.1 Impacts of cement production 
As a mining industry, cement production has significant social, economic and environmental 
impacts which have direct and indirect implications on human and environmental wellbeing. 
Studies have shown that mining generally has been a significant source of economic 




Twerefou, 2009). Romero (2004) submits that stakeholders pay considerable attention to the 
negative externalities of mining than the positive externalities and the extent to which they 
contribute to the wellbeing of the local communities.  He suggests that to foster the positive 
benefits governments and mining companies should focus on better approaches of managing 
the external benefits of mining. Governments, as the entities in charge of the welfare of a 
country, are primarily responsible for the management of externalities and therefore, can 
maximise the positive benefits too (Romero, 2004). Mining companies on the other hand have 
the responsibility to engage in a closer interaction with local communities, in which local 
communities can express their concerns regarding the mining activity and mining companies 
can explain their activity and its impacts. 
 
Cement industry particularly supplies the material needs of modern day development (CSI, 
2002). Significant studies have shown that the Nigerian cement industry have in recent past 
impacted on the social and economic terrain of the country (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010; 
Maxwell-Cook, 2012; Pan African Capital, 2012). For instance, Maxwell-Cook (2012) asserts 
that the Nigerian cement industry has been expanding and has contributed immensely to the 
growth of the economy from 7% to 11% per annum. This growth, Maxwell-Cook attributed to 
the neoliberal transition witnessed in the sector. The growth in the Nigerian cement industry 
has also been noted to have contributed significantly to employment generation in the country 
(Maxwell-Cook, 2012). As a result of the expansion, environmental impacts of the industry 
have continued to be on the rise. The environmental impacts of cement production can either 
be physical or biological impacts (Mannion, 2002; MMSD, 2002; Twerefou, 2009). The 




landscapes and the ecology of the area is disrupted (MMSD, 2002). The disruption continues 
as long as the cement plant produces because clinker production requires intensive use of 
materials. Biologically, the flora and fauna of the entire ecosystem is also altered which 
indirectly affects other ecosystem services. Mostly, cement plants are found in rural 
ecosystem where land resources remain the most valuable form of livelihood. Unregulated 
Cement production may affect the soil and its ability to perform its physical, chemical and 
biological functions, thereby impacting on the socio-economic activities of the community. 
 
Cement production can also cause noise, and air pollution as well as health problems for local 
communities. Clinker production requires intensive use of raw materials and energy resulting 
in significant carbon emissions into the atmosphere among others. Cement industry remains 
the largest single material source of emissions in the world (CSI, 2002, 2009; Steinweg, 
2008). Studies have reported that 60% of the CO2 produced by the cement industry is from the 
production of clinker while 40% comes from fuel used in the process (Steinweg, 2008; CSI, 
2009). Cement production has 3 sources of greenhouse gases (Worrell et al., 2001; Steinweg, 
2008; Yared, 2010): The first source is from the heating of limestone, the primary raw 
material. Limestone contains more than 90% calcium carbonate. When limestone is heated, it 
dissociates into calcium oxide, the main ingredient for cement and carbon dioxide, a 
greenhouse gas. 
  CaCO3     CaO + CO2 ------ 1 
                Heat 850oC 
For every 100 grams of calcium carbonate heated in a kiln above 750oC, about 56 grams of 




(Yared, 2010). This means that, for every 56 grams of Calcium Oxide used by the industry, 44 
grams of CO2 is released into the atmosphere (Yared, 2010). Relating the above submission, 
Yared (2010) explains that about 2.77billion tonnes of world cement production in 2007 
means the release of up to 1.45 billion tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere due to 
decarbonisation of CaCO3 alone. The second source of greenhouse gases comes from the 
combustion of fossil fuel such as methane, furnace fuel, coal or alternative fuels such as 
biomass, re-ground tyres and household and industrial wastes. The European Cement 
Association (2009) reports that approximately 335KG of CO2 is produced from combustion of 
fuel in cement production. The third source of GHGs in cement production relates to the use 
of electricity produced by power stations that are burning fuels. This accounts for about 50Kg 
of CO2 per tonne of cement produced (European Cement Association (ECA), 2009). Putting 
the above sources together, the cement industry releases about 0.8 tonne of carbon dioxide 
into the atmosphere per tonne of cement produced (Yared, 2010). Considering the positive 
and negative impacts inherent in cement production as discussed above, understanding the 
practicalities of the suggestions of Romero (2004) can broaden our learning about resource 
governance in a neoliberal perspective. 
 
3.4.2 Best practice and sustainability initiatives in the cement industry 
As in other industries, the global cement industry has recognized that to remain successful in 
the global village, there is the pressing need to combine sound financial performance with a 
commitment to social responsibility, environmental stewardship and open and transparent 
interaction with stakeholders (CSI, 2002). The idea holds that environmental and equity 




activities, they must be an integral part of development itself and must be understood as 
involving the whole society (CSI, 2002; Steinweg, 2008). The ‘Triple bottom line’ as the 
commonly used metaphor for corporate sustainability defines the three dimensions of a 
sustainable business which the industry aims to adopt as follows (CSI, 2002): 
● economic prosperity and continuity which includes creation of wealth and growth 
opportunities for both the business and its stakeholder 
● environmental stewardships including emissions reduction and resource conservation 
on both a local and global scale and  
● Social responsibility, including quality of life and fair treatment for both company 
employees and the society in general. 
 
Several initiatives have been taken by the global cement industry to accommodate businesses 
and sustainable development. The most popular and prominent initiative in the industry is 
Cement Sustainable Initiative (CSI) of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD). CSI was formed to help the cement industry address the challenges 
of sustainable development with the participation of major cement companies worldwide. The 
CSI promotes sustainable development through actions that companies can undertake to 
accelerate the move towards sustainable development, knowledge, experiences and best 
practices sharing. The cement industry is also playing an active role in the Kyoto Protocol to 
cut down the sectorial greenhouse gases emissions, particularly in the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). The global environmental concerns and efforts towards good practice in 
the cement industry as mentioned above and the growth of the industry in Nigeria over the 




empirics of the interactions of the myriad of actors in the sector can contribute to resource 
governance discourse in a neoliberal context.  
 
In this section, I have discussed the neoliberal transformation of the Nigerian cement industry 
and global efforts at promoting best practice. In the next section, I aim to apply the legal and 
constitutional framework for governance of the sector to situate the neoliberal changes in the 
industry at the instance of multilevel governance framework proposed in the previous chapter. 
 
3.5 Legal and constitutional framework for environmental regulation in Nigeria’s 
cement industry 
As earlier stated in this chapter, the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria places 
minerals and mining on the exclusive list as one of the matters of national relevance. This 
means that power and legitimacy to develop mineral resources resides with the federal 
government of Nigeria. However, environmental protection right of any activity is 
constitutionally vested on all levels of governments. Translating the concurrency of 
environmental protection in Nigeria, the operations of the cement company affects the 
Nigerian environment. Thereby, federal and subnational governments have constitutional 
rights to ensure environmental stewardship and protection in the sector. 
 
In light of the above, the Federal Ministry of Mines and Steel Development (MMSD), 
(formerly the ministry of solid minerals development) oversees the Nigerian mining sector. 
The Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) is responsible for environmental regulation 
in the sector. This means that MMSD and FMENV are involved in the regulation of cement 




exploration and exploitation of solid minerals in Nigeria are: The Nigerian Minerals and 
Mining (NMMA) Act 2007; the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations (NMMR) 2011 
and the Guidelines on Mineral Titles Application, (GMTA) 2014; National Environmental 
(Mining and Processing of Coal, Ores and Industrial Minerals) Regulations (SI No 31 of 
2009); Environmental Impact Assessment Act (Cap E12 LFN 2004).  
 
As explained in the Guidelines on Mineral Titles Application 2014, guided by NMMA 2007 
and NMMR 2011, any cement producing company must seek EIA approval from the Federal 
ministry of Environment and approved by the ministry. The EIA before its approval by the 
federal Ministry will involve several processes and stages that require the involvement of 
subnational government. Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act of 1988 (FEPA Act) 
(repealed by NESREA Act 2007) also empowers each State and local government in the 
country to make laws to protect the environment and set up its own environmental protection 
body for the protection and improvement of the environment within their regions. This means 
that apart from the ministry of mines and steel development oversight functions as the 
industry is mineral resources related; the federal ministry of environment and the 
corresponding state where the industry is domiciled also have active roles to play in the 
regulation of the operations of the industry as it affects the environment. The EIA process 
which became the norm in the late 1980s can be related to the Type I MLG and the changing 
nature of centre-periphery gates explained in chapter two.  
 
Aside from the EIA that the company must do before applying for mineral licence, the 
company must also sign a mandatory Community Development Agreement with the local 




approved EIA must present a blueprint of the social and economic contributions the company 
plans to make to their host community (Oladunjoye & Okwonkwo, 2015). This mandatory 
community development agreement or better still memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
normatively legitimises the host communities as stakeholders in the industry. While the 
community development agreement is commendable, there are concerns that government has 
failed to provide a structure to monitor its implementation and coordination (Ladan, 2014). 
However, the agreement situates the local communities as important territorial stakeholder in 
the category of Type II MLG typology that can interact informally to solve problems affecting 
them (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2010). This interaction is one the focus of this study.  
 
Notably, the exclusion of the subnational governments in the control of mineral resources 
development brings to fore resource control contentions existing in the country (Ekuri & 
Etim, 2017). More importantly, as the federal government devolves economic responsibility 
of the sector to the private sector actor. This devolution introduces the corporate actors in the 
Nigerian cement industry as a major new governance actor classified as Type II governance. 
The adoption of neoliberal policies under the instruction of international organisation, the 
involvement of the international companies in the devolution process and accession and 
application of multilateral agreements by successive Nigerian government has loosen the 
state-society gates in the country. These conditions summed up, I argue create multilevel and 
multi-actor dimensions of social relation which I identify as a novel gap the study aims to 






Neoliberalism as reflected in the literature and the Nigerian case is generally associated with 
free trade, less government, and relying on markets to deliver policies as against state-led 
solutions to social and environmental problems (Harvey, 2005; Liverman & Vilas 2006; 
Thorsen & Lie, 2006). Neoliberalism brings about trade liberalisation and seeks to reduce 
public expenditure by eliminating subsidies and the sale of public utilities as well as shedding 
jobs in the public sector (Castree, 2006). Most significant in relation to this study is the 
privatization of previously commonly or state-owned mineral and natural resources and the 
‘rolling-back’ of environmental and labour regulations (Liverman & Vilas, 2006). The 
theoretical basis and empirical impacts of neoliberal policies have been subjects of contention 
in recent past as reflected in chapter two. For example, it is generally assumed that efficient 
market mechanism and regulatory freedom associated with neoliberalism can promote 
sustainable use of resources if properly organised (Peck & Tickell, 2002; Liverman & Vilas, 
2006). That is, the general effects of neoliberalism can either be direct, indirect as well as 
negative or positive depending on the governance arrangement it is built on (Liverman & 
Vilas, 2006). However, economic efficiency is inextricably linked to increased pressure on the 
natural environment which means that change in ownership might result in environmental 
degradation (Liverman & Vilas, 2006). Therefore, the impacts and implementation of 
neoliberal policy is dependent on the political and institutional arrangements it enjoys. As in 
this case, a developing nation with weak institutional arrangements and political will to 
evolve effective resource management policies, the study will contribute to knowledge on the 





The free trade characteristic of neoliberalism is another area of contention that can result in 
increased resource demands, pollution and inequality (Liverman & Vilas, 2006; Saad-Filho & 
Johnston, 2005; Thorsen & Lie, 2007). However, neoliberalism advocates suggest that 
environmental protection can improve because of environmental provisions of trade 
agreements or increases in average incomes to stakeholders (Liverman & Vilas, 2006). 
Notably, reduced government intervention particularly in developing countries with weak 
regulations may mean more pressure on land and its resources and less investment in 
environmental regulation and enforcement (Wheeler, 2001; Liverman & Vilas, 2006).  
 
Despite the criticism of neoliberal policies, it provides an avenue to promote inclusive and 
sustainable development if properly articulated and implemented. This is achievable when 
neoliberalism is viewed as a set of processes, rather than an end contingent on history and 
place producing diversities (Peck & Tickell, 2002; Castree, 2006). In this way, the lessons and 
experience of neoliberal processes can be used to address emerging political and institutional 
issues affecting its successful application in a developing nation. Because of Neoliberalism, 
environmental governance has overtime evolved to internalising social and environmental 
cost of resource use and transfer of environmental management responsibility to non-state 
actors. Neoliberal environmental governance assumes that environmental resources are most 
efficiently managed by private owners, and that consequently environmental management is 
best achieved through market relations where resource rights are definable, defendable, and 





Neoliberalisation becomes an ideology and a policy discourse when governments adopt its 
values. When adopted as a set of policy measures, concrete regulations and procedures 
combining the philosophy with policy discourse become evident (Castree, 2010). This has 
been discussed in the preceding chapter, while the Nigerian cement industry context has been 
described here. Economic liberalisation and the shifting roles of the state actors in the 
Nigerian cement industry over the last 17 years as presented in this chapter apparently 
exhibits transition to neoliberal practices. Changes toward neoliberal approach discernible 
from the Nigerian cement industry experience can be summarised as follows. 
 
Table 3.6: Summary of transition towards neoliberal environmental governance in the 
Nigerian cement industry 
The federal and regional governments pioneered the establishment of cement industry in 
Nigeria  
1957-1980 
Cement manufacturing industry barely develops owing to numerous production challenges 1986-2000 
Federal government fully privatised the Nigerian cement industry and introduced other 
measures to encourage private investment. 
2000-2004 
Federal government introduces distinct national environmental institutions and policies to 
separate regulatory roles of the state from facilitation with subnational (state and local) 
governments having active roles in environmental regulations 
1988-1992 
Policy reforms in the sector lead to emergence of new governance arrangements in the 
private companies and community based organisations 
2000-to date 
Non-governmental organisations and other civic society groups become increasingly 
involved in environmental policymaking in the country owing to greater accessibility of 










This chapter has explored how successive governments’ development plans for the non-oil 
extractive sector portray the transition to a neoliberal development approach and the build-up 
of multilevel resource governance capacity. By explicitly exploring the historical and spatial 
perspectives of mineral resource development in Nigeria, I have argued that recent transitions 
in the Nigerian cement industry have triggered the neoliberalisation of nature discourse 
(Castree, 2011). The review has shown how successive government plans failed to capitalize 
on the diverse natural resources endowment of the country to address socio-economic, 
environmental and regional development of the country. It discusses how over-reliance on the 
oil sector affected the development of the non-oil extractive sector, became the main source of 
insecurity and militancy in the country which stems from negligence of oil companies and 
government to address environmental stewardship.  
 
As revealed in the reviewed literature, the failure of the many development objectives of 
successive governments was basically because of political instability in the country. However, 
after the successful transition to democracy in 1999, successive governments have continued 
to focus on the policies that aimed at reducing economic burden on the government. This has 
led to the liberalisation and the development of the Nigerian cement sector to allow foreign 
and local private investments. Government also facilitated the coordination of environmental 
regulation in the country. The globalised neoliberalism has changed Nigerian politics, leading 
to changes in the resource and extractive industries, including the cement industry. This I 
argue has resulted in neoliberal natures presenting an arena for multilevel governance 




framework presented in chapter two to the case study. To be able to suggest sustainable 
pathway for the industry, the historical perspectives of the development of the Nigerian 
cement industry discussed here has illuminated the past challenges that affected the industry. 
Whether recent reforms were to avoid past mistakes and promote inclusive sustainable 
resource development where the state is embedded in the society (Midgal et al., 1994; Midgal, 
2001) is a question of evidence. This is to critically assess if the reforms and changes evident 
in this case meets the regulatory yearnings of the state and society, considers the aspiration of 
the poor and corporate elitists (Perreault, 2009). These power asymmetries that must be 
negotiated through a constant reconfiguration of the relations between civil society actors, 
state institutions and transnational actors at a diversity of interconnected spatial scales is the 
context of this study (Perreault, 2009; ESID, 2014).This I exemplify using the Nigeria cement 
industry in the empirical chapters five, six and seven. The next chapter presents how Iapplied 

















In the previous chapters, I have demonstrated the need to apply multilevel environmental 
governance framework to explore changing roles and relations of state and society in a 
neoliberal context. Here, I present the data collection and analysis methods used to carry out 
the study. I also consider the contextual and ethical issues that affected the research process 
not discussed in the previous chapters that are germane to the work. Following from this 
introduction, section 4.2 presents a summary of literature review and the research questions 
guiding the research. This is followed by the description of the Nigerian case study areas 
outlining the reasons for their selection for in-depth study in section 4.3. In section 4.4, I 
discuss extensively the study research design. As reiterated by Yin (2003, 2012, and 2014) 
research design is an important blueprint of a study, it aims to address logical problems of 
what questions to study. Similarly, De Vaus, (2001, p.9) posits that ‘given the research 
questions or theory, research design answers the question ‘what data is needed to answer the 
question or test the theory in a convincing way?’ These observations indicate that a detailed 
research design is paramount, because it enhances the study’s coherence by holding all the 
parts and phases of the work together. I have therefore devoted this section to describe the 
research design I have employed to situate and connect the framework to specific sites, 
individuals, groups and institutions as well as bodies of relevant interpretive materials needed 
to make sense of the study (Philliber, Schwab and Samsloss, 1980; George & Bennett, 2005). 
I have addressed the research design for this study under the following key elements: 




Section 4.5 presents the practicalities of the research design I addressed in section 4.4. In this 
section, I discuss the stage by stage data collection experience. This includes choosing and 
recruiting key participants/respondents, data gathering and data analysis. Having done that, 
the discussions that follows set out my positionality as it affected the study (section 4.6), 
ethical considerations as well as risk and contingencies issues (section 4.7) and lastly the 
conclusion. 
 
4.2 Summary of literature review and the research questions 
The purpose of the study is to explore and make sense of neoliberal resource governance at 
the instance of multilevel governance focusing on the privatised Nigerian cement industry. 
Before arriving at the above aim, I explored critical theoretical, conceptual and empirical 
literature on development- environment-governance crossroads. I observed that governance 
perspective has opened a window which provides insights on the variety of mechanisms by 
which social interactions can take place either as formal or informal (Stoker, 1998; Bridge and 
Perreault, 2009; Perreault, 2009; Bevir, 2011). It was also observed that, the multilevel 
environmental governance concept has become a ‘compelling metaphor’ (Rosamond, 2000, 
p.197) to explain and understand the dynamism of government and governance actors’ 
interrelations both within and between levels (Jordan, 2001; Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2003; 
Bache & Flinders, 2004; Paavola, 2008; Piattoni, 2010). The ‘multilevel’ and ‘governance’ 
(Bache &Flinders, 2004, p.3) credentials of the multilevel governance framework are hereby 
admitted best fit to explore natural resource governance in a neoliberal context in an 




My decision to apply MLEG approach to Nigeria, where key social institutions are often 
dysfunctional, offered an innovative means of conceptualising recent governance 
developments in the country over the last two decades. These include the growth of non-state 
actors in economic development and environmental management activities. I argue that the 
rise of non-state actors in the country during this period attests to change from government to 
governance. And the ‘loose coupling’ (Benz, 2000, p.33) characteristic of MLG I suggest is 
evident in the growing relations between sub-national state actors and supra-national 
governance actors in the country. I contend that these social relational developments require 
the application of a MLEG approach, irrespective of Nigeria’s often dysfunctional social 
institutions. This I feel helps comprehend and explain the empirical implications of the 
changes owing to neoliberal transition in the country. As applied in the European Union 
context, this approach has greatly assisted scholarly and practical understanding of the context 
specificity of governance and the implications for resource development (Hooghe & Marks, 
2001; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010). 
Apart from its contextual robustness by incorporating political, economic and ecological 
elements in a specific case study, there are other important advantages which I argue made 
MLEG the appropriate theoretical choice for guiding in this study. First is that a MLEG 
framework emphasises the dynamic, changing roles of multiple actors, modes and scales of 
relations in different dimensions. Secondly the framework does not undermine the 
sovereignty and influence of the nation state as the regulator and facilitator of social 
interactions and relations. One alternative theoretical framework, the social capital approach, 




involvement in resource management (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000; Burt, 2000). Yet, it has 
been criticised for being society-centred and pays less attention to nation states that set the 
rules of the game in resource development (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001). Also, Bebbington, 
(2002) reiterates that the criticisms of the concept of social capital as being loosely specific 
and heterogeneous in context are important.  
The institutional analysis and development framework (IAD) is another analytical framework 
that could potentially have been used in this case. But commentators have argued that IAD’s 
complex nature makes it unsuitable for a study involving historical perspectives of political 
and social relations (Whaley & Weatherhead, 2014). IAD is a multi-tier conceptual map 
which focuses on the action situation leading to interactions and outcomes (Mcginnis, 2011; 
Ostrom, 2005; 2011). IAD can be used to identify an action situation, the patterns of 
interactions and outcomes the situation presents and the evaluation of the outcomes (Ostrom, 
2011). Multi-level governance as a flexible approach facilitates institutional improvement in 
solving problems as it aids holistic analysis of changing actors’ roles and emerging relations 
(Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). IAD however, has been criticised for being a historical and 
apolitical in nature (Whaley & Weatherhead, 2014). The IAD is viewed to have given undue 
attention to rules and fails to incorporate the power dynamics and context adequately (McCay, 
2002; Whaley & Weatherhead, 2014). While the social capital and IAD approaches are also 
suitable to some extent for the study under consideration, their weaknesses which are very 
central to this study have been improved in the MLEG framework. For example, regarding 
social capital, Bebbington (2002, 801) submits that “social capital is a “mesolevel” concept 




focusing our attention on actors and their networks, the ways in which networks structure 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion and the ways in which the mobilisation of these networks 
help explain change in access to resources and relations of power”. Taken together I believe 
that MLEG is the most appropriate theoretical framework, allowing the elements considered 
in the study to be flexibly related to explain and understand structures of power relations 
between state and non-state actors. MLEG enabled me to consider the political, economic and 
ecological context historically while also recognising the important role of the state in the 















Table 4.1: MLEG framework features compared to Social capital and IAD approaches 
MLEG Social capital approach IAD 
 Captures the shifting and 
changing roles and powers 
of actors (authority 
reallocation and 
transformations) 
 Involves multiple actors, 
modes and scale 
(Flexibility of network and 
structural patterns of 
relation) 
 Contextualises political 
and ecological relations of 
social actors 
 Also focuses on social 
relations for collective 
action problems 
 It is more Society-
centred in approach 
 It pay less attention to 
the sovereignty of the 
nation states. 
 It is loosely specific 
and heterogeneous in 
context  
 Useful in identifying 
and analysing an action 
situation, the patterns 
of interactions, 
outcomes of the 
situation and the 
evaluation of the 
outcomes.  
 Focuses on collective 
action problem 
 Applicable to any 
policy context and 
multiple actors’ 
analysis 
 It is too apolitical and 
ahistorical 
 
To ensure that the economic transitions in the Nigerian cement industry is at the instance of 
multilevel governance, I reviewed the economic development and environmental planning 
history of the country as an extractive economy. I also reviewed the implications of the 
transition on the centre-periphery and state-society gates in the country to ascertain the 
following necessary developments (Piattoni, 2010, p. 83):  
(1) Different levels of governments are simultaneously involved in policy-making 
(2) Non-governmental actors are also involved at different governmental levels 
(3) The interrelationships that are thus created defy existing hierarchies taking the forms 





Based on these considerations, I concluded that the environmental and economic history of 
the country indicates that Nigeria is an extractive economy having its main economic 
backbone in the environmental resources spread across the country. Also, there has been 
significant increase in the number of economic and environmental actors based on political 
and economic freedom associated with neoliberal governance-centric processes since the 
1980s. I am convinced that the human and natural resources endowment of Nigeria and the 
changing institutional arrangement for development is an instance of multilevel governance. 
This provides an avenue to explore the implications of governance-centric development 
approach for sustainable development in strategic priority sectors of global environmental 
concern. I decided to focus the study on the cement sector, a significant non-oil extractive 
industry in a major cement producing state, Ogun state in southwest Nigeria.  
 
The choice of the Nigerian cement industry is because significant financial investment has 
been witnessed in the sector over the last 16 years. This has been due to the privatization 
policies of the 1990s. Apart from that, the contribution of the global cement industry to 
climate change is huge. The industry contributes about 5% to global carbon emission by 
virtue of the nature of the industry as energy intensive and various environmental impacts 
(Cement Sustainability Initiative, 2002). Sources of emissions in the cement industry include: 
during clinker production, burning of fossil fuels and exhaustion of natural resources as well 
as from mining and transporting raw materials (Cement Sustainability Initiative, 2002). More 
so, cement industries are located in rural regions where sensitive environmental resources are 
located. In most cases livelihood of the local inhabitants depends on these resources. The 




geopolitical zone without cement producing hotspots in Nigeria portends socio-economic and 
environmental impacts requiring structured coordination.  
 
Considering the above submissions, three key research questions emerged as a focus for the 
study as follows: 
(1) How has the state configured environmental governance of the cement industry and 
what roles do sub-national tiers of the administration play in this process?  
(2) How have non-state actors and stakeholders’ roles and relations in environmental 
governance been affected by privatization in the cement industry?  
(3) To what extent can the state and non-state actors’ relations and responses to 
privatization be understood as contestations to the goal of sustainable development in 
the Nigerian cement industry and what lessons does this have for Nigerian 
development generally? 
 
In this section, I have discussed the summary of the review of the conceptual and empirical 
literature informing the framework of this study. In the next section, I discuss the case study 
context where the data for empirical analysis of the study was collected.  
4.3 Nigerian environment and case study description 
This study is focused on Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa. Nigeria accounts for 
over half of West Africa’s population (Benebo, 2011). Nigeria is located approximately 
between latitudes 4º and14º North of the Equator and between Longitudes 2º 2' and 14º 30' 
East of the Greenwich Meridian. It borders the Republic of Niger and Chad Republic to the 




Benin to the west. Out of Nigeria’s total area of 923,768 sq. km, 910,768 sq. km is land and 
13,000 sq. km is water (Federal Ministry of Environment, 2001; Adeyemo, 2006). 
Nigeria enjoys a tropical climate with warm temperatures, in the north, a drier and hotter 
climate is prominent while higher precipitation and relatively cooler climatic condition 
dominates the southern part of the country (Federal Ministry of Environment, 2001). The 
country is characterised by alternate wet and dry seasons with two broad vegetation belts, 
namely: the forest and savannah. There are however regions of high mountains with their 
peculiar vegetation found in the central and far eastern part of the country. There are two 
major rivers in Nigeria forming a significant landmark nationally with many other tributaries; 









Figure 4.1: Map of Nigeria (Iledare & Suberu, 2010) 
Nigeria operates a federal republic type of government and is currently divided into thirty-six 
(36) states with the federal capital territory in Abuja. The states are further divided into 774 
local government areas characterised with of about 250 ethnic groups. The population of the 
country was 140,003,542 in the 2006 population census, 152 million, with a population 




Commission, estimated population of Nigeria in 2017 is 182 million (“Nigeria’s current 
estimated population”, 2017).  
 
Since May 29th 1999, Nigeria has been enjoying democratic government. The stability of 
democratic government for over 17 years has to some extent allowed true federalism to be in 
operation unlike the military dispensation. The elected officials at the subnational levels make 
their own legislation and laws as may be needed by their regions (Nwafor, 2006; Lawal, 
2012). This has made it possible for state governments to create ministries and agencies 
concerned with environmental regulation working at times parallel to the federal government 
agencies. Nigeria is an extractive economy with many natural resources such as limestone, 
petroleum, tin, natural gas, and water resources being explored at various scales across the 
country (Nigeria’s Mining Sector, 2016). Mineral mining for economic purposes dates back to 
the colonial era. By the 1960s the oil boom further shifted the country’s economy toward oil 
revenue while other minerals were being explored illegally to the detriment of the 
environment. Nigeria is one of the major cement producing nations in Sub-Sahara Africa, an 
industry with significant social and environmental impacts which have direct and indirect 
implications on human and environmental well-being. Cement production began in Nigeria in 
the late 1950s. Cement is the main material for making concrete, the second most important 
resource in the world after water. Today, cement producing industries are spread across the 
country in both large and small scales. This is due majorly to the changing economic policies 





To ensure information is captured in detail as the whole country cannot be covered, the study 
was carried out at a sub-national level. The study focused on a prominent cement producing 
state in Nigeria, Ogun state in southwest Nigeria. Ogun state, created in 1976 is referred to as 
the state with the highest number of industries (Lucas, 2014), because of its proximity to 
Lagos state, the commercial capital of Nigeria. Lagos state is a megacity with high 
population, but it is the state with the smallest land mass in the country. Ogun state benefits 
significantly from the population and socio-economic activities spill over from Lagos state. 
The state is named after Ogun River which strategically runs across it from north to south. 
The state comprises of 20 local government areas (LGAs) (Figure 4.2). It is bordered to the 
east by Ondo state and to the north by Oyo and Osun States, the Republic of Benin to the west 
which makes it an access route to the expansive market of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) and to the south by Lagos, the former capital, the commercial 
nerve centre of the country. These strategic opportunities earn the state the popular 
appellation ‘The gateway state’. Ogun state has a land area of 16,409.26 square kilometres. 
Ogun is endowed with a favourable climate and good vegetation for all year-round cultivation 
of various cash and food crops as well as livestock rearing. Ogun State’s population (based on 
2006 Census) was 3,751,140 comprising of 1,864,907 Males and 1,886,233 Females. The 
projected population as at 2016 is over seven million. (“Ogun state brief”, 2017) 
 
Ogun state has in the south, the evergreen forest vegetation and soil which is most suitable for 
the cultivation of cash and food crops like oil palm, rice, kola-nut, cocoa, cotton, cassava, 
cocoyam and vegetables. In the north, vast grazing savannah land suitable for animal 




front to the south that is good for beach resorts. The State has natural resources that include 
forest and water bodies as well as large quantities of mineral deposits, such as limestone, 
phosphate, granite stone, gypsum, bauxite, bitumen, feldspar, clay, glass sand, kaolin, quartz, 
tar sand and gemstones. Limestone is found in commercial quantity in Ogun state and this has 
further attracted huge investment in recent years. Within the state, there are three important 
cement producing local government areas (LGAs): Ewekoro; Sagamu and Yewa north Local 
Government Areas (LGAs).  
 
I had initially chosen to use the three LGAs as case study sites, but I decided to concentrate on 
the oldest and the newest sites to enable me to explore them more comparatively and 
meaningfully. Apart from the above reason, these two sites are found within the same region 
as their LGAs share boundary. Also, the oldest site is currently owned by a Multinational 
Company (MNC): LAFARGE/WAPCO while the newest site is owned by a Nigerian 
Company (NC): Dangote Cement Limited, the company has grown to become a multinational 
company with cement plants in over 15 countries in Africa. Dangote is also currently 
developing a new plant within the study area.  
 
These companies are within 30Km radius with other small cement companies around. These 
unfolding events interestingly make the region a development and environmental hotspot 
which makes a good case for interrelations between formal and informal actors and 
institutions particularly in environmental geography. In this section, I have discussed the 
background of the study areas chosen for the study. The reasons for the choice of the case 




turned to the research design I put forward to carry out the study considering the submissions 












4.4 Research Design 
Considering the research questions and the underlying theoretical and analytical framework 
discussed in the previous chapters and summarized above, qualitative research methodology 
was adopted in this study. Studies have shown the relevance of qualitative methods in case 
study research (Flick, 2002; Patton, 2002; 2015). As human elements remain the common 
denominator in any program (Goodyear et al., 2014), qualitative inquiry cultivates the most 
useful capacity of humans - capacity to learn (Patton, 2015). Unlike the quantitative research 
methods, qualitative research methodology provides an atmosphere for the exploration of 
individual respondent’s free expression of views (Creswell, 2014). The human element and 
the need for individual respondent’s views as reflected in the aim of this research made the 
choice of qualitative methodology suitable for this study.  
 
Creswell (2014) reiterates that qualitative methods have the specific characteristics of 
enabling a wealth of detailed information because it recognises individuality of research 
respondents which is much needed to explore the complexities of multilevel governance in 
this case. It also recognises experience and subjectivities of individual respondents. This is 
also very important to illuminate richer insights and explanations through its integration of 
wide variety of data (Creswell, 2014). Though the study population in qualitative methods 
might be few compared to quantitative methodology, the in-depth nature of the approach 
enhances rich data generation in studies of this nature (Creswell, 2007; 2014). 
 
As case study approach emphasizes “why” questions more than “what”, it was considered 
suitable for this study. This case study approach helped in exploring the complexities of 




Creswell (2007) describes case study approach as situation where cases are explored through 
detailed, in-depth data collection, and multiple sources of information. And then report a case 
description and themes with the potential of generating high level explanatory richness 
thereby inducing a comprehensive result (Creswell, 2007). I have applied the data richness 
and explanatory potentials of the case study approach with its ability to emphasise lived 
experience of participants in this case.  
 
Two data types I chose to address the research questions raised in the study are primary and 
secondary data. Primary data sources used are Semi-structured interviews with key informants 
(KIs) identified for the study and observation of physical objects and projects in the case 
study areas. Secondary sources of data include: review of important documents and empirical 
literature. The complementary strength of primary and secondary data has been so useful in 
this study. Interviews are regarded as suitable means by which information about the 
perception of actors involved in governance processes are gathered by allowing respondents 
to provide meanings and experiences of their lived interests (Flick, 2002; Silverman, 2006, 
2013). Though experiences of respondents may not be neutral accounts of reality or value-free 
expression, they are found to be invaluable sources of pre-conceptualized views of the subject 
matter (Flick, 2002). Secondary data sources such as archival documents and academic 
literatures on the other hand enhance the credibility of the study because they enable cross-
checking and broadening the data collected throughout the interview (Silverman, 2006; Yin, 
2003). The combination of these data sources enabled me to triangulate study materials to 




dynamism of development-environment-governance nexus at the instance of multilevel 
governance. 
 
Data collected were subjected to a combination of thematic and contextual analysis 
techniques after transcribing and coding. Thematic analysis technique is a flexible analytical 
tool which can interpret research topics from various aspects (Boyatzis, 1998). Thematic 
analysis technique is a useful tool for producing qualitative analyses through thorough 
searching across a data set to find repeated pattern of meaning and responses that fit the 
earlier prepared themes (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). Braun and Clarke, (2006) argue that though 
thematic analysis technique is a poorly branded analytical method, the technique has 
significant potential to generate insights that can open new perspectives on the subject matter. 
It also has the potential to generate a rich and detailed explanation out of a complex data set 
and ability to highlight similarities and differences across a data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Thematic analysis method is a useful tool for producing qualitative analyses suited to inform 
policy development such as in this study (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). 
However, Bazeley (2009) argues that contextualizing and making connections between 
themes help build a coherent argument supported by the data in qualitative data analysis. I 
have mapped out 6 phases of data processing designed for this study (Figure 4.3). The 










Figure 4.3: Phases of data analysis in the study 
 
4.5 Research Methods 
This section explains the conditions under which the various stages of investigations were 
carried out from choosing the key participants/respondents, data gathering methods and data 
analysis methods.  
 
4.5.1 Sampling frame and Selection of Key Informants 
Considering the qualitative nature of the study which requires eliciting in-depth information 
from key informants, the sampling frame for the study is non-probabilistic purposive 
sampling method (Patton, 2015). The purposive sampling method (also known as judgement 




informant possesses” (Tongco, 2007, 147). Purposive sampling method as non-random 
technique requires no underlying theories or certain number of informants (Tongco, 2007). 
The researcher purposely focuses on the people who will provide the information needed for 
the study based on their knowledge and experience (Tongco, 2007). Guided by the research 
questions raised in the study, I have chosen purposive sampling method for its flexibility to 
combine sampling techniques in the different phases of the study where needed. It also 
provides a variety of sampling techniques that can be adopted by qualitative researchers to 
achieve their goals. Purposive sampling method has been criticised that it can lead to research 
bias because it is based on the judgement of the researcher (Tongco, 2007; Patton, 2015). It is 
also argued that it can be difficult to defend the appropriateness and representativeness of the 
sample made in purposive sampling (Creswell, 2007, 2014; Patton, 2015). As such, it might 
lead to difficulty in attaining analytical generalisations in a study. However, other sampling 
methods are also subjective as they also focus on data sources of interest to their study 
(Morgan, 2008). The inherent bias in purposive sampling has also been identified as its major 
contributor to its efficiency (Tongco, 2007). Therefore “There is no one best sampling 
strategy because which is best will depend on the context in which researchers are working 
and the nature of their research objective(s)” (Given, 2008, 698). In light of the above, I have 
considered the context and objective of this study and adopted stakeholder sampling 
technique, one of the major techniques in purposive sampling method. 
 
Key informants for this study were identified and chosen for interview based on their roles as 
individuals in institutions and organizations concerned in the study. The participants I have 




key informants for the study. In the classification, the participants were grouped into state and 
non-state actors, within which are sub-categories of governance actors related to the Nigerian 
cement industry (see figure 2.2, p.64) as informed by the analytical framework. 
 
The state actors in this study are government representatives or employees from the three tiers 
of government in Nigeria namely; Federal, state and local governments concerned with 
environmental policies implementation. The non-state actors however comprise of private 
sector actors such as the cement manufacturing companies and civil society organizations 
(CSO) - the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Community Based Associations 
(CBAs) and Community Development Associations (CDAs), as well as other interest groups 
such as research and academic institutions and the media. 
 
After categorizing the identified participants into group of actors, I prepared a list of names 
and contacts of respondents deemed suitable for the success of the study. Spatial context of 
the study determines significantly the choice of samples chosen. This is because the study 
involves an extractive industry which has geographic and environmental connotations. It is 
however believed that the samples chosen have the ability to help in understanding and 
explaining the research questions. Having selected relevant key informants for each category, 
data collection proceeded. There exist no hard and fast rules about what sample size should be 
in qualitative research (Patton, 2015). However, to ensure saturation of sample size and avoid 
redundancy, given the flexibility benefits of qualitative research approach, I proposed a 
minimum of 50 and maximum of 60 key informants as the sample size. In all, 75 participants 
were approached and a total of 55 participants were successfully recruited and took part in the 




As earlier reiterated, I used stakeholder technique, a purposive sampling approach to 
determine the sample for the study. In selecting participants, a convenient sampling method 
was adopted (Abrams, 2010). Though, there are debates that convenient sampling method 
could lead to bias, sampling error and problem of generalisation of study findings, its 
simplicity and importance in context based studies make it a suitable method in this study 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Apart from the fact that some of the stakeholders 
concerned in this study cannot be substituted, accessibility and availability of others also 























Table 4.2: Number of respondents and interviews conducted based on category of actors  
Category of actors Level/type of organizations No. of 
respondents 
State  Federal Ministry of Environment; 
NESREA 
Ogun state government, Ministry of 
environment  
Ogun state Ministry of Forestry 
Ogun state Environmental Protection 
Agency (OGEPA) 
Ewekoro Local Govt. Council 












Non-state: Private sector:  
cement manufacturers 




NGO/CSO Environmental Right Actions (ERA)/ 
Friend of The Earth (FOTE),  
Social and Economic Right Advocacy 
(SERAC),  
Nigeria Environmental Study/Action 
Team (NEST) 
Environmental Law Research Institute 
(ELRI) 
Nigerian Conservation Foundation 
(NCF) 
Nature cares  
HEDA  
















CBA Ewekoro community representatives, 
Ibese community representatives, 


















4.5.2 Data Collection: Interview, Observation and Documents review 
As informed by my research design, Semi-Structured Interview (SSI) with key informants, 
observation and review of documents are the main sources of data for the study. Though 
Semi-structured interview with key informants remains one of the most important source of 
primary data, other methods have played significant roles in ensuring that I do not rely 
excessively on interviews only to avoid ‘trivial preferences’ (Silverman, 2013, p. 13). Other 
methods in essence have played complementary roles in exploring the questions raised in the 
study and ensure methodological triangulation (Thurmond, 2001; Silverman, 2013).  
 
The data collection process took place in two stages. The first stage lasted 3 months between 
August and November 2012. The second stage also lasted 3 months between April and July 
2016. The long break between the two stages was due to illness warranting medical leave of 
absence from study between 2013 and 2015. The first phase of the data collection process 
served as a pilot study, which informed the subsequent refocussing of the study. The initial 
aim of the study was to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches as well use GIS. The 
pilot survey subsequently informed my refocussing the study to address how neoliberal 
transition in the country despite weak social institutions affect the governance of the Nigerian 
cement industry. This gap informed the choice of qualitative method and application of 
MLEG framework rather than the proposed mix method. 
 
During the interview, questions relating to the background, roles and relations of actors were 
raised (see appendix) which then snowballed into development and social relations issues 
related to the study. Efforts were made to promote conducive and relaxed environment for 





As mentioned earlier, I used a purposive sampling approach to determine the sample for the 
study. In selecting participants, a convenient sampling strategy was adopted. Convenient 
sampling strategy involves locating convenient subjects that meet the set criteria of a study 
and selecting respondents on a first-come, first-served basis (Abrams, 2010; Robinson, 2014). 
Though, there are debates that convenient sampling method could lead to bias, sampling error 
and problem of generalisation of study findings, its simplicity and importance in context 
based studies make it a suitable method in this study (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). 
Apart from the fact that some of the stakeholders concerned in this study cannot be 
substituted, accessibility and availability of others also require adopting a method of sampling 
that fit that purpose. 
 
Semi-structured interview  
A total of 75 participants were identified and approached as key informants for the study and 
55 participants successfully participated in the interview sessions. 15 participants did not 
respond to the participation request while five appointments did not hold after several 
attempts. 55 participants successfully interviewed comprised of the 10 in the first stage and 45 
in the second stage. 13 state actors were interviewed; 5 from the federal, 4 from the state and 
4 from the local governments respectively, this constituted 24% of the total participants. 42 
non-state actors constituting about 76% were involved in the following order: 4 cement 
company representatives (7%), 10 NGOs (18%), 18 Community representatives (33%), and 
10 participants from the academia, consultancy and media (18%). The need to make sense of 
the study’s research questions as it sought to explore the spaces of multilevel environmental 




social relations in the extractive industry transcends largely the state actors and the 
companies, it always involves many stakeholders beyond the formal institutions and state 
actors by virtue of territorial and functional interests (Piattoni, 2010). Apart from the above 
reason, considering the primary classification of participants, state actors who are responsible 
for coordination and facilitation of resource development and environmental regulations hold 
specific roles in their respective ministries. Therefore, having the same number of participants 
with non-state actors might not address the richness of information (Kuzel, 1992; Gaskell, 
2000). The sample size of state actors compared to non-state actors in the study is appropriate 
and adequate to address data saturation in the study (Gaskell, 2000; Green & Thorogood, 
2004; Francis, et al., 2010). 
 
The interview process began few months before the fieldwork by making contacts with the 
respondents on the already prepared list as discussed earlier. I first sent emails introducing 
myself and my research request. I then expressed my interest in them as key informants for 
the study and requested for their responses if interested so that I can then send further 
information on the study. This was then followed by appointment time, date and venue with 
respondents with favourable reply. I duly considered ethical considerations before 
commencing any interview.  
 
I made sure that I inform each participant of his/her role in the research and ensured their 
consent either written or recorded consent. There were a few instances where both recorded 
and written consent were not given but the participants agreed to take part in the study and 
remain anonymous. However, this was very unusual. Recognizing the important roles their 




such instances, immediately after the interviews, I would quickly do a recording of highlights 
of the interview as the memories were still fresh in my mind so as not to forget key points.  
Other interviews were successfully conducted with at times written and recorded consent 
given.  Some of the key informants preferred to be interviewed in the local language which I 
agreed to and translate the interview later and transcribe. I ensured that personal views of the 
respondents were not lost in the translation by translating literally where necessary. 
 
Open-ended questions were posed to the participants as the interview was not structured type, 
which then allows me to not only focus on the draft questions. Important issues emanating 
from the interview sometimes led to other questions not part of the prepared questions. This 
helped a great deal to evoke much information. As the interview involved people of varied 
background such as officials of government, Royal fathers and individuals, my approach to 
each interview varied quite significantly. For example, the state actors’ interview process 
mostly followed a standard interview schedule, the non-state actors particularly those of the 
communities varied widely. The interview sessions varied between 10 and 60 minutes per 
participant.  
 
Though the interview process was largely successful, several challenges were encountered. 
First of all is the strike action which unfortunately required that I reschedule some key 
appointments which eventually did not hold. Another important challenge was the fear of 
state actors in participating in the study which almost frustrated me but by virtue of my 
position as both an indigene of the state and academic staff in a university in the state, I was 
accorded some respects and allowed access. Challenges of finance and time crept in because 




almost truncated my time table. These challenges led to the failure to hold about five other 
interviews earlier scheduled as the participants could not be reached for another interview 
appointment. Despite these challenges, the interview recorded about 92% success as 55 out of 
60 key informants took part successfully.  
 
Observation 
Observation is another important method that enabled me to avoid mere reliance on 
interviews and experiences of the participants. In this case, I visited sites of key projects and 
observed events related to the study during the fieldwork. I was privileged to elicit more 
information which allowed me triangulate to improve my data reliability and validity. I 
observed key developments as revealed by the key informants such as the ongoing 
resettlement project in one of the case sites. I also observed the relics of the demolition 
process carried out by the Ogun state in one of the new plants of a national company. Other 
necessary materials for the study were also extracted from the many important documents 
collected prior to the fieldwork, during the fieldwork and after the fieldwork. These include: 
pamphlets, brochures, policy documents, and year books and agreements as well as websites. 
Having recognised the theoretical and empirical importance of secondary data in a study of 
this nature (Green & Thorogood, 2009), how I have reviewed secondary data used in this 
study is briefly described next.   
 
Secondary data  
Secondary data sources were used in this study to address the background context and to 
corroborate primary interview and observation. These include environmental policy 




governance, neoliberalism, and corporate governance in theory and practice. These materials 
were obtained from different sources such as the Federal Ministry Environment; National 
Environmental Standard Regulation Enforcement Agency(NESREA); Ogun state ministry of 
Environment, Ogun state ministry of Forestry, and Nigerian Conservation Foundation, Lekki, 
Lagos, Nigeria Environmental Study Team, Ibadan, Environmental Rights Action, Lagos and 
Human and Environment Development Agenda, Lagos. Books, Journal and newspaper 
articles were sourced from the library and the internet.     
 
I used these materials to review the development planning and environmental regulation 
history and issues related to the changes from development state approach to a neoliberal one 
in the country. The development planning context concentrated on the use and application of 
development plans in Nigeria since Colonial era to date and how this affected the 
development of non-oil mineral sector. The environmental regulation context focused on the 
emergence of holistic and coherent environmental institutions in Nigeria. In the context of 
non-oil extractive sector, the Nigerian cement industry transition was also critically reviewed 
to characterise its transition as a neoliberal process. The socio-economic and environmental 
impacts of cement production; implications of the transition on the roles of state and non-state 
actors of governance were reviewed within the national and international context.  
 
Findings from the review of secondary sources presented in the contextual and conceptual 
chapters (chapters 2 and 3) informed the interview questions and the themes that guided the 
data analysis. For instance, I was guided by the review to explore the changing roles and 
relations of state and non-state actors in the governance of the Nigerian cement industry. This 




governance due to neoliberal transition in the sector over the years. The interest further 
heightened by the fact the constitutional arrangement for resource control has not changed as 
the federal government still controls the development of mineral resources. This led to the 
question of how privatisation in the sector has impacted the roles and relations of state and 
non-state actors in the new Nigerian cement industry. The changing roles of state and non-
state actors in the Nigerian cement sector and the need to explore the impacts in a neoliberal 
context aligns with Hooghe and Marks’ typology of multilevel governance and analytical 
frame of Piattoni. These prompted me to identify the core themes of the study as follows: 
background, role/activities, relationship, challenges/prospects, recommendations/emerging 
issues. These themes were used in the analysis of the primary data in combination with other 
empirical secondary literature to answer the research questions. 
 
4.5.3 Data Analysis 
Qualitative research relies majorly on interpretive perceptions to illuminate how humans 
engage in meaning and make sense of the world (Patton, 2015) from inception of a study to 
the write up stage (Stake, 2010).  It is an inductive process and constructive art which 
demands high level of intellectual ability to create, reflect and analyse (Creswell, 2007). It 
thus has no rigid linear process for analysis (Kitchin & Tate, 2000; Creswell, 2007). 
Following the ‘data analysis spiral’ by Creswell (2007) consisting four general procedures 
namely data managing, reading, describing; classifying and interpreting, representing and 





Data analysis commenced with the creation of all interview recordings into a single file with 
unique identification. I then translated all interviews done in local languages to English and 
transcribed all the interview audio files into a single word document file. To get familiar with 
the data, I read and re-read the transcripts several times. This helped me to condense and 
reduce the transcripts further as I was having close to 500 pages in the first place which 
somehow look daunting to analyse at first. I engaged actively in repeatedly reading and 
reflecting on the transcripts to relate to the existing codes (see appendix) that informed my 
research questions and also identify emerging issues that may be relevant to the study in 
preparation for analysis. 
 
After the coding, I moved to the analysis proper where codes were to guide in generating 
relevant quotes and texts connected to the study objectives. I employed Atlas Ti.7 qualitative 
analysis software to analyse the data. I decided to use computer assisted software because it 
afforded me easy organisation of data in the first instance. It also helped speed up my analysis 
considering the volume of the transcript and much more importantly in managing my data 
robustly. Atlas Ti. is one of the major computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS) which offers various tools to systematically structure raw data (Muhr, 2004; 
Friese, 2013). While there are several other computer assisted software for qualitative data 
analysis, choice of Atlas Ti7 in this case relates to its simple and robust nature. It provides 
useful tools for social science researchers to explore complex data in a simple and robust 
environment (Contreras, 2012; Friese, 2013). Atlas Ti offers tools to manage, extract, 
compare, explore and reassemble large amount of data in a creative, flexible and systematic 




functions, but the choice of Atlas Ti in this study is because it is easy to use. It also allows 
researchers to take control of the intellectual process rather than automating the interpretation 
(Muhr, 2004; Friese, 2012). Interpretation of data followed by linking the data with secondary 
materials and observed data to make sense of the study research questions. I combined both 
secondary and primary data actively in interpreting the data to present the eight-chapter report 
of the study.  
 
4.6  Positionality 
Aside from the relevance of the cooperation of key informants and participants in social 
research, position of the researcher is another important issue which affects the success of 
social research in so many ways (Moch & Gates, 2000; Merriam et al., 2001). Studies have 
shown that researcher’s experience is central to social research as it ensures valid and reliable 
data analysis (Moch & Gates, 2000; Gibbs et al., 2007) while it also forms part of the 
interpretation. It is therefore pertinent that researcher’s reflections on the data collection 
process be documented (Flick, 2002).  
 
It is always believed that when a researcher shares the same cultural background with his 
subjects it makes data collection easier. However, this is not always the case particularly 
when the researcher is affiliated to a foreign university. My multiple positions in this study 
helped in overcoming situations earlier viewed as opportunities but turned otherwise on the 
field. I sought maximum assistance where needed to ensure the success of the fieldwork. 
 
My position as a Nigerian and a member of University academic staff in Ogun state helped 




because I am affiliated to a university in the west. I then decided to unveil my background as 
an academic staff of a popular university in the state and as an indigene of the state with 
interest of the state at heart. This gave me the opportunity to gain ground further and assure 
the respondents of their anonymity in taking part in the study as indicated in the participant 
information sheet and consent letter. After which they agreed to take part in the study on the 
condition that no audio recording and written consent that I should take their participation as 
consent. I decided to agree to their demands as I believe there are ample benefits in 
interviewing them at this point. This is because the affected participants could talk freely and 
bear their minds on issues pertinent to the study. This largely affected government actors and 
cement producing company representatives.   
 
Secondly, my choice of the extractive industry no doubt has been determined by my 
background as an environmental geographer interested in resource use, abuse and 
management. An important position of having been involved and relate with both formal and 
informal actors and institutions in the Nigerian mining sector for over 16 years helped me in 
forging ahead. My personal relations with some key community chiefs and religious leaders 
gave me the credential to be introduced to the people initially declining to take part in the 
study. This does not translate that everything went smoothly but my multiple positions helped 
to relate flexibly as an internal person to ensure the success of my study. I recall I was given 
personal recognition and warmly welcomed in a major government agency and assisted with 
the data base of key actors in the sector. A community chief also made several contacts with 
his colleagues on my behalf while in another government Ministry, I was totally regarded as 




In the conduct of the interviews, my position has helped in creating a more hospitable 
situation prior to the commencement of most interviews except in very few situations. This 
has significantly enhanced the quality and quantity of information most respondents gave both 
off and on records. Generally, my position as an indigene of the state and a lecturer aided my 
data collection where necessary and as I am familiar with the mining industry by virtue of my 
previous experience helped me to relate freely. This is not to say I used my position to 
influence data collection, but in some cases participants doubt your sincerity irrespective of 
what documents you are able to show. When they know, you are an insider, you know what is 
going on they will be willing to cooperate. Despite these situations, I tried as much as I could 
to maintain my objectivity. 
 
4.7 Ethical considerations and confidentiality 
Research is based on ethical values such as honesty, fairness, objectivity, openness, 
trustworthiness and respect for others (COSEPUP, 2009). These values are the standard that 
must be met in any scientific research to avoid questionable research practices. Recognizing 
these ethical values, I sought ethical approval from the University of Birmingham having 
provided the required details and itinerary for the fieldwork. Ethical review is an important 
process developed to ensure that researchers engage in good ethical practice. This involves 
getting research participants informed about their likely roles and the implications through 
provision of information sheets; use of consent forms to ensure that participation is 
documented as much as possible.  I proceeded to the field with approved materials such as the 





Signed consent was sought before every interview. I also ensured that in recorded interviews I 
informed the respondents about the recording and the intentions being purely academic. 
Where written consents were not allowed, recorded consents were used by informing the 
respondents during the interview. Written or recorded consent were therefore obtained from 
respondents except in cases of respondents who personally refused written consent and 
recorded interviews but granted interviews. Apart from the participants remaining anonymous 
in the study, names of towns, states and government agencies as well as companies remain the 
same in the study.   
 
4.8 Conclusion 
Having established the conceptual, contextual and analytical grounding of the study in the 
preceding chapters, in this chapter I have described the methodology used to apply the 
framework in the neoliberal Nigerian cement industry. I presented a summary of literature 
where I recognised that governance perspective has opened a window which provides insights 
on the variety of mechanisms of which governance actions can take place either as formal or 
informal. And its multilevel governance has become a framework useful to understand the 
dynamism of government and governance actors’ interrelations both within and between 
scales in environmental geography. Then, I raised three major questions the study would 
attempt to answer afterwards. This was followed by the description of the case study setting 
and the reasons of my choice of the Nigerian cement industry, Ogun state and local 
communities chosen. I also discussed the logical sequence by which I planned to answer the 




methods of semi structured interview, observation and document review; case study approach, 
data collection and analytical techniques.  
 
Having done that, I outlined the practicalities of the research design on the field in the 
research method section. In this section, I discussed how key informants for the study were 
selected in relation to research method chosen followed by the data collection experience. 
Keys issues such as recruitment processes, appointments and challenges faced were 
explained. Then I presented data analysis processes before discussing my position in the 
research process and the implications. Before the concluding section, I explained ethical 





CHAPTER FIVE  
THE CHANGING ROLES AND RELATIONS OF STATE ACTORS IN THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE OF THE NIGERIAN CEMENT INDUSTRY 
5.1 Introduction 
The most important aspect of any resource development process is its planning and 
regulation. Federal and sub-national governments have always been the main institutions 
responsible for planning and regulating resource development. This is by designing and 
implementing relevant policies that guide resource use, abuse and environmental protection. 
Each tier of government has specific responsibilities in the development and regulatory 
process. Growing environmental degradation resulting from resource exploitation and the 
different requirements and impacts peculiar to each sector of the economy necessitate the 
need for environmental regulations for each sector in Nigeria. State actors in environmental 
regulations in Nigeria include the federal and semi-autonomous states and local governments.  
In light of the changing economic policies from developmental state to neoliberalism in 
Nigeria's extractive sector discussed in chapter three, here, I seek to explore empirically, how 
recent neoliberal and environmental policies reforms have affected central and subnational 
governments roles and relations in the new Nigerian cement industry. The expectation is that 
government’s role and responsibilities in the regulation of the Nigerian cement industry 
would also have been devolved between the central and the peripheral governments (Paavola, 
2008; 2016). Paavola (2016) explains that one of the cogent reasons of multilevel 




The discussion begins with description of the historical background of legal and institutional 
milestones for environmental planning and regulations regime in the country in section 5.2. I 
highlight legal instruments and institutional frameworks for environmental standard 
regulation in the various sectors of the economy that evolved over time. I then discuss the 
fragmented roles and relations between the federal, state and local governments in the 
regulation process in sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. In section 5.5 I characterised the 
relations of the state actors as experienced in the Nigerian cement industry. Having done that, 
emerging issues and their implications for sustainable development in the cement sector in 
particular and the extractive industry in general are then critically examined in section 5.6 
before the concluding section. This is achieved through the analysis of interviews with state 
and non-state actors and evidence contained in the various policy documents as well as 
burgeoning literature on development and environmental governance in Nigeria. 
5.2 Evolution in legal and institutional instruments for environmental standard 
regulation in Nigeria  
Nigeria now has a relatively comprehensive environmental regime, having the Federal 
Ministry of Environment and the National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency as the main national institutions responsible for the formulation of 
environmental policies, monitoring compliance and standard enforcement respectively 
(Fagbohun, 2012; Ladan, 2012). Nigeria’s environmental regime has gone through a series of 
transformations to promote environmentally sustainable development. Prior to the 1990s 
when the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), the first environmental agency 




Government in environmental protection were geared primarily towards the protection and 
conservation of the economically important natural resources (Ladan, 2012). There were no 
coherent laws on industrial pollution and hazardous wastes, and existing so-called 
environment-related laws were scattered throughout other policy sectors (Ladan, 2012).  
Until the late 1980s, industrialization was considered a key indicator of development until the 
emergence of the concept of sustainable development in the 1980s. States and Municipal 
governments gave tax breaks and other concessions to lure industrialists to establish industries 
in their domain, and the uninformed citizens had to live with the resultant environmental 
problems (Adegoroye, 1994). As a result, a seemingly endless list of environmental problems 
spread over the country ranging from effluents from industries into the rivers, air pollution as 
well as land degradation and health problems. By the 1980s Nigeria witnessed drastic 
environmental problems, these led to the beginning of systematic development of coherent 
environmental laws and institutions in the country. The systematic development of 
environmental regulation in Nigeria is discussed here under four phases namely: (1) The era 
of ad hoc environmental policies (1960-1987), (2) The era of toxic waste crisis (1988-1999), 
(3) The introduction of the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) (1999-2007) and (4) 
The National Environmental Standard Regulation and Enforcement Agency (NESREA, 2007- 
onward). The phases are categorized based on milestones achieved towards the emergence of 






5.2.1 Phases of systematic evolution of holistic environmental regulation institutions in 
Nigeria  
The era of ad hoc environmental policies (1960-1987) 
During the period of ad hoc environmental policies (1960-1987), there was no particular 
environmental law guiding economic and regional development in the country. There were 
only ad hoc sector by sector environment-related legislations such as the Associated Gas Re-
Injection Act 99 (1979); Oil pipeline Act (1956); Forestry Act (1958); Public Health Act 
(1958); Destruction of mosquitoes Act (1958); and Lagos’s plan of Action (1980) among 
others (Ladan, 2012). Industrialization was considered a key indicator of development and 
stringent laws to control industrial pollution and hazardous wastes as well as land degradation 
were deemed unnecessary (Adegoroye, 1994). However, the UN Stockholm conference 
(1972) on human environment ignited the need to evolve holistic environmental regulations 
and laws (Adegoroye, 1994), and led to the first major step in the process of institutionalising 
environmental concerns in project development in 1975. This was reported to have led to the 
creation of Urban development and environment department in the then Federal Ministry of 
Economic Development. The department was later renamed Division of Environmental 
Planning and Protection in 1983 in the former Ministry of Works and Housing (Ogunba, 
2004). In 1982, another attempt to formulate a coherent environmental law at the national 
level proved abortive (Nwafor, 2006). But the incident of toxic waste dumped in Koko village 
in the old Bendel state (now Delta state) in 1987 marked the turning point in the history of 
environmental protection in Nigeria (Adegoroye, 1994). The central government was forced 
to develop a holistic rather than sectoral approach to environmental protection due to public 




The toxic cargo which came from Italy was in five shipments, totalling 3884 metric tonnes; 
this seminal moment catalysed the consciousness of the government and the Nigerian people 
to environmental protection (Adegoroye, 1994). 
The era of toxic waste crisis (1988-1999) 
In reaction to the incident, the Harmful Waste Decree 42 was promulgated in November 1988 
to define harmful wastes, prohibit their dumping, and create offences related to the above act. 
Subsequently, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act 58 of 1988 was 
enacted. The FEPA Act established the Federal Environmental Protection Agency charged 
with overall responsibility for environmental protection while also encouraging state 
governments to create environmental protection bodies. During this period, FEPA published a 
few regulations for the protection of the environment among which were the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) Decree 86 of 1992. The EIA decree has since remained a 
substantive instrument for environmental intervention in the country. 
FEPA was the first African national institutional mechanism for environmental protection, 
however being the first never translated to the best environmental institution to date. The 
national policy document on the environment which was launched in 1989 guides the 
functions of FEPA. Similarly, a consultative and policy making forum called the National 
Council on the Environment was created to promote cooperation, coordination and 
harmonization of policies and implementation of enforcement strategies between and among 
federal and state environmental protection agencies (Adegoroye, 1994). By 1992, FEPA was 




expanded to include conservation of natural resources and the control of land erosion and 
desertification. FEPA was at that time organized into five major technical departments as 
follows: Planning and Evaluation, Environmental Resources Conservation, Environmental 
Technology, Environmental Quality and the Inspectorate and Enforcement, and had regional 
offices in Lagos, Port Harcourt, Benin-city, Kaduna and Kano. By 1997, the first set of EIA 
guidelines and guidelines in five major sectors of the economy were produced and applied by 
FEPA. A number of international conventions were signed during this period as covered 
below (Adegoroye, 1994).  
The EIA Act (No. 86) of 1992 established the EIA guidelines for ensuring environmentally 
sound sustainable development projects in the country. The Act outlines the goals and 
objectives of an EIA, and mandated that EIA be carried out for certain types of projects. Such 
projects include industrial, mining and petroleum activities as well as screening, reviewing 
and approving an EIA before commencing such projects. It also stipulates penalties for non-
compliance. The EIA decree was established with the aim of protecting the Nigerian 
environment and to regulate the industrialisation process with due regard for the environment. 
By this Act, no project can be executed without prior consideration of the environmental 
consequences of the project in the form of an environmental impact assessment. 
Mainstreaming EIA in Nigeria's development process is a major milestone in the history of 
environmental regulation in the country. EIA marked the beginning of environmental standard 





The introduction of the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) (1999-2007) 
In order to further ensure that the environmental objectives stated in section 20 of the 
constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria and fully implement the National policy on the 
environment, FEPA was transformed to the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) in 
1999. The ministry was mandated to integrate environmental concerns into economic 
development beyond EIA, review and strengthen existing environmental legislation as well as 
carry out intensive environmental education and awareness campaigns. The transformation of 
FEPA to a Ministry of Environment provided a platform for environmental governance 
beyond the established hierarchical, command-and-control approach. As explained by a key 
government official: - 
‘Our office is the field headquarters, Federal Ministry of Environment XXX, anything 
concerning environment is vested in the Ministry, the amelioration of the effects of 
climate change on the environment…. if you want to establish a (major) business any 
developmental business Nigeria EIA Act 86 of 1992 says any (major) developmental 
act, any development project whether by federal, state or local government or 
individual you must carry out EIA of that project before you start. Failure will attract 
penalty, fine or imprisonment or both, that is for that Ministry’ (GRFD 1, 15th October 
2012). 
 
The Federal Ministry of the Environment became the main institution charged with the 
responsibility to implement environmental intervention instrument (the EIA Act) in Nigeria. 
Though the move was laudable it was perceived to lack adequate enforcement mechanisms, 
because there was no enabling law backing environmental compliance and enforcement 
leading to a loophole between compliance and enforcement of environmental laws (Benebo, 




Enforcement Agency (NESREA) was created (Ladan, 2012).  NESREA’s creation is 
succinctly captured in the words of its first Director Dr. Mrs Ngeri Benebo: 
‘In 1999 the Government wisely decided to merge, the Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency and relevant Departments from other Ministries into a single 
Federal Ministry of Environment. However, the new Ministry of Environment lacked 
the necessary laws to enable enforcement. This created a vacuum in the effective 
oversight of environmental laws, standards and regulations in the country’ (Benebo, 
2010 p.541). 
The National Environmental Standard Regulation and Enforcement Agency (NESREA, 
2007- onward) 
By 2007, the Federal Government realized the pressing need to further address the 
enforcement gap and the National Environmental Standard Regulation and Enforcement 
Agency (NESREA) Act 2007 was promulgated to repeal the FEPA Act. This new Act created 
NESREA as a parastatal body of the then Federal Ministry of the Environment, Housing and 
Urban development with a vision to inspire personal and collective responsibility in building 
an environmentally sustainable Nigeria. The Act empowered this agency to enforce all 
environmental laws, guidelines, policies, standards and regulations in the country as well as 
compliance with provision of international agreements, protocols, conventions and treaties on 
the environment to which the country is a signatory (Our activities- NESREA, 2017). With 
the establishment of NESREA, it is believed that industrial environmental degradation will be 




The Agency is structured into one service and three technical Departments, namely: 
Administration & Finance Department; Planning & Policy Analysis; Inspection & 
Enforcement and Environmental Quality Control. The agency also has regional offices in all 
the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria with state offices in 13 states. The NESREA Act and 
Regulations constitute a new beginning because in both purpose and contents, they aim at 
addressing the preponderance of obsolete environmental regulations, standards and 
enforcement mechanisms. Over the years, the absence of such regulation has resulted in high 
rates of non-compliance with environmental laws, regulations and standards (Ladan, 2012). In 
order to deliver on its mandate, the immediate implementation strategies of NESREA are 
geared towards governance through adopting the following approaches: 1) collaboration and 
partnership; 2) conducting public education and awareness on topical environmental issues; 
and 3) strengthening institutions and building capacity to monitor compliance and enforce 
existing environmental regulations, including guidelines for best practices (Ladan, 2012). 
To achieve its main objective, the agency developed and is still developing regulatory 
guidelines for the different sectors of the economy. About 33 regulations have so far been 
developed and are implemented nationally (GFRD5, 14thApril, 2016). However, it is 
important to note that NESREA is a Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) (a parastatal) 
under the Federal Ministry of the Environment charged with environmental standard 
enforcement, while the Ministry is responsible for environmental standard mainstreaming in 
any project through EIA approval. Changes in environmental regulation in Nigeria has widely 





‘… this law of EIA was latent during the military, then during the civilian EIA Act of 
1992… so before then I don’t think there was serious monitoring of these industries, I 
think they were all doing what they feel they can do, but since the enactment of that 
Act, there have been changes’ (GRFD1 15th October 2012).  
When asked about the experience in the cement sector, the interviewee states that: 
‘Now they cover the conveying belt so that the dust from the quarry will not go into 
the atmosphere, even their storage point is also covered. So, you can’t see dust, I have 
been there recently, so environmental management has improved more than it used to 
be because of the effects of the EIA. You know they built one new factory now, the 
XXX, it’s up to standard so I think every mitigation measure has been introduced, I 
think they are complying’ (GRFD1 15th October 2012).  
 
Another government official also has this to say about the changes in environmental 
regulation in Nigeria: - 
‘Before NESREA came on board, there have been a lot of activities going on that are 
not well regulated, because the Ministry of Environment is saddled with so many 
responsibilities. That area of enforcement wasn’t given much needed attention. And 
that’s what led to the Act that established NESREA. So, that NESREA will be given 
the function of enforcing environmental law to ensure that every industrialist, 
manufacturing company comply with the details of environmental ordinance’ 
(GFRD5, 14th April 2016). 
 
In this context, Ladan (2012, p.119) affirms that ‘Nigeria’s formal environmental regime has 
developed significantly from humble beginnings. Having been initiated in the colonial period 
during which environmental issues were generally couched within public health regulation. 
and having developed in a rather ad hoc manner in the early days of independence during 
which heavy reliance was placed on the law of nuisance, Nigeria now has a relatively 
comprehensive environmental regime’. But is having comprehensive environmental regime 




This section has reviewed the emergence of a coherent environmental regulation instrument in 
Nigeria at about the same period neoliberalism was spreading globally. Trending the historical 
development of the institutions for environmental standard regulation in the country to date, it 
could be understood that these institutions emerged after much pressure from the public and 
international community. Significant achievements could be said to have been made by 
setting up necessary legal and institutional instruments needed to ensure coherent 
environmental standard regulation as the country further dips into neoliberalism. Having said 
this, the roles of FMENV as statutory and foremost institutions for environmental regulation 
in the cement sector is discussed in the next section.  
5.3 The role of FMENV and NESREA in environmental regulation in Nigeria’s cement 
sector 
With the emergence of EIA Act as the environmental mainstreaming instrument, it was no 
more business as usual for investors in the Nigeria cement sector more importantly as 
government was no more the core investor. The main achievement of the evolution of a 
coherent national environmental regulation institution is that government has successfully 
separated regulatory roles from business roles. Government is no more the polluter and at the 
same time the regulator. While government has considerably divested its interest to the 
private sector actors in the Nigerian cement industry, it has evolved a statutory institution to 
ensure the mainstreaming of environmental protection into businesses. Government has also 
strengthened sub-national governments to protect their immediate environment. In light of 
this, existing industries were asked to do environmental audits and reassess their impacts 




2016). Though, no evidence to back this claim but by inference, the role of NESREA was to 
strengthen the regulatory process through ensuring that existing industries comply with 
evolving regulatory processes. The National Policy on the Environment (NPE) outlines the 
procedures and actions required to launch Nigeria into an era of social justice, self-reliance 
and sustainable development in the 21st Century. However, effective application of the policy 
has remained the nation’s greatest challenge as environmental degradation still persists in the 
country. The policy has at its core the will to ensure sustainable development based on proper 
management of the environment through the integration of environmental concerns into major 
economic decision-making processes. It also emphasises internalizing environmental 
remediation costs into major development projects and employing economic instruments in 
the management of natural resources as well as the use of environmentally friendly 
technologies.  The process of ensuring this starts with mandatory conduct of Environmental 
Impact Assessment before embarking on any major development project. The EIA process is 
a confirmation of the relative significance of the state in environmental governance nationally 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2010). 
Furthermore, the NPE adopts several principles of sustainable development. These include: 
● The precautionary principle which holds that where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, the lack of full scientific knowledge shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective means to prevent environmental degradation.  
● The Polluter Pays Principle (3p+) which encourages industries to invest positively to 
prevent pollution, by emphasising that the polluter should bear the cost of preventing 




● The user pays principle (UPP), in which the cost of a resource to a user must include 
all the environmental costs associated with its extraction, transformation and use 
(including the costs of alternative or future uses forgone).  
● The principle of intergenerational equity which requires that the needs of the present 
generation are met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs is also adopted.  
● The principle of intra-generational equity which requires that different groups of 
people within the country and within the present generation have the right to benefit 
equally from the exploitation of resources and that they have an equal right to a clean 
and healthy environment and  
● The subsidiary principle which requires that decisions should as much as possible be 
made by communities affected or on their behalf by the authorities closest to them.  
While putting the above principles into practice begins with FMENV, it also directly involves 
subnational governments before it finally ends with the central government. The process 
within the FEMENV was explained by a senior government official as follows:   
‘The ministry (FMENV) is divided into six professional departments and two service 
departments …you also have environmental assessment department, that is another 
department… Their own duty is if you want to establish a business any developmental 
business in Nigeria the EIA Act 86 of 1992 says any developmental act, any 
development project whether by federal, state or local government or individual you 
must carry out EIA of that project before you start’ (GRFD1 15th October 2012). 
He further explained the processes involved: 
‘…So, when you now go to the Ministry to obtain EIA form, fill it, they will come and 
inspect - site verification. That is the first thing to come see where you are going to 
establish… is it a company or whatever, a cement factory, whatever. They will come 




people, Memorandum of Understanding with people or just took the land? They will 
know whether you acquire the land in a proper way, ask you some questions, look at 
the land whether there are water bodies in the area, are people living in that area, you 
know, and all that kind of. So, they will know, look at the vegetation of that area. Is it 
forested or just secondary vegetation or the rest? … so, those things will be taken note 
of. So, after that you are now being given the go ahead to start test, may be like soil 
sample, water air, all those things, and write your EIA report before you now bring it 
to the ministry for approval before there will be a panel, that panel will be an 
independent panel to look at the report’ (GRFD1 15th October 2012).  
Another government official further explained the intergovernmental processes involved: 
‘… after the company, might have submitted the EIA report, what the federal ministry 
of environment does is to invite us. They will invite the state, they will invite the local 
government, they will also invite the immediate communities and other stakeholders. 
Then there will be a round table, submit the report to us, we will review those areas 
that we feel that the company has to do something about, we will tell them. The 
federal government also does the same thing, the local government does the same 
thing. They set up a review panel, the federal ministry of environment will invite 
expert from different fields, in areas of socio economics, areas of waste management, 
then area of mining activities if it has to be a cement industry, just like when, this new 
WAPCO factory was been set up such things was also carried out’ (GRST1, 15th 
October 2012). 
The stakeholder involvement was also affirmed by another government representative: 
‘Every stakeholder used to be around even academia, professional bodies, NGOs etc. 
it’s not just federal, state and local government affair’ (GFRD5, 14th April 2016). 
As earlier discussed, to ensure effective coordination of all environmental matters, the Federal 
Ministry of Environment was first created in 1999. It was merged in 2006 with Housing & 
Urban Development Ministry. In 2008 a new Federal Ministry of Environment was created, 
the Ministry has since remained the interface for environmental consciousness in line with 
global environmental practices for sustainable economic and livelihood of Nigerians. The 
head office of the Ministry is in Abuja with field offices in the 36 states of the federation. The 
ministry comprises of six technical departments, eight service departments seven NDPBs and 




and natural resources conservation for sustainable development of the country (About the 
Ministry, 2017).  
The main instrument used to achieve this mission is the EIA Act No. 86 of 1992. 
Environmental assessment department, a technical department in the ministry is saddled with 
the responsibility of implementing the EIA Act. It is claimed that the department is to ensure 
environmentally sustainable development through regulation of the oil and gas industry, 
environmental impacts assessment of development projects and development of guidelines 
and standards for environmental quality monitoring (“About the Ministry”, 2017).  The 
environmental assessment department is domiciled in the headquarters in Abuja while other 
departments are found in the field offices across the country (GFRD1, 15th October 2012).  
Under the Department of Environmental Assessment (DEA) is the Impact Mitigation 
Monitoring (IMM) branch. The IMM oversees EIA auditing and post-impact analysis of 
approved projects. In my views, the role of IMM conflicts with the duties of NESREA. The 
DEA supervises NESREA among other parastatals and works with the ministry of mines and 
steel development, the line ministry for the cement sector. It was learnt that there exists a 
MoU for collaboration and cooperation between the Department of Environmental 
Assessment on behalf of the Ministry and the Mines Compliance department on behalf of 
MMSD on EIA, Environmental Audit and other matters related to mining and the 
environment (About the Ministry, 2017). This is argued necessary to address conflicting roles 
and responsibilities hindering the success of environmental regulation experienced in the past 




Under Section 12 (8 &13) of the EIA Guidelines, establishing a cement industry requires 
social and environmental impact assessment. The Act provides the necessary requirement of 
balancing both the positive and negative impacts of the project on the environment and the 
society. Section 2 (1) of the Act requires an assessment of public or private projects that are 
likely to have a significant (negative) impact on the environment. Section 2 (4) states that the 
basic starting point of EIA is an application in writing to the ministry for their environmental 
assessment before embarking on the project and section 60 creates a legal liability for 
contravention of any provision.  
 





This section has discussed the emergence of a national, coherent environmental institution 
(FMENV) and policy instrument (EIA) in Nigeria. It also shows that this development 
signifies the government intention to prioritise environmental protection nationally. In the 
environmental regulation process federal, state and local governments play roles leading to 
EIA approval of any development project such as cement production. The next section 
explores the EIA process and key stakeholders involved in the Nigerian cement industry.  
5.3.1 Stakeholders and Stages of EIA process in the cement sector 
Major stakeholders involved in the EIA process as an environmental instrument in Nigeria are 
the government agencies (Federal, state and local), the non-state stakeholders such as 
environmental consultants, the project proponent, the public and the NGOs (see Figure 5.2). 
Government agencies particularly the federal government, play the most important role in the 
process as the framework to ensure the success of the process emanates from them.  The key 
decision-makers in the process are the government as the regulator, registered consultants as 
the middlemen and the project developer.  
Table 5.2 Major stakeholders in the EIA process in Nigeria (Author) 
Stakeholders Roles 
Government agencies  
Federal 




Non-state stakeholders  
Project proponent Developer/cement company 
Environmental consultants Middlemen 





Considering the EIA Act, environmental regulation in the cement industry begins with 
application in writing to the federal ministry of environment for environmental impact 
statement/certificate (EIS). The intending cement company (proponent) applies to the 
regulating ministry (FMENV) by submitting the project proposal detailing the project 
information; environmental impacts of the project, and the project alternatives at all the 
phases of the project. In the case of the cement sector, the construction site, size and design 
along with operational and decommission stages constitute the body of the proposal. The 
Mitigation measures and monitoring strategies throughout the entire life of the project as well 
as explicit post-closure plan / reclamation of the environment are also included. This is then 
followed by initial environmental evaluation by the Department of Environmental Assessment 
(DEA) in the ministry before a go ahead order to draft the EIA. The initial evaluation is 
undertaken to screen all projects likely to take place in the area whether there is the need for 
EIA. After the screening, the proponent is then permitted to prepare a draft of the EIA. 
In accordance with Sections 7; 22 (3), 25 & 37 of the EIA Act, the EIA draft report will be 
presented to the public for comments by the regulating ministry. This is to afford the 
stakeholders and interested public the chance to give their views on the social and 
environmental impacts of the project. This is an important aspect of the EIA process that has 
been contentious in recent time (Ogunba, 2004). Comments arising from the display to the 
public are then forwarded to the Independent Review Panel. The draft must be subjected to an 
impartial, scientific and independent review parallel to the regulating ministry and the 
proponent. The report must then be submitted to the council through the regulating ministry 




unbiased information is provided. According to Section 39 of the EIA Act the regulating 
ministry must publish the report of the independent review in the appropriate manner and 
shall advise the public that the report is available. 
Final decision following the provisions of the Act is then made. The project is either approved 
having met necessary requirements of the assessment or further modification is requested for 
EIA reconsideration. The decision may also be that the project is rejected if necessary 
conditions are not met by the project developer. The decision of the regulating ministry shall 
be in writing detailing the project operations, recommended mitigation plans for the adverse 
environmental impacts that have been adopted and the follow up programme to be 
implemented for the project. More importantly, the decision of the regulating ministry must 
be published and made available to any interested public or group. If approved, the regulating 
ministry is further mandated by law to carry out its statutory role of monitoring the activities 
of the proponent for mitigations at all phases of the project as stated in section 41 of the EIA 
Act.  
Having gained approval from the regulating ministry for the project to take-off, the need for 
compliance and enforcement of the plans proposed in the statement becomes mandatory. It 
has been noted that the challenge of environmental regulation in Nigeria was the absence of a 
statutory agency backed by law to enforce environmental standard despite the presence of 
adequate legislation and guidelines for environmental standard (Ogunba, 2004; Benebo, 2011; 




 Figure 5.2: Environmental Impact assessment process in the Nigerian Cement Industry 
Source: EIA Act No. 86 of 1992 
 
Dr. Mrs Ngeri Benebo, former director of NESREA has this to say about environmental 
regulation in Nigeria: - 
 “In the past, weak environmental governance - characterized by poor compliance 
monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws, standards and regulations – was 
one of the main challenges to addressing the myriad environmental problems in 
Nigeria. But over the last two decades, environmental governance has become central 
to government efforts to implement a wide range of environmental programmes 
designed to protect air, water, natural resources, wildlife and public health. 
Environmental governance has also become a major instrument used by the 
government to help address problems such as the discharge of pollutants into the 
environment, the control of hazardous wastes, and the protection of ecosystems, flora 




institutional mechanisms on environmental compliance monitoring and enforcement 
… The new Ministry of Environment lacked the necessary laws to enable 
enforcement. This created a vacuum in the effective oversight of environmental laws, 
standards and regulations in the country. To address this gap in line with section 20 of 
the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Federal Government 
established the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement 
Agency, as a parastatal of the Federal Ministry of Environment. The National 
Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency Act 2007 repealed the 
Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act Cap F 10 LFN 2004” (Benebo, 2011, 
p.540-541). 
 
The above submission captures the essence of the creation of an enforcement agency 
separately in response to the new trend of challenges emerging after efforts to evolve a 
coherent national environmental protection instrument. Jordan (2008) notes that the more 
government aim to solve a pressing problem, the more complex problems emerge, this shows 
the degree of complexity involved in social relations. NESREA is the newest institutional 
mechanism created by the Nigerian government to ensure effective environmental 
governance. NESREA monitors compliance and enforces environmental laws, standards and 
regulations as well involve relevant stakeholders in the implementation of its programmes and 
activities (Benebo, 2011). The important role NESREA’s emergence plays is reiterated below 
by a key interviewee 
‘Before NESREA came on board, most of the industries have been doing it in a way 
that they cut corners. They don’t want to go through the right process. They just start 
operation without having the necessary environmental papers. But since NESREA 
came, we have been enforcing the document. The situation has changed. And now any 
extractive industry that wants to start operation know they have to get the complete 
document because there is awareness. They know NESREA will frown at it if we get 





Section 2, of NESREA Act, 2007 established NESREA as the main environmental regulatory 
body. The role of NESREA in environmental regulation in the cement sector is to ensure 
compliance with environmental management system as agreed in the Environmental Impact 
Statement by the regulating ministry and the project proponent. A key government actor 
narrates NESREA’s role as follows: - 
‘To start with, we first identify the facility to monitor. We carry out an inventory with 
the help of the other stakeholders e.g. local government, state etc., to know where the 
facility is situated. Once we have the names and the location. Then the agency will 
appoint a desk officer to be in charge of the facility. So, the desk officer will constitute 
the team to monitor the facility and a letter of introduction will be written from the 
office to the facility. The team will then choose a date for inspection’ (GFRD5, 14th 
April 2016). 
He explained further that: 
‘After the inspection, there will be closing conference. The leader of team will reveal 
the result of their observation and necessary recommendations will be given to them 
verbally. When the team gets back to the office, they will write a report and 
recommendation which will be submitted to their boss. The boss will go through it and 
approval will be given on it. Then a letter will be forwarded to the operators of the 
facility inspected’(GFRD5, 14th April 2016). 
Then, 
‘A time limit will be given to them depending on the level of observation. And after 
the expiration of the time limit, if the concerned area has not been addressed, another 
letter will be written as a reminder for them to address the concern. And failure to 
address the concern, there will be another letter and that will be in form of abatement 
letter. If they fail to comply, another letter in form of abatement notice with timeframe 
to comply with. Failure to comply with that will lead to sealing order. A sealing order 
or stop work order will be given. If that is tampered with, the office will take a legal 
action against them. And if it’s not tampered with, after sealing, an administrative fine 
will be given to them for not complying with the order of the agency. And if the fine is 
paid, and they rectify what they were told to do, then the company will be opened’ 





The inspection process explained above is shown in figure 5.3 below: 
Figure 5.3 NESREA facility inspection process 
Another respondent has this to say about the agency: - 
‘Oh yes! That is the police force of federal ministry of environment. Yea! they are the 
one allowed to enforce the standard, so what the core ministry do, if we go on 
monitoring we see it, direct it to headquarters, headquarters will now direct it to an 
agency that enforces’ (GFRD2, 15th October 2012).  
 
Two main policy documents guiding NESREA functions in the cement sector are National 
Environmental (Mining and Processing of Coal, Ores and Industrial Minerals) Regulations, S. 
I. No. 31 of 2009. The Regulation aims to minimize pollution from mining and processing of 
industrial minerals and encourage the application of up-to-date efficient cleaner production 




Sector) Regulations, S. I. No. 21 of 2011 provides the regulatory framework for the control of 
all activities of this sector in order to protect Nigerian environment from their negative 
impact.  
The nature of a cement company requires that raw materials (Limestone) be mined and then 
processed to get the final product which is the cement. This is classified as quarrying and 
production operations respectively. The main material for cement production is limestone 
which is mined in the quarry and conveyed to the factory for processing to the final product. 
While quarrying affect the natural ecosystem in some many ways (CSI, 2002; Steinweg, 
2008), the processing also involves intensive energy consumption and carbon emission 
processes. The global cement industry releases about 0.8 tonne of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere per tonne of cement produced (European Cement Association, 2009; Yared, 
2010) producing up to 5% of global man-made CO2 which contributes to climate change 
(Industry Update, 2010; CSI 2002). Cement production accounts for 60% of CO2 produced 
while 40% comes from fuel used in the process (Brown etal., 2012). The regulations for 
cement production require that an operational cement industry in Nigeria must carry out 
environmental audit every two to three years to ensure the industry is complying with its 
environmental management plans (EMP) (GFRD5, 14th April 2016).  The environmental 
assessment must be carried out by environmental consultants accredited by NESREA on 
behalf of the company. Accredited consultants serve as middlemen between the regulating 





‘NESREA’s duty is to carry out auditing. So the consultant accredited by federal 
ministry is accredited to carry out environmental impact assessment not audit, so 
NESREA accredit their own consultants for audit. There are guidelines to follow like 
obtaining an EIA of that area before carrying out any activity. An approval will be 
given to carry on, then after operation has commenced, every three years, it is the duty 
of facility operators to ensure that the facilities are audited by accredited consultant’ 
(GFRD5, 14th April 2016). 
 
The above statement reveals an issue of serious concern about power tussle between the 
Ministry of environment and NESREA. In view of the above discussions, without doubt the 
central government plays a germane role in development policies and environmental 
regulation processes in the extractive industry. Therefore Parenti (2014) argues that a modern 
territorial state’s role is managing, mediating, producing and delivering non-human nature - a 
capitalist state. This section reveals the changing and conflicting roles of the central 
government in environmental regulation in the devolved Nigerian cement industry. While this 
is not, it goes on to show that lessons learnt in the past have not had any significant impact in 
policy reforms in the country. The findings signify the continued establishment of hierarchical 
command and control environmental regulation process in the country with little 
modifications. It also revealed the intention of the government to becoming the regulator of 
the environment and facilitator of sustainable development in the industry. This is evident in 
the different roles the FMENV and NESREA play in the regulation process. However, during 
this period, subnational governments too have been actively engaging in environmental 
regulation in the industry as empowered by the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria 
and the national policy on the environment.   
As such, the regulation process in the cement sector involves the state and local government 




by the discussion of the roles of subnational governments in environmental regulation process 
in the Nigerian cement industry. 
‘Cement industry is an extractive industry which has significant impact on the 
environmental wellbeing of the people and climate change issues in general. By virtue 
of the nature of the industry as extractive one, the exclusive right belongs to the 
central government to control but the environment belongs to all and is on the 
concurrent list in the constitution of Nigeria. This gives the state legal right to play a 
significant role in regulating environmental impacts of the industry’. (GRST4, 1st June 
2016). 
In the above statement, it is noteworthy that as an extractive industry, subnational 
governments have no legitimate role in its development, they are passively involved in the 
decision-making process. Their active role is only pronounced in environmental regulation in 
the sector. 
Another government representative explains this as evident below: 
‘To carry out our compliance responsibility, in the first instance, you know I 
mentioned that we first identify the facility through the local government, state 
government. And funny enough most of these extractive industries are not within the 
metropolis. They are all situated in the forest. So, we collaborate with them to give us 
the necessary information in order to be able to locate them’ (GFRD5 14th April 
2016). 
 
The next section discusses how the roles evidenced above are played by subnational 
governments in the Nigerian cement industry. 
5.4 The role of subnational governments in environmental regulation in the Nigerian 
cement sector 
‘The state is carried along in the EIA processes from inception to approval, while after 




with the responsibility of enforcing compliance at the state government level’ (GRST4 
1st June 2016). 
 
The above statement attests to the two main roles of subnational government in environmental 
regulation in the Nigerian cement industry - Participation in Environmental Impact 
Assessment process and inspection and compliance monitoring during operations. As 
contained in the National policy on the environment, state governments have the rights to 
create their own Ministry of environment to perform their constitutional right of ensuring safe 
and sound environment within their states. The government of Ogun state in line with the 
above established the ministry of environment and Ogun state Environmental Protection 
Agency (OGEPA). Subject to NESREA Act 2007, the Ogun State Environmental Protection 
Agency (OGEPA) Act 4 of 2003 and Ministry of Environment Law of 2004 are the main 
policy documents guiding the state roles in environmental regulation in the cement sector 
(Onilude, 2015). The Ogun state Ministry of environment plays a significant part in the EIA 
process before the final decision by the federal ministry of the environment. The Inspection 
and Compliance Monitoring Department (ICMD) of the Ogun State Environmental Protection 
Agency (OGEPA) then takes up the responsibility of monitoring environmental compliance if 
the project is approved. This was confirmed by a government respondent: 
‘Part of the activities we carry out here, one of them is we carry out inspection, in 
form of assessment, and auditing of industrial facilities in the state. Secondly, we do a 
kind of review of environmental reports, the reports are in two or three forms one of 
them is the environmental audit report which is a two year, report that is submitted to 
the agency. Then the other one, is environmental implications studies, which is a 
smaller version of environmental impact assessment studies that is being done for a 
larger project but the implications study is done for two kind of industries. One is an 
industry that is about to start. Like I said it’s a smaller version of EIA, so for industry 
that is starting, then the other one is for an existing industry, that is proposing to 




The respondent continued: - 
‘We do a kind of impact mitigation monitoring and that impact mitigation monitoring 
is after an industry has submitted the EIA or the environmental implications study. 
Then the impact mitigation monitoring is done quarterly, we do on our own, but most 
of the time we don’t really do much of it, but in conjunction with federal ministry of 
environment. We do it quarterly, at times twice a year, depending on the kind of 
approval given to that industry by the ministry of environment’ (GRST1, 15th October 
2012). 
 
The approval of the EIA comes from the federal ministry of environment while the 
compliance monitoring is done by the federal government and state Agencies (that is 
FMENV, NESREA and OGEPA). A key participant has this to say about roles of the agencies 
as representatives of central and subnational governments: - 
‘When you look at the law that’s 1988 law, the federal ministry of environment 
empowered state to monitor the industry, that’s compliance monitoring. They monitor 
once in a while but the state is like community police and that’s what they are 
expected to do. The state work on any issue before it gets to the federal level. They 
take immediate action in a particular area. NESREA is the federal police’. (EC1, 5th 
May 2016). 
Under the EIA Act the state government as the host is involved in the EIA review process till 
the approval stage. This is to ensure credible environmental management plan which will 
guide the state actors in monitoring the operations of the company. At the local government 
level, the local government actors are partly involved in the EIA process of industries mainly 
as spoke persons for the host communities as emphasised in the subsidiarity principle in the 
National Policy on the Environment. A key actor at the local government level states that: - 
‘We are not so much involved in the process before it is finally approved, normally the 
EIA that we have been receiving here is being sent down from the Federal Ministry of 
Environment. When we receive, we monitor, and at times we invite the originators of 




duty is just to monitor and make sure that they adhere strictly with what we have on 
that paper, that is what we do’ (GRLG2, 14th November 2012).  
Another interviewee had this to say: - 
‘During the environmental monitoring and compliance visit, the Ministry from the 
headquarters, officials will come, the state involved, if it’s here in Ogun state we will 
involve one or two persons. The state Ministry of environment or OGEPA, the state 
environmental protection agency, they too will be involved, then the local government 
where that eh... factory or industry is located, will also be involved. But the 
community are not represented because, I think the Act does not include them in the 
visit because the environmental person from the local government will be there 
representing the interest of the community because any protest the community will 
have will be lodged with the local government. So, they will come with the view or 
views of the community, may be if the community are not happy concerning their 
welfare or whatever, that representative of the local government will present it in that 
meeting’ (GFRD1 15th October 2012).  
 
The above statements indicate that though local government actors are involved in the 
environmental regulatory process in the cement sector, the tier of government almost always 
receives information about EIA too late to influence its approval by the federal government. 
As the closest government actor to the people, local government actors are expected to be 
carried along in the EIA process from inception. This shows that the subsidiarity principle 
which emphasises delegation of decision-making powers to the local governments as the 
closest to the people (Blank, 2009) is not practicable in the Nigerian extractive industry. A 
key government official’s reaction below told me: - 
‘Initially, I talked about delegation of roles to some stakeholders, areas of waste 
management have been delegated to the state. Also, monitoring of eateries has been 
delegated to the state, but that doesn’t stop us from going to those areas to educate and 
give them awareness. Also, the food handler’s permit has been given to the state to 
issue, and the area of environmental monitoring has been assigned to the local 
government to carry them along. Though they might not have the legislation in most 
of the environmental instances, but NESREA has all the necessary legislations on the 




they can’t prosecute, they do refer it to us. And the one that has been assigned to them 
to monitor, we get across to them and make proper investigations. If there is any area 
that concerns the state, we send them a letter to that effect’. (GFRD5, 14th April 2016) 
 
The roles of federal and subnational actors in environmental regulation in the Nigerian cement 
industry discussed above indicates the inevitability of government actors regulating health and 
environment of the cement sector. Compared to the past efforts, emergent institutions and 
regulations for environmental regulation in the country in general show that environmental 
well-being is considerably taking the centre stage. However, the emergent roles of the 
government actors are still very complex. This is not to say all is well with environmental 
regulation in Nigeria but significant progress has been made in the process of evolving a 
coherent environmental intervention regime for the country. These institutions can deliver 
positive environmental outcomes only if their roles are supportive rather than conflicting as it 
is experienced in this study. In the next section, I characterise the above findings and identify 
the complications and implications on environmental regulation in the Nigerian extractive 
industry as experienced in this case study.  
5.5 Characterising the state actors’ roles evident in the Nigerian cement industry  
 Evidence so far shows that the characteristics of state actors’ new roles in the Nigerian 
cement industry as a typology of Hooghe and Marks’ (2003) Type 1 Multilevel Governance 
(MLG). As discussed in chapter two, Hooghe and Marks explain that Type I multilevel 
governance is characterised with a nested jurisdiction (Nigeria) where every citizen is located. 
In the jurisdiction, there is only one relevant jurisdiction (National government) at a territorial 




this jurisdiction, it is stated that the allocation of policy competences (development and 
regulatory policies) across the jurisdictional levels is flexible (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The 
experience of the Nigerian cement industry environmental governance presents the 
characteristics Hooghe and Marks (2003) explain as Type I MLG. It is also similar to what 
Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) term multiple tiers of authority and hierarchical mode of 
environmental governance by Kooiman (2003). Despite the emphasis on subsidiarity 
principles in the environmental policy of the country, the central government still hold the 
regulatory power. Though governments at various scales engage in other modes of 
governance such as persuasion, and co-governance/collaborative governance, the hierarchical 
mode remains the basis on which other modes are practiced. For example, NESREA 
established a voluntary corps scheme called Green corps. The scheme is controlled by the 
agency.  
Another major example is the involvement of environmental consultants in environmental 
regulation as middlemen between government and the cement companies. Environmental 
consultant must be contracted by any project proponent to conduct EIA as well as 
environmental audit. The consultants must be registered and accredited yearly by the national 
and state government in some cases. Apart from the overexploitation by the government, 
government officials do not allow level playground for the consultants (EC1, 5th May 2016). 
They influence the choice of consultants used by a company, this not only poses a big threat 
to the survival of the consultants, it also put the credibility and sincerity of the whole process 
to doubt. Moreover, the choice of who the government works or partner with has been largely 




creation of NESREA to enforce environmental standard hitherto missing and the development 
of 33 sectoral regulations to address their peculiar environmental challenges is no doubt 
laudable compared to the past.  
Successes achieved so far are due to pressure from the non-state actors inside and outside the 
country particularly the adoption and domestication of Agenda 21 in the country. It is quite 
appreciable that Nigeria’s environmental regulation system has moved from mere command 
and control toward an incentive based regulation through the polluter pays principle set out in 
1992 Rio Declaration. The Rio Declaration emphasises that a polluter: 
● Should incorporate external cost into its operations. 
● More importantly, where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, the lack of 
full scientific knowledge shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
means to prevent environmental degradation.  
A comprehensive EIA is mandatory to ensure cost-effective environmental remediation plan 
is put in place by the proponent. The fundamental principle in the constitution of Nigeria 
indicates development and environmental regulation process in the industry begins from the 
central/federal government. It also allows the state governments to take active part in the 
process. This gives the states the space in which they may operate in cooperation or in parallel 
to the federal government particularly in the compliance enforcement stage which has always 
been the areas of concern (Fagbohun, 2012; Fagbohun & Adejonwo-Osho, 2013; Erhun, 
2015). This parallel arrangement has been attributed to poor framework for best practices to 
secure effective and efficient enforcement and compliance with international and municipal 




existing legal and institutional frameworks are minimal and sub-optimal and has led to 
significant social and environmental welfare losses (Amokaye, 2012). 
Similarly, Fagbohun and Adejonwo-Osho (2013) admit that Nigerian government has 
responded to global call for environmental protection with pieces of legislations, agencies, 
institutions and policy statements on the governance and management of the environment. 
The extensive legislations, institutions and policy statements have no effective and robust 
framework for implementation to achieve the desired sustainable environmental management 
(Fagbohun & Adejonwo-Osho, 2013). Relatedly, Erhun (2015) attests that Nigeria enjoys a 
comparatively well-established body of laws and a full-fledged Ministry to regulate the 
Nigerian environment but despite all these measures, the country still experiences regulatory 
failure in environmental governance because economic development is priced over and above 
sustainability of the environment. A common ground in the above submissions is that Nigeria 
no doubt has put in place some key environmental policies and regulations but the 
frameworks for its successful implementation is lacking. In light of this great challenge, 
Fagbohun (2012, p.10) argues that  
“The inefficiency with environmental regulation in Nigeria is a creation rather than the 
effect of the law. Rather than being central, law is incidental. I further contend that in 
the absence of a profound reconfiguration of the present regime, particularly in the 
way it has guided allocation and monitoring of responsibilities for environmental 
protection, there is no reason to imagine and/or expect current strategies to succeed in 




There is every indication that the main problem affecting environmental regulation in Nigeria 
as reflected in the Nigerian cement sector is that the existing law has not made adequate 
provision to avoid duplication of duty and over-filing between government actors. The main 
weakness of the law is concerned with delegation of responsibility to the lowest level of 
public authority close to the people (Fagbohun & Adejonwo-Osho, 2013; Erhun 2015).  This 
weakness has been a cause for concern as explained by a non-governmental professional 
participant: - 
‘We need strong government to tackle bad behaviour (corruption and unethical 
practices) and make sure our economic policy works. National system of innovation 
can’t thrive with the level of bad behaviour we have in the system. Like the 
government is strong now, then national assembly should cooperate to change the 
laws. The laws are very weak against the kind of bad behaviours we have. If someone 
stole billions and he’s told to pay fine or it takes a year to be convicted. And you see 
lawyers sharing in the loot and defending people we know are thieves. So, the laws are 
very weak, national assembly should cooperate by looking at the laws and be 
reviewed. The three arms of government need to be very strong’. (AC2, 4th May 2016) 
 
Another important weakness of the law is that existing law provides opportunities for 
offenders because of conflicting standards and information gaps as expressed below by some 
participants: - 
‘You see where you have regulations and you cannot really get those regulations right 
and many people don’t even know what these regulations are. The information that are 
supposed to be readily available on their website are being sold or if you have to travel 
to Abuja from wherever you are before you can get them and these are things that 
ordinarily, should be free so if people want to comply, let them know what they want 
to comply with’ (EC2, 6th May 2016).  
In the case of law enforcement, a government representative relates that: - 
‘In the areas of law enforcement as well, we are still working on the law, for instance 




the company got a copy of OGEPA law, that the fine of burning waste is #50,000, so 
they have to pay 50,000 because they are not burning waste in their premises. They 
took their waste to a suburb and they were burning it under a high-tension wire. So, 
we have to strengthen the law. The challenges are just the areas of logistic, 
enforcement, addressing the issue of regulation to make it more current’ (GRST3, 13th 
April 2016) 
Another key non-state participant relates his experience: - 
‘I have been to several workshops that NESREA and ministry of Environment will 
openly disagree about issues. Openly, they have not been able to manage themselves 
well. Look at ordinary noise level, Ministry of environment says 90 for some areas. 
The same area, NESREA says 70’ (CPC1, 11th April 2016). 
Relatedly, another key participant submits that: -  
‘Different tiers of government actors monitor compliance of the industry to 
Environmental Management Plan. These include federal, state and local governments. 
NESREA particularly is the federal agency saddled with regulations and standard 
enforcement, but other actors too sometimes come to do same duty claiming legal 
right on the account of territorial interest and that environment is a common wealth 
and is on the concurrent list in the Nigerian constitution. This sometimes leads to 
conflict of interests, double standard, wasteful spending which is not good for not only 
business but also good government’ (CPC4, 3rdMay 2016).  
 
As evident above, “multi-level governance solution may minimize governance costs if and 
when governance functions have different optimal scales of implementation” (Paavola 2016, 
p. 147). Conflict of interest, double standard and wasteful spending constitute considerably to 
escalating cost of governing. However, reducing cost of governance is one important 
explanation of multilevel environmental governance (Paavola 2008, 2016). Multilevel 
Environmental governance can help overcome the challenge of fragmentation and aid 
integration of actors’ efforts as collective actions thereby reducing government cost and 




those of devising and agreeing on rules, monitoring and enforcing compliance with them, and 
resolving conflicts over them.  
By implication, the present state of environmental regulation in Nigeria negates collective 
action solutions embedded in multilevel environmental governance. Aside from reducing 
governance cost, multilevel environmental governance also promotes collective actions. 
MLEG can be adopted as an instrument to facilitate collective action through the introduction 
of representation (Paavola, 2016). Assigning key functions to subnational government actors 
rather than creating conflicting situations and double standards could be better option in this 
case. Applauding the legal, institutional and environmental intervention and standard setting, 
the integration of the fragmented actors’ activities toward multi-functionality of the 
environment is significantly elusive. Multi-functionality refers to the possibility of multiple 
use of natural resources such as forests and watercourses best exemplified with the help of the 
ecosystem service literature (Paavola 2016, p. 149). The concept was developed and well 
documented in agricultural development studies in the European Union. It aimed particularly 
to attach agricultural subsidies to the provision of other outputs like environmental benefits 
and detaching subsidies from output of agricultural production (Clark, 2005; Paavola, 2008). 
Meanwhile, multi-functionality of the environment remains the most important task that must 
be foundational to any environmental regulation particularly in resource-based economies. 
The need to further define or assign key roles to different government actors at different scale 
to reduce governance cost on the one hand and promote collective action on the other is 
imminent. This is because without addressing these issues exploiting the benefits of 




In this section I have characterised government actors’ roles in environmental governance as 
experienced in the Nigerian cement industry. So far, the characteristics of the state actors 
changing roles as demonstrated in the preceding sections reveal some complications with 
legal implications. In the next section, I have discussed some emerging complications and 
implications despite the evidence of improvement in environmental regulation from command 
and control to incentive-based approaches stipulated in Agenda 21 and domesticated in 
Nigeria as exemplified by the Nigerian cement industry case.  
5.6 Complications and implications of environmental regulations in the Nigerian cement 
industry 
Major complications emanating from defective environmental laws in Nigeria derived from 
the analysis in this chapter can be classified into three categories. They are legal framework 
for:  
● Intergovernmental cooperation and coordination; 
● Inclusive public participation and  
● Multifunctional environmental resource development. 
 
Intergovernmental cooperation and coordination problems in Nigeria’s environmental 
regulation system 
These complications I argue have significant implications for successful multilevel 
environmental governance in Nigeria. Inter-ministerial and governmental conflicts have been 




government actors in regulation ends. At the federal level, problems of cooperation, cases of 
intergovernmental conflicts have been adequately documented between federal ministry of 
solid mineral development and the environment ministry (FMMSD, 2004; Onyenekenwa, 
2011), between NESREA and Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) (Ogboru, 2015) 
and some state governments (Otubu, 2012). The implication of this is that efforts are 
fragmented due to overlapping functions. Public funds are wasted as there exists no 
cooperation, conflict of roles and responsibilities between federal, state and local government 
keeps escalating governance cost, collective action and the attainment of environmentally 
sustainable development. This negates the gross importance of multilevel governance as it 
does not add any values to the development process other than battle for supremacy, wasteful 
spending and exploitation. A major experience of battle for supremacy is the demolition of 
structure at the new cement factory Dangote cement is developing in Ogun state. It was learnt 
that the company did not follow due process and as a result the state government demolished 
structures erected on the factory site and stopped the construction until due process is 
followed (GRST4, 1st June 2016). Wasteful spending can be discerned from the duplication of 
duties between the federal and state governments. In terms of exploitation, this is discernible 
from the lamentations of company representatives and environmental contractors.   
Inclusive public participation challenge in the Nigerian environmental regulation system 
The second important issue is the legal framework for inclusive public participation. 
Participation of non- state actors in resource development and environmental regulation 
process has been the bane of crisis and militancy in resource producing communities of 




conflicts and restiveness. Resistance to poor development framework by implication has led 
to concerned stakeholders being confrontational and using forces to claim their supposed 
right. Countless non-governmental organisations have been formed in the quest for 
environmental resource control and good governance in the Niger delta region. Also, 
numerous militant groups abound all in the name of bad governance and neglect of the 
communities believed to be the geese laying the golden egg for the country (Amnesty 
International, 2009; Onigbinde, 2008; Nwoke, 2015). Absence of procedural rights of the 
people in the implementation of environmental regulations has affected the fundamental right 
to clean and healthy environment in Nigeria (Erhun, 2015). Despite the defective participatory 
framework, the emergence of environmental non-governmental organisations is on the 
increase in the country. This I have discussed along with other key non-state actors from 
society-centric credential of governance concept in the next chapter.  
Absence of framework for multifunctional resource development 
In this era of laissez faire and climate change, the need to judiciously use resources to meet 
socio-economic and environmental needs requires multifunctional approaches involving using 
technological and organisational innovations to promote sustainable use of resources. Legal 
framework for multifunctional resource development is another important issue emanating 
from the roles of state actors in environmental governance in this study. Today, we are in the 
era where human activities affect virtually every aspect of the earth’s biophysical and 
ecological system more than ever before with far-reaching implications for the state and its 
society (Duit, 2016). The nation state remains the primary mode of social and political 




decision-making (Duit, 2016). Environmental state and environment making state are two 
important perspectives by which the state-centric environmental regulation in Nigeria over the 
last two decades can be further illustrated, explained and understood. An environmental state 
accepts the provisioning of environmental collective goods as core responsibility (Duit, 2016, 
p. 70). The environmental state gives precedence to environmental well-being over 
unregulated economic development through expansion of environmental policy portfolios to 
address pressing environmental issues. Significantly, Nigeria’s economic system drifted away 
from developmental/welfare state approach to a more liberal one where ‘free market’ takes 
precedence and the prevalence of competitive investment (Ekanade, 2014). More importantly, 
the creation of specialized administrative and regulatory environmental intervention 
institutions as well as socio-environmental issues became the focus of political and legal 
contestations in the country.  
A genuine environmental state gives precedence to the environment over the economy by 
prioritising environmental sustainability over economic concerns when the two conflict (Duit, 
2016). In the case of Nigeria, priority ranking between the economy and ecology rather than 
reverse, it is intensified despite huge financial and time investment toward increasing 
environmental policy portfolios. Regulatory and redistributive powers of the state have not 
been effectively used to systematically promote environmental values over economic values. 
Rather the state has taken it as the avenue for revenue generation for the government thereby 
jettisoning the environmental priority objectives. Hood and Maggets (2007) identify the four 
basic resources a nation can use to promote environmentally sustainable regional development 




● Nodality: the power of being in the centre of a network  
● Authority: being able to issue rules that allow, forbid, and prescribe certain 
behaviours from other societal actors 
● Treasure: financial resources which can be used to persuade other actors to act in a 
certain way and  
● Organisation: the ability to create organisations stocked with people that can carry 
out tasks on behalf of the state to promote multifunctional environmental resource 
development and governance in the country.  
However, such resources have been used by the Nigerian state to force neoliberalism on the 
society (Ekanade, 2014) rather than re-embed the state in the society in the country. A 
participant narrates his experience relating to this challenging situation: - 
‘I have opportunity of being in Netherland sometimes ago, I got to the regional office 
of environment and ask them, how do you enforce or implement your environmental 
laws?  They said it is participatory in the sense that they involve all the stakeholders 
when they are coming out with the law. So, it is not difficult to implement any longer 
because they were part of the draft. But here they force the pill down your throat so 
you have to take it. Most of the time here they talk about enforcement but there they 
don’t talk about enforcement you just comply’ (EC2, 6th May 2016). 
Another participant also admits that: - 
‘As regards cement industry, we all know why government decided to privatise it, 
because they aren’t making profit. The private sector came in and they revived some 
of these companies into profitability. It’s a good development but the challenge there 
is that they want to maximize profit. Like where they supposed to bring in new 
technology, because of the profit, they won’t, instead they continue to manage. There 
are lots of countries out there that you will hardly see pollution or emission of dusts in 
their cement industry because of the high level of technology there.  But because of 
cost implication and they want to maximise profit, that’s why most of them here don’t 
employ the right technology. The government regulators that are supposed to check 
and probably sanction them if necessary, out of pity (the problem of unemployment), 




The stance of government actors in the whole process portrays the notion of environment-
making state as an indispensable mediating membrane in the metabolism of capital (Parenti, 
2013). Managing, mediating, producing, and delivering non-human nature to accumulation is 
a core function of the modern, territorially defined, capitalist state (Parenti, 2013, p. 844). The 
non-human nature of the Nigerian territory is a significant source of wealth delivered to 
capital by the state without much recourse for the supporting and regulating services nature 
provides (MEA, 2005). The way out of this daunting problem is that ‘The will power has to 
be there’ (CPC1, 11th April 2016). The political will of the state to embed in the society will 
begin with taking an important step by embracing cooperative federalism where all 
government actors across scales cooperate rather than compete (Amokaye, 2012). This is 
when the state-centric (Pierre, 2000b) credential could be said to be intellectually engaged in 
practice. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined whether the changes in environmental regulations in the Nigerian 
cement industry translates multilevel governance where the central government devolve 
certain regulatory roles to the subnational government and the implications. I have combined 
empirical literature and policy documents with primary data to examine the development of a 
coherent environmental institutions and instruments in Nigeria.Moreover, roles of federal 
government and subnational governments in the industry in recent past were critically 
examined. Issues and implications of the findings for successful environmental governance 
were also identified and discussed. The findings revealed that the federal government of 




national institution. The federal government remain the main regulator in the sector. 
Subnational governments have also been playing regulatory role to complement federal 
efforts. However, the roles are still found to be duplicated and conflicting despite the 
awareness of the government over the years. There is the need for a legal framework to 
redefine the key roles each category of government actors and non-governmental counterparts 
can play without conflict and duplication of responsibilities.  
A historical review of environmental regulation in Nigeria reveals that the development of 
coherent environmental management regime nationally began in the 1980s as a result of 
public pressure on government to stem the tide of massive dump of toxic and sensitive waste 
materials into the country from Europe. This led to the promulgation of EIA Act as the 
substantive environmental intervention instrument and creation of the first environmental 
agency in Africa, Federal environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). The National Council on 
Environment was also established along with a comprehensive policy document on the 
environment- National Policy on the environment. With the creation of FEPA and 
promulgation of EIA Act of 1988, it was no more business as usual in the country for any 
project proponent. Any development project in the country must go through the EIA process 
first to assert if the project requires EIA or not. Further to integrate sustainable development 
elements to all areas of human activities in the country, FEPA was later transformed into a 
Ministry. By the end of 2007, another agency, the National Environmental Standard 
Regulation and Enforcement Agency (NESREA) was created to fill the gap of environmental 
standard enforcement in the country. NESREA stepped up environmental regulation in the 




from conducting EIA before establishing a cement company, new sectoral guidelines to 
ensure standard were developed and used to monitor compliance in the industry. The key 
regulations for the cement industry include: The National Environmental (Mining and 
Processing of Coal, Ores and Industrial Minerals) Regulations, S. I. No. 31 of 2009 and 
National Environmental (Non-Metallic Minerals Manufacturing Industries Sector) 
Regulations, S. I. No. 21 of 2011. This means there are three major environmental regulation 
instruments in the Nigerian cement sector. 
Another important finding is that the national policy document and constitution of the country 
further empower subnational governments to establish their own institutions for 
environmental protection. On this basis, state and local governments in the country have been 
involved in the regulation of environmental and health issues in the cement industry. In the 
case of the study area, Ogun state, two key institutions were established for environmental 
protection. It was revealed that the state is actively involved in the EIA process before its 
approval by the central government. After EIA approval, state monitors compliance on its 
own and sometimes with other tiers of government. While the involvement of local 
government is integral as the closest to the people, it was discovered that local government 
involvement has not been encouraging due to its exclusion in the EIA process most times and 
probably related to absolute lack of financial and legislative autonomy. 
The observed pattern of relations shows that Type 1 multilevel governance (Hooghe & Marks, 
2003); Multi-tier governance (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006) and Hierarchical governance 
according to Kooiman (2003) is practiced in Nigeria. The creation of subnational 




sector. While this is not encouraging, there is substantial evidence that the transformation will 
continue as reactions heighten from the civil society organisations. As captured by Rosenau 
(1995, p14) ‘To grasp the concept of control one has to appreciate that it consists of relational 
phenomena that, taken holistically, constitute systems of rule. Some actors, the controllers, 
seek to modify the behaviour and/or orientations of other actors, the controlees, and the 
resulting patterns of interaction between the former and the latter can properly be viewed as a 
system of rule sustained by one or another form of control. It does not matter whether the 
controlees resist or comply with the efforts of controllers; in either event, attempts at control 
have been undertaken. But it is not until the attempts become increasingly successful and 
compliance with them increasingly patterned that a system of rule founded on mechanisms of 
control can be said to have evolved’. It appears that the success of environmental protection in 
Nigeria lies on how government actors control the use of state resources on one part and how 
society is able to ensure the state is kept accountable for these new responsibilities. 
‘Governance does not just suddenly happen. Circumstances have to be suitable, people have 
to be amenable to collective decisions being made, tendencies toward organization have to 
develop, habits of cooperation have to evolve, and a readiness not to impede the processes of 
emergence and evolution has to persist’ Rosenau (1995, p.17). As this chapter has 
demonstrated, Type I multilevel governance evident in Nigeria is fraught with fragmentation, 
as government actors are not cooperating for collective actions. It is also noteworthy that non- 
governmental organisations are developing as boosted by the neoliberal reforms in the 
country. As the state actors, particularly the central government has been partial in the design 
of a framework for effective multilevel environmental governance, analysing non-state actors 




is important. In light of the above, the next chapter assesses the society-centric governance 







ASSESSING THE NEW GOVERNANCE ACTORS’ ROLES IN THE NEW 
NIGERIAN CEMENT INDUSTRY 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I assess the new governance actors’ background, their emerging roles and the 
implications for inclusive development in the new Nigerian cement industry. Considering the 
privatization policy prevailing in the sector since year 2000 the Nigerian cement industry has 
transformed to a new booming non-oil extractive sector. As revealed in the preceding chapter, 
the changing roles and relations of the state actors in the Nigerian cement industry relates to 
environmental regulatory responsibilities of the government at all levels. Even though, the 
regulatory duties of the state actors are still not coherent or effectively delegated, the findings 
so far indicate the emergence of a national environmental regulation instrument in the 
country. This I have argued represents good intention from successive governments in 
separating economic development from environmental protection but for its lack of 
coherence. As discussed in chapter three, it is also evident that the federal government’s 
exclusive mineral rights were in no way devolved to sub-national governments but rather to 
new governance actors. The neoliberal policy, establishment of standard environmental 
regulatory processes and the inclusion of a memorandum of understanding in the approval of 
operational licenses in the extractive industry corroborate the debates on hollowing out of the 
central state in public policy administration (Rhodes, 1997; Jessop, 2002; Bevir, Rhodes & 
Weller, 2003; Harvey, 2005; Peet, 2007; Prince, 2012). This I have also situated at the 




also signifies the emergence of ‘new governance’ (Pierre, 2000a) viewed as ‘new public 
management’ (Bevir, Rhodes & Weller, 2003; Hill, 2013). This informs the need to assess the 
political and economic roles of new governance actors in the new Nigerian cement industry.  
 
As ‘government is only one component of any governance arrangement’ (Capano, Howlett 
and Ramesh, 2015, p. 314) with the sole responsibility to govern the society in any mode they 
deem fit, understanding the background of the new governance actors is deemed necessary. 
This is because recent debates on governance has shown how new governance actors could 
work in the ‘shadow’ of government (Héritier & Lehmkhul, 2008;Kooiman & Jentoft 2009; 
Meyer, 2012; Capano, Howlett & Ramesh, 2015) thereby affecting the governance process in 
different ways. Illuminating the background of these actors helps understand how the 
institutional link existing between the state, business and society has impacted on the 
legitimacy and authority of the new actors in the new Nigerian cement industry (Capano, 
Howlett & Ramesh, 2015).  
 
Commendably, literature on neoliberalism and governance increasingly pinpoints that Non-
State Actors and Stakeholders directly and indirectly contribute to policy decisions from 
governance perspective (Kooiman 2003; Trumpy, 2008; Seidman, 2007; Tengku-Hamza, 
2011). The influence of Non-State Actors in governance has received significant attention and 
well documented in the developed world. Their emergence, increasing roles in influencing 
policy decisions, complementing government roles and contributions in a less developed 
nation, an extractive economy yet to survive transition like Nigeria raise an important 
question: How have the Non-State Actors and Stakeholders roles and relations been affected 




ineptitude particularly in socio-economic development policies implementation and 
environmental regulation? Analysis of the interview sessions, secondary literature and policy 
documents were integrated to address these questions. 
 
As discussed in detail in chapter two, the chapter is informed by Type II Multilevel 
Governance framework (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Type II MLG as explained by Hooghe and 
Marks, comprises of specialised jurisdictions, fragmented into functionally specific pieces, 
operating at different scales without fixity in their existence. It however engages Piattoni’s 
(2010) analytical space of multilevel governance to relate the dispersed political authority and 
competences across territorial and functional actors due to neoliberal policies in the sector. It 
is argued that the introduction of neoliberal economic policies in Nigeria not only legitimise 
market as governance actors, it normatively set in motion the increased involvement of 
territorial and functional civil society organisations in governance. This is based on the 
myriad of non-state governmental activities evident in the country, although not all of them 
are directly related to the Nigerian cement industry at the moment. For example, the non-
governmental organisations are spread across the country and mostly involved in many other 
environmental issues that are of priority at a point in time. 
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. Following from this section, the next section, 6.2 
discusses the new governance actors in this study, it then clarifies the major actors considered 
with reasons. It seems simpler to differentiate between state and non-state actors but their 
nature and roles in the governance process are complex and complicated in practice because 
of territorial, regulatory and legislative powers of government. As discussed in detail in the 




considered in this chapter include: Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) and Private Non-profit 
Actors (PNPA) (Considine & Lewis, 1999). In section 6.3 attention is focused on the roles of 
the key Private For-profit Actors described in section 6.2 in the economic development and 
environmental regulation of the Nigerian cement sector. Expectation here is that the main 
actors discussed here have assumed new roles different to profit-making and as such the 
corporate practices should reflect the new role meaningfully. This is then followed by the 
roles of the prominent Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) and other Society Actors in section 
6.4. The rise of civil society due to globalisation and neoliberal policies has been associated 
with normative political roles of the society in the governance process (Himley, 2008; 
Castree, 2011). This role may be territorial or functional depending on the background of the 
society actors (Piattoni, 2010). This part of the chapter assesses how the host communities as 
territorial stakeholders and non-governmental organisations as citizens and functional 
stakeholders in the development of natural resources in Nigeria have responded to the changes 
in the Nigerian cement industry. Conclusions are presented in the last section. 
 
6.2 Delineating New Governance Actors and Stakeholders in the Nigerian cement 
industry  
Non-State Actors (NSAs) are actors in the new governance process apart from the state 
operating at different scales with great flexibility of existence (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; 
Calame, 2008). The role of NSAs in the governance process is vital and it is believed that 
NSAs will continue to influence government policy directions considerably (Cashore, 2002; 
Betsill & Corell, 2008; Calame, 2008). Different types of NSAs have been identified based on 




roles of NSAs in economic development and environmental protection among other areas 
such as security and defence as well as climate change have been prominent focus in the 
governance framework (Calame, 2008; Piattoni, 2010). It has therefore been suggested that to 
understand and develop NSAs roles, application of the intellectual credentials of governance 
is essential (Calame, 2008; Piattoni, 2009; 2010). In this study, two main types of non-state 
actors identified are Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) and Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) 
(Considine and Lewis, 1999). Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) are Business oriented, they are 
also referred to as Corporate Actors (Flam, 1990) and Private Sector Actors (PSA) (Tengku-
Hamza, 2011). Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) is often referred to as civil Society 
organisations particularly in relations studies. 
 
In Nigeria, Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) are registered with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC) and regulated by Company and Allied Matters Act (1990). However, not 
all Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) are required to register with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC). While Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) are registered as private limited 
companies or Public limited companies, Civil Society Actors requiring registration are 
registered as incorporated Trustees. Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) have been divided into 
cement manufacturing companies, environmental consultants/contractors for the industry, 
consumer associations and cement manufacturers association in this study. The key actors 
considered in this category are the cement manufacturing company and the environmental 
consultants because of the active roles they play in the industry (Table 6.1). The consumer 
and manufacturers association were observed to be very passive in the country because efforts 




the major new governance actors in the devolved Nigerian cement industry. As new 
governance actors in the industry, their corporate strategies are expected to have incorporated 
a wider scope beyond economic responsibility to the shareholders (Brammer, Jackson & 
Matten, 2012). They are normatively expected to evolve corporate values and practices that 
publicly promote their social and environmental responsibilities beyond philanthropy and 
formal regulations respectively. This is arguably important because of the new political and 
economic responsibilities taken up as new governance actors in a neoliberal perspective 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). 
 
Private Non-profit Actors (PNPA) on the other hand are Civil Society Actors, they are a 
combination of wide array of non-governmental organisations based on diverse values and 
interests within the society. This group of actors such as indigenous groups, charitable 
organisations, faith-based organisations, professional organisations, and non-governmental 
organisations as well as labour unions among others are considered civil society organisations 
by the World Bank (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). The diversity of these group of actors necessitate 
identifying them and explaining their relevance in this study. Three types of Private Non-
profit Actors (PNPA) considered in this study are– Community based Organisation (CBO), 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and others (academics, individuals/professionals 
and the media) (Table 6.1). As explained in chapter two, non-state actors can evolve based on 
specialised jurisdiction (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2003) as either territorial of functional 
(Piattoni, 2009, 2010). Community based Organisation’s (CBO) jurisdiction is territorial as 
they evolve as stakeholders affected by cement producing activities in their local 




jurisdiction than territorial because their involvement is based on their wealth of functional 
knowledge, profession and experience (Piattoni, 2010).  
 
Having identified the prominent new governance actors considered in this study and reasons 
for their involvement in this section, the next section discusses the nature and roles of these 
actors in the new Nigerian cement industry. This is intended to understand these roles as 
responses to the reforms in the sector that has been characterised as neoliberalism. 
Table 6.1: Key NSASs roles and categories in the study 
Category  Key non-state actors Roles  
For-profit actors Cement companies 
(Corporate Actors) 
 Producers of cement and aggregates to 
generate profit and impact on the socio-




Middlemen between state and corporate 
actors in the implementation of 
environmental intervention instruments- 
EIA, EA 
Non-profit actors  Non-governmental 
organisations 






Stand for the social, economic and 
environmental rights of the community  
Others- Media and 
academic professionals  
Contribute to governance through 
journalistic and academic publications  
 
6.3 Nature and roles of Private For-Profit Actors (PPA) in the new Nigerian cement 
industry 
There are two major private for-profit actors identified in the Nigerian cement industry, 
however in terms of shift in responsibility the new governance actor are the registered 




group of actors I henceforth refer to as Corporate Governance Actors (CGA) in this chapter. 
The CGA involved in this study are classified as Multinational Companies (MNC) and the 
Indigenous National Companies (INC). There are so many private companies in the Nigerian 
cement industry today. Prior to the 1980s, corporate actors’ role in the cement industry was 
very minimal because of the policy of the country and particularly the nature of the industry 
(see chapter 4). Cement production is capital intensive, energy consuming and 
environmentally damaging. Government’s neoliberal policy and the so called Backward 
Integration Policy (BIP) in the sector changed the development paradigm to give rise to the 
private sector actors astronomically (see chapter 4). On this background, the significance of 
the state in the governance process can be understood as indispensable. 
 
As far as economic development is concerned in Nigeria, it is commonly understood that state 
actors are the main players particularly during the developmental state period. Though there 
were evidences of the influence of foreign companies during that time, the introduction of 
indigenization policy in the 1970s further strengthened the involvement of local private sector 
actors in businesses in Nigeria. In the case of the Nigerian cement industry, the influence of 
business in the sector became dominant with the adoption of neoliberal policies in Nigeria. 
Prior to that period, central and regional governments were the pioneer investors in cement 
production in the country (Hay, 1971). The first cement industry was established in Nkalagu, 
Enugu state by the federal government in 1957. West African Portland cement Company 
(WAPCO), Ewekoro owned by Blue Circle (UK) formerly Associated Portland Cement 
Manufacturers (APCM), a foreign company was the second. The indigenisation process of the 




WAPCO Sagamu and Ewekoro (Akinyinka & Chibuike, 2016). Many other cement plants 
were established by the regional governments. By the year 2000, most of these government 
owned cement industries could not operate effectively. This was because of political 
instability and indigenisation experience of the 1970s which scared foreign investors from the 
country (Akinyinka & Chibuike, 2016). With privatization and the BIP, the Nigerian cement 
industry became a frontier for foreign direct investment and subsequently the largest in Africa 
(Dangote cement, 2015 annual report). The two corporate governance actors considered in 
this study- Lafarge Africa and Dangote Cement evidently dominate the Nigerian cement 
industry.  
 
Market, Businesses or corporations are not new in the development literature as their main 
intention is always to invest and maximise profit (Sharma, 2015). Recent debates on 
development policies have called the ‘economic man’ nature of businesses into question 
particularly in developing countries where government failure is prominent. Modern 
corporations and businesses have recognised the need to incorporate complementing the 
social responsibility of governance into their corporate strategies without jeopardising their 
business interests (Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012). Corporate governance actors are 
expected to take on more responsibilities not on the shareholders only but the stakeholders 
especially in the extractive sector. This case for the extractive sector is particularly important 
because of the nature of the industry on the socio-economic well-being of the host 
communities. Mineral resources are mostly found in the rural communities where their 




governance actors background and strategies to take on their new roles in the Nigerian cement 
industry, a very sensitive sector (CSI, 2002). 
 
Corporate governance has been an interesting area where the intellectual credentials of 
governance have been applied in recent past emphasising internalising social and 
environmental externalities cost of corporations in the form of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) (Owen, 2005; Gill, 2008; Kurtcu, 2014). In effect, corporate bodies are 
now taking their Corporate Social Responsibility more seriously. The European Commission 
(2011) describes CSR as the responsibility of corporate enterprises for their impacts on 
society. Emerging perspectives on corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
particularly in developing and extractive economies suggest going beyond grounding 
corporate social responsibility in the voluntary behaviour of companies (Fox, 2004; Hilson, 
2008; Van Alstine, 2009; Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012; Van Alstine and Barkemeyer, 
2014). This they claim can be achieved by understanding the historical and political factors 
that determine the nature and forms of social responsibility corporations engage in (Brammer, 
Jackson & Matten, 2012). In the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
debates, several reservations have emerged as to why corporate social responsibility has been 
regarded as voluntary despite its institutionalisation as responsibilities to the society (Carroll, 
1999; Fox, 2004; Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012). One of the major areas of reservation is 
the corporate social responsibilities of corporations in relation to their impacts on indigenous 
people, working conditions in developing countries and the environment (Banerjee, 2000; 
Radin & Calkins, 2006; Jermier et al., 2006; Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012). Recent 




emphasise understanding the diversity and dynamics of corporations and development to 
know their efforts at accommodating changes in their responsibilities.  
Gray (1994, p.18) argues that 'corporations are crucial in any progress towards sustainability. 
They account for a large proportion of the world's economic activity and hold much 
international power, they control much of the world's resources, technology and innovation 
and they have much influence over much of mankind choices'. The growth of Lafarge Africa 
and Dangote Cement in Nigeria cement industry portrays the empirical evidence of Gray's 
argument. In light of the above, corporate governance practices of these corporations in terms 
of social and environmental responsibility, information disclosures and practice could be 
viewed as obligatory rather than voluntary. This is because the companies' structures and 
philosophy show that they are multinational companies irrespective of the direction of 
expansion. More so, because of the MOU companies are mandated to sign with host 
communities indirectly legalises the need to obtain social licence to operate by relating with 
community stakeholders to achieve common goals. 
The other type of private for-profit, non-state actors are the environmental consultants 
working as intermediary between business and the state. The environmental consultants are 
the registered and accredited contractors by the government and must be used by the cement 
producing companies in carrying out their environmental impact assessment and 
environmental audit (GFRD1, 15 October 2012; GRST3, April 13th 2016). Irrespective of the 
background of the companies, they are not permitted to handle their EIA and compliance 
without a consultant. No matter how equipped the corporate actors, they cannot carry out their 




consultants as required by the law of the land. Moreover, ownership change in the industry 
means that social, economic and environmental roles have also changed. In this study, 
environmental consultants are recognised as non-state actors but their activities seem to be 
significantly influenced by the state, although their background also shows that they may 
work as shadow of government elites. While this point makes it a necessity to identify their 
background and roles in the sector, I have focused on the cement companies as the key 
business actor in this study. In the next section, I describe the background and critically 
explore the roles of the corporate governance actors beyond hierarchical regulations of the 
State Actors in the sector aside from their profit-making intentions. 
 
6.3.1 Description of Corporate Actors background and roles in Nigeria cement industry  
Lafarge is the world leader in building materials production (“Lafarge Holcim” 2015). 
Lafarge Africa Plc (Formerly Lafarge WAPCO) is a leading Sub-Saharan Africa building 
solutions Company and member of the Lafarge Holcim group. The creation of Lafarge Africa 
Plc has transformed the Company into a Group which is well equipped to continue the 
acceleration of the growth and to withstand challenges in the market place (Lafarge Africa, 
2014). Lafarge Africa claims that their cement production capacity has grown from 4.5 
million tons to about 12 million tons in addition to 3.5 million cubic meters of Ready-Mix 
Concrete, and over 5 million tons of Aggregates portfolios. Further from that the company 
prides with a turn-over from 100 billion Naira to over 200 billion Naira, and the growth of 
Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) from 36 to 55 billion 
Naira. Lafarge took its first step in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1985 by opening a site in 




and Benin (1999), and Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia (2001). Lafarge 
now has activities in 10 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Lafarge Africa Plc's Operations in Nigeria began with the acquisition of WAPCO operations 
in Nigeria. Since its acquisition by Lafarge group, Lafarge WAPCO has become a truly 
multinational company, strategically positioned for greater heights (Lafarge Africa, 2014). 
With the acquisition of West Africa Portland Cement Plc (WAPCO) (Southwest Nigeria), 
AshakaCem Plc (Ashaka) (Northern Nigeria), Atlas Cement, Port-Harcourt (South-south 
Nigeria) and substantial stake in Unicem, Calabar (South East Nigeria), Lafarge holds 
leadership position in the Nigeria cement industry with investment in companies that have a 
total production capacity of about 8.5 million metric tonnes per annum (Lafarge Africa, 
2015).   
Another important business actor considered in the study is Dangote Cement industry. 
Dangote cement is a Nigerian, Multinational, fully integrated quarry-to-customer cement 
producer. It is a subsidiary of Dangote Industries Limited (DIL) founded by Aliko Dangote in 
1981 as a trading business. Dangote industries initial focus was on importation of bagged 
cement and other commodities. The company began with importation of bulk cement into the 
country and then bagged for distribution. The ambition to become a major player in the 
industry started in the 1990s with the taking over of Benue Cement Company Plc (BCC) in 
January 2004 and by 2007 the company began operations (Dangote cement Annual Report, 
2015). Dangote Cement is a leading cement producer with existing and planned operations in 
16 African countries, revenues more than US$2 billion and nearly 17,000 employees 




plants with total capacity of 29.3Metric tonnes per annum (MTA) located in Obajana, Kogi 
state, Ibese, Ogun state and Gboko, Benue state. Two additional plants are reportedly under 
construction in Itori, Ogun state and Okpella in Edo state. The Obajana plant opened in 2008, 
has limestone reserves of 647 million tonnes expected to last for 45 years (Dangote cement 
annual report, 2015). Obajana plant is the largest cement factory in Sub-Sahara Africa with 
13.25 (MTA) capacity. The initial capacity was 5MTA, extended to 10.25 MTA in 2012 and 
additional 3.0 Mta in late 2014 (Dangote cement annual report, 2015). As the company 
claims, Obajana plant runs on natural gas, with LPFO and coal as back-up and primary fuel. 
Ibese on the other hand is blessed with about 1,150 million tonnes of limestone which the 
company claims will last for about 78 years of production without specific annual rate. Benue 
Cement Plant 4.0 MTA plant at Gboko is Dangote’s oldest factory in Nigeria commissioned 
in 2007 (Dangote cement Annual Report, 2015). Due to its long distance from the national gas 
infrastructure, the plant was designed to run solely on Low pouring fuel oil (LPFO), upgraded 
in 2015-16 to now run on coal. The plant has about 133 million tonnes of limestone reserves 
which can last more than 30 years as stated by the company. Dangote cement also has 
operational facilities in Senegal, South Africa, Cameroon and Ghana (importation), Ethiopia, 
Zambia, Tanzania and are committed to building integrated production factories in Republic 
of Congo, Kenya, Zimbabwe and outside of Africa, Nepal. The sporadic growth of Dangote, 
an indigenous company within ten years of operation most significantly emphasise relative 
significance of the private sector in resource use (Aigbokhan & Ailemen, 2006; Peet & 
Hartwick, 2009). However, its impact on the other elements of development in the sector is 




p. 3) there should be significant progress in the natural, economic, social, cultural, and 
political conditions (Peet & Hartwick, 2009). The import of the above is to show the spread of 
the companies across the country bearing in mind the socio-economic and environmental 
impacts the company might have across the country in their intensive use of energy and 
natural resources. The companies as new governance actors in the sector have a lot to offer in 
complementing the evident social and environmental failures of government.  
As part of the new governance actors, there are corporate commitments and values that could 
be argued to portray corporate governance actors who have factored the institutional 
dynamics of the country of operation into their practices. For example, Lafarge Africa Plc 
disclosed that the company is committed to a deliberate strategy of sustainable development 
which combines industrial knowhow with performance, value creation, respect for employees 
and local cultures, environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources and 
energy. To actualise this commitment, the company focuses on Customers, Results, Integrity, 
Sustainability and People, Openness & Inclusion (C.R.I.S.P.) as the values characterising the 
company's foundation. The company also claims its commitment to progress and attention to 
the ever-changing needs of local communities, by contributing to the improvement of their 
quality of lives in a sustainable manner through setting up local development programmes in 
key areas that have direct impacts on socio-economic wellbeing of the people and their 
environment. This claim was attested to by a key community representative:  
‘They also give our children bursary award every year. We might say it’s not enough, 
but then they are trying in their own capacity. They also empower our youths in their 






Another prominent community respondent claimed that: 
 
‘In the past, it wasn’t so but later with some changes in the company, in the last 6-7 
years, they have been performing their corporate social responsibilities to the 
community… I would say in d last10 years. In the days of our fathers there was 
nothing like that… We have a school built for our community, we have a health 
centre, with state of the heart equipment.’ (CCE5, 10thApril 2016).  
 
The company also claim on their website to give priority to health and safety, commitment to 
respect, care and excellence as well as commitment to be ranked among the World's most 
effective industrial groups in terms of environmental protection, social responsibility and 
corporate governance. The comments of the above respondents show that the company’s 
presence is felt in the communities. However, it was also learnt that the company was also 
reluctant in the initial stage to relate with the communities as evident below: 
‘…what I noticed then was that, the rapport between the company and the community 
was so shallow. …they don’t take cognisance of it, they are not taking care of the host 
community. When the community became aware that the company supposed to give 
them certain rights, then they took them to the court and gradually they started giving 
them some rights’ (CCE9, 31st May 2016). 
 
The quote above shows that community resistance was responsible for the stewardship the 
company now pride themselves with. This would not have been possible without the 
knowledge about the mandatory community development agreement which has made the 
communities stakeholders in the sector.  
In the case of the second company, as related on the company website, Dangote Cement 




cement production as well as distribution. In tune with international practices as claimed by 
the company the key measures identified and implemented to ensure sustainable operations by 
the company include: Investments in state-of-the-art bag filters at all plants to ensure minimal 
dust emissions and regular monitoring as well as action plans put in place to reduce emissions 
in tune with national and international statutory control guidelines. A key respondent explains 
the process as follows: 
‘… We use electrostatic precipitator here in Dangote cement. The work of the 
machine is to arrest escaping dust and send it back to the system. That is why if you 
look at the lawn it’s clean. That shows the impact of the electrostatic precipitator. We 
have back filters that attract dust. We charge and recharge often and often. If you go to 
other cement industries, you will see cement dust here and there and the place are not 
clean as you see it here’ (CPC1, 11thApril 2016). 
 
The company also asserts that the use of different fuel options mainly to minimize the 
complete dependence on fossil fuels thereby reducing emission of Carbon dioxide (CO2) and 
other greenhouse gases. The company further explains that most of the plants’ Captive Power 
is generated using natural gas with options to use other fuel as backup. Also, the completely 
covered raw material and processing conveyors ensure dust free manufacturing and covered 
conveyor belts for lime stone from the mines into the plant is a standard feature in the 
company’s operations (Dangote cement Annual Report, 2015). Moreover, impounded rain 
water around plant areas, the company explained is used for cooling purposes and is 
completely re-circulated while waste-water is efficiently treated for further use or safe 
disposal (CPC1, 11thApril 2016).  
The company proclaims that apart from being committed to providing the best place for their 




operation is paramount. These they do by providing supports on education, health and 
empowerment in host communities and sponsor sports and cultural development initiatives in 
these communities and elsewhere. The claims of the company sound promising and 
responsible; however there seems to be issues as to what could be the host community’s 
priority and who determines what is in such communities as observed in the views of some of 
the respondents on the social commitment of the company. For instance, a participant 
expressed that:  
… We had development association but the king that brought XXX didn’t open to 
them concerning how XXX came in, even to the well learned and vast citizens of ###. 
… We asked him concerning XXX, if there is any agreement between the investor and 
the community? The king wasn’t happy with our interrogation. … The king doesn’t 
want development for this community. (CCIB1, 12thApril 2016).  
 
As discussed in the contextual chapter (Chapter three), cement companies are mandated to 
sign a memorandum of understanding with community stakeholders before mining license is 
approved, no concrete structure to ensure compliance to the MOU (Ladan, 2014). However, 
the MOU seems an indication of legitimising the extended roles of the corporate governance 
actors on socio-economic issues in the extractive sector. It also arguably legitimises the local 
communities to relate with the companies as stakeholders as evident above. This development 
corroborates the debates on the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
particularly in the extractive economies (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Brammer, Jackson & 
Wenner, 2012; Bebbington 2013; Sharma, 2015). 
As mentioned earlier, it is believed that the change in ownership from joint investment or 




multiple effects: on the economy, on the society and the environment which we all depend. 
That is a development that does not underscore other needs of the modern society (Peet & 
Hartwick, 2009). This section has described the background of the corporate governance 
actors and their corporate strategies as new governance actors in the Nigerian cement 
industry. Noting the economic progress and corporate disclosure of these actors, it is evident 
that the companies are functionally strong and operating profitably in the new Nigerian 
cement industry. As new governance actors, the following section documents the evidences of 
the companies’ new political and economic roles in the sector. 
 
6.3.2 Corporate governance Actors’ imprints and responsibilities in the Nigerian cement 
industry 
The previous section has shown that the privatisation of the Nigerian cement industry has 
ushered in competent corporate actors with the wealth of financial and professional expertise 
to develop the sector sustainably. Their corporate disclosure has also shown some elements of 
commitments to their new governance roles, however, it is important to ensure that the 
disclosures are not mere rhetoric. In this section, attempts are made to assess the imprints of 
the corporate actors in the Nigerian cement industry beyond profit making, as per the socio-
economic and environmental commitments of the companies. As argued by Kurtcu (2014, 
pp.35-36) “… the businesses’ engagement with social and environmental issues in most of the 
cases is to increase their competitiveness, their attempt to frame their activities by certain 
principles and guidelines instead of state imposed laws in other words their self-regulation 
and the issues they deal with in their CSR projects which would be regarded as one of the 




governing and exemplify how business actors engage with governmental practices in this 
realm”. Following the above line of argument, I argue that like many other Multinational 
companies (Owolabi 2008; Uwuigbe, 2012; Uwuigbe & Jafaru, 2012), corporate actors in the 
Nigerian cement industry have engaged in self-regulatory, corporate social and environmental 
responsibility to shore up government lapses and remain in business profitably.  
Unlike the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), corporate businesses have primary intention to 
make profit and at the same time be in business always. To get along in this age of 
informational governance, globalisation, and climate change, corporate businesses must not 
only try to abide by state rules and regulations, they must evolve initiatives which will keep 
them in business and complement the shortcomings of the government (Kilcullen & Kooistra, 
1999; Hardjono & Van Marrewijk, 2001). This is more important in countries with weak 
natural resources development frameworks like Nigeria. The emergence of business actors in 
this sector thus means robust social and environmental strategies to complement state 
weaknesses should be in practice compared to the past. Looking at the key corporate actors 
identified in this sector, their background and achievements in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
encouraging. The annual report of the companies in the last five years indicates that the 
companies have recorded significant success leading to expansion, merger and aspirations for 






Table 6.2: Cement companies Net income in billions of Naira (USD)2011-2015 
Company Year 2011 Year 2012 Year 2013 Year 2014 Year 2015 
Lafarge    8,654,720  14,611,260  28,022,200   28,360,146   29,657,773 
(28,366,830) (47,890,068) (91,845,952) (92,953,608) (97,206,728) 
Dangote 110,488,000 146,016,000 210,263,000 185,814,000 213,171,000 
(362,137,004) 478,584,070) 689,160,930) (609,026,548) (698,692,232) 
Source: Dangote Cement Annual Report 2015; Lafarge Africa Annual Report 2015 
*Exchange rate used 1st August 2017@ 305.1 Naira to one US Dollar   
From the above table, it is evidenced that the economic objectives of the corporate actors are 
being achieved steadily, the companies have been competitively growing. One company is 
racing down the bottom mopping up weak cement companies to grow big within the country. 
The other company has taken home advantage and race to the top expanding rapidly 
throughout the Sub-Saharan sub-continent. But economic factor is only one element of 
sustainable development (WCED, 1987). The economic success translates to more profits for 
the companies’ shareholders and as an extractive industry more pressure on the environment 
and its resources as well as more energy needs. These are other sustainable development 
issues which affect other stakeholders beyond shareholding. In fact, it affects the State, the 
Business and the society at large. While government rakes in revenue from the company 
annually from environmental permits issued to the companies by the government. What it 
means to the other stakeholders such as the host communities and the public is not clear 
particularly when the government fails to play its welfare role on the society as claimed by 




‘Government never deem it fit to grade any road. There was a time we went to local 
government to help us grade some roads, they said we should bring money for fuel. 
XXX grade road for us every year… Government don’t care about us. The only thing 
they do is to come around deceive when election comes’ (CCE6, 31st May 2016).  
 
Another respondent also affirmed that: 
 
Federal government didn’t do anything for us instead they get most of the benefits that 
should have been diverted to the development of the community from XXX. And 
since they’ve been getting the benefits from XXX, a single road, they didn’t construct. 
All the development you see in …today is done by XXX’ (CCE7, 31st May 2016). 
 
This could mean that host communities’ trust in government is lost and the communities fight 
their cause on their own. Another issue of concern is whether more profit to the company 
translates to more regional development projects to the host regions and probably more 
environment friendly equipment. In the views of the stakeholders, there are mixed feelings to 
this development. For example, a participant laments that government: - 
‘…need to shift their focus from looking at environmental governance as a revenue 
generating medium. It’s not something that should generate revenue. They should see 
it as much more than that, as a commonwealth (resources that benefits all) (AC1, 20th 
September 2012).   
 
The Global Report Initiative (GRI) for sustainability reporting makes it an obligation for 
Multinational Companies to report their social, economic and environmental commitments to 
the public as a way of ensuring that corporations are exerting positively on the environment. It 
is widely believed that such transparent approach will allow the organisations to track 
measure and manage their impacts on the environment (Layira, Uwaoma & Olagunju, 2011). 
This will also aid earning the trust of shareholding and non-shareholding stakeholders. In the 




regulatory approach is in advanced stage because of strong government legislation, 
community pressure and effective administration and litigation procedures ((Layira, Uwaoma 
& Olagunju, 2011). However, in developing countries like Nigeria the CSR is still 
developing, there is no legal obligation directly attached to the framework which makes it 
seem a voluntary process (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010). Now, it is much desired by the 
corporations to meet global reporting standards as Multinational corporations. It can be 
argued that in the requirement of mining licence approval in the Nigerian cement industry 
CSR is mandatory. Though, different lines of argument exist on the legitimacy and forms of 
corporate social responsibility. Growing evidence indicates that rapidly globalising world is 
forcing many corporations to disclose their social and environmental responsibilities annually 
to provide more holistic views of their performance to the public (Slack, 2011).  
In the case of the Nigerian cement industry there are indications that the involvement of 
Multinational corporations has brought significant improvements to corporate responsibility 
practices. Apart from existing studies alluding to these changes (Owolabi, 2008; Adewuyi & 
Olowookere, 2010; Layira, Uwaoma & Olagunju, 2011; Uwuigbe, 2012) and annual financial 
report of the companies indicating steady growth and profit in the last five years, a key 
community representative also testified that: - 
'… Like now, they used to invite us to their AGM in Lagos. There, they will 
announce their profit for the year and some other vital information will be disclosed 
openly, that’s a bit of transparency. But before now, there was nothing like that, and it 
has helped us a lot when making our demands' (CCE6, 31st May 2016).  
 




'…they are doing a lot they need to do to the community, not enough, but they are 
doing a little which we know that they are improving yearly.  ... It’s not the best, but 
we need more, as we are asking more, they are doing more, it’s like we continue 
asking more (CCE1, 14th November 2012).  
 
Notably, the former statement evidenced improvements in the roles of the company over time 
compared to the latter. Though the story is not the same in terms of benefits enjoyed by the 
host communities of these companies, there exist a line of agreement in terms of positive 
changes due to change in ownership of the companies, a community stakeholder relates that: - 
'Concerning XXX, we hear it’s the largest cement factory in Africa. The XXX factory 
has the highest production. The whole of this community is on limestone' (CCI 1, 
12thApril 2016).  
 
This section shows that corporate governance in the Nigerian cement industry has 
significantly impacted the sector economically as the companies’ imprints are felt by the local 
communities in different ways. It was also revealed that the corporations have shown signs of 
extended responsibility mainly in terms of corporate responsibility disclosure. In the section 
that follows, I critique the practices of CSR by the two corporate actors. 
6.3.3 Strands of CSR practised in the Nigerian cement industry 
Aside from the statutory compliance with the environmental regulations instruments of the 
government, the corporate social responsibility drive of Lafarge Africa and Dangote cement 
as the New Governance actors in this study portrays some form of self-regulatory and 
collaborative or network governance processes (Kurtcu, 2014). The strands of corporate 
responsibility practised in the sector are classified into two forms: socio-economic and 




responsibilities on their websites. Aside from annual reports on both financial and non-
financial activities and performance, web-based socio-environmental disclosure is common to 
the companies. The new governance actors’ CSR practice is discussed under two following 
themes: corporate socio-economic responsibility and corporate environmental responsibility. 
Corporate socio-economic responsibility of corporate governance actors in the Nigerian 
cement industry 
There are expectations that the socio-economic responsibility of the companies would take on 
board improved community relations and standard development projects in their host 
communities. This arguably should be mandatory because the MOU between the companies 
and the host community is meant to legitimise development relationship between the 
companies and their host communities. However, it appears the companies’ handling of CSR 
is still regarded as philanthropy. For example, Lafarge Africa’s corporate governance report 
(2015) presents community development projects in the host communities as donations and 
charitable gifts although it was stated elsewhere in the report as community investment. Yet 
they claim in their sustainability report that “At the community front, we undertake planned 
stakeholder engagements at all Lafarge Africa sites. Our stakeholder relations approach 
recognizes the host communities as strategic partners to whom we accord mutual respect, 
believing that our footprints should, in its overall assessment, be a blessing to our neighbours” 
(Lafarge Africa Annual Report, 2015, p. 54). It is the opinion of this study that philanthropic 
CSR should be differentiated from the community development responsibility of the company 
if recent debates on CSR particularly in extractive economies are adequately considered 




because if the community projects are regarded as donations and gifts, there might not be 
strategic plans for meaningful engagement and sustainable projects as claimed by the 
company.  
The company also claims to be working at country level on several developmental programs 
that adopt the three-bottom line approach to address concerns for the society, economy and 
the environment. This they claim is to complement their statutory community development 
investment. Key areas of corporate social investment across the country include: 
● Supporting education through literacy enhancement 
● Community engagement and development  
● Health and safety  
During the 2015 financial year, Lafarge Africa claims to have spent a total of about 
1.091million USD (333,118,182 million Naira) on community development projects in the 
two communities within Ogun state (Ewekoro and Sagamu) (see Table 6.3) on the following 
projects: 
● Bursary awards to indigent students in Ewekoro and Sagamu communities 
● Support for the Braille Training School and the Nigerian Association for the Blind 
● Expanded skills acquisition and empowerment scheme for youths in vocational trades 
● Renovation of blocks of classrooms in various schools in the communities 
● Reconstruction of 1.3KM road and drainage systems on the Ewekoro plant axis of the 




Table 6.3: Annual community development investment of the new governance actors in 
Naira’000(USD) 
Company Years and amount expended  
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 












- - - - - 
Source: Companies annual report 
Dangote cement also claims to be actively engaged in social responsibility investment which 
has impacted on the local community and the country at large. The company’s CSR 
investment is reported under donations and sponsorship in the 2014 annual report without any 
significant breakdown of community development project in the host community. More 
importantly, there was no significant sustainability report in the report, this shows that the 
company’s economic interests reign supreme while social and environmental investments are 
habitual (Oliver, 1991). The company’s mission statement alluding to their commitment to 
sustainable development resonates Oliver’s (1991) habitual tactic used by organisations to 
take rules’ values for granted. Unlike the previous report, the company’s 2015 annual report 
present significant information on the company’s sustainability practices. Although the report 
particularly did a breakdown disclosure of social investment in local communities, financial 
breakdown was conspicuously missing.  Yet the company continue to engage in the habit of 




commitment of the companies to socio-economic responsibility is discouraging because of the 
manipulative strategies the companies are employing. However, this is not to say there is no 
significant progress made only that questionable strategies are being applied by the corporate 
actors. Comparatively, as shown in the above table Lafarge Africa has improved its socio-
economic responsibility disclosure while Dangote cement reports reflect gross defiance of 
accurate information. Lafarge Africa’s breakdown of social investment particularly in the host 
communities since 2011 has been consistent compared to Dangote cement’s lumping of social 
investment figures together under donations and sponsorship. Dangote cement reported over 
one billion Naira as donation and sponsorship in 2014 and 348.03 million in 2015. A critical 
view of Dangote cement social investment in the host community as claimed in their report 
show that the company invested in projects that promote their business in the area and a focus 
on the community elites rather than the masses. A community representative explained that: 
‘It is supposed to be a great opportunity for the people of this community but the way 
they have come about it; they never intend to give any opportunity to the community. 
Those that brought XXX only thought about themselves and never had the people in 
mind and have denied the people of that opportunity till now’ (CCIB3, 30th May2016). 
Although a company representative claimed that: 
‘If you look at Itori, there is a road built by XXX, it is 100% cement that was used. 
You can see the stretch from Itori to this place (about 24KM), the road used to be 
muddy. We sometimes sit, we have consultative forum with them, we ask them what 
they want. There are places we build classroom, road, renovation of health care 
system, borehole etc. we don’t only want to affect them negatively, likewise 
positively’ (CPC1, 4thApril 2016). 
But there are counter claims that:  
‘The borehole project was done but it didn’t work. The majority of the project money 




time, if they try it, there will be accident. We can’t count the number of accidents on 
this road (CCIB2, 30th May 2016). 
 
The findings corroborate Owolabi’s (2008) that company’s corporate social responsibility can 
mainly be driven by parent company’s policy as CSR still seem to be strategically 
implemented as philanthropy in Nigeria. It could be submitted that future conflicts involving 
the companies and host communities may arise in the Nigerian cement industry information 
and the level of awareness of the stakeholders have improved compared to the past.  The 
difference in the corporate actors CSR in the case communities can lead to conflicts if not 
addressed. The next section discusses the second strand of CSR in the new Nigerian cement 
industry. 
Corporate environmental responsibility of corporate governance actors in the 
Nigerian cement industry 
In terms of environmental responsibility, both companies have adequately disclosed related 
information on their websites. Lafarge Africa (2009) environmental policy statement claims 
to minimise the impacts of their products on the environment, human health and limit the 
amount of waste generated. The company claimed to implement the principles of sustainable 
development by engaging in the following:  
● Using stakeholder relations through cooperation with government regulators and 
legislators  
● Making environmental policy and information about their products available to the 




They also admit their commitment to:  
● The protection of the environment and human health in all the stages of their 
operations beginning with government regulations and other voluntary regulatory 
processes that relate to the industry such as environmental management systems 
and international standard certification. 
● Health and safety measures and research and development toward the use of 
alternative renewable resources for their operations.  
● Putting environmental values of their prospective contractors into consideration 
before working with them.  
More recently in the company’s 2014 Annual report, the company disclosed that it has set 
targets to make its business more sustainable and contribute positively to local social and 
economic development in their plan termed ‘sustainability Ambitions 2020’. This they claim 
is articulated around 34 ambitions that will make the company a leading sustainability 
company in the world. The ambitions have been articulated under the following three pillars: 
(1) Building Communities; (2) Building the Circular Economy and (3) Building Sustainably  
On the other hand, Dangote cement’s sustainability approach covers three key areas of 
Environmental care; Health & Safety and Social Investment (“Sustainability- Our Approach”, 
2016).  
The company claims their care for environment prompted investing and operating in tune with 
international practices through: 




● Regular monitoring and control of emissions following national and international 
guidelines.  
● Use of different fuel options to minimise carbon emission and other greenhouse gases 
● Covering the raw materials and process conveyors from mines into the plant to ensure 
dust free production process 
● Impoundment and recirculation of rain water around the plant for cooling purposes 
and 
● Efficient treatment of waste water for re-use and safe disposal.  
The commitment of these companies per their information disclosure on their websites seems 
encouraging, impressive and apparently, an improvement to what obtained in the past. 
However, it is not only disclosure of corporate values that matters but the practice of the 
values that indicates that the set values are implemented by the companies (Navran, 2003). 
Key participants’ views attest to the companies’ efforts towards improved corporate 
strategies. A non-state participant states that: 
'As MNC, the company makes sure that global policies, dos and don’ts are complied 
with. These strategies include sustainability policy of deploying alternative fuels from 
alternative sources that are environment friendly'. (CPC3, April 28th 2016). 
 
Another key participant explains that: - 
'...we use electrostatic precipitator here XXX. The work of the machine is to arrest 
escaping dust and send it back to the system. That is why if you look at the lawn it’s 
clean. That shows the impact of the electrostatic precipitator. We have back filters that 
attract dust. We charge and recharge often and often. ...we also voluntarily accept 
guidelines from international financial organisation, that’s the public-sector arm of the 
World Bank. They come to check some of our figures and look at our books’ (CPC1, 




A government actor admitted that the improvement witnessed so far is not strange because: - 
'...environmentally, everybody is aware now. There is no cement factory that does not 
have their environmental compliance department it is a whole department' (GFRD2, 
15th October 2012).  
 
This shows the relevance of information power in this age, and not employing the information 
revolution potentials might spell doom for corporations in the 21st century. The information 
revolution has been described as development of technologies such as computers, digital 
communication, and microchip in the second half of the 20th century that has led to dramatic 
reduction in the cost of obtaining, processing, storing, and transmitting information in all 
forms (Business Dictionary, 2017). The corporate actors in the Nigerian cement industry are 
taking the advantage of information revolution as it could be seen that the companies are 
growing in profit and investing further to expand. This could be because of the improved 
corporate disclosure processes (Owolabi, 2008; Uwuigbe, 2012) on one hand and probably 
the context of operation on the other. These have implications on the development of the 
sector. Over all implications discernible from the above findings are discussed in the 
following sub-section.  
6.4 Implications of Corporate Actors socio-environmental responsibility beyond state 
regulations in the Nigerian cement industry 
In this section, implications of corporate governance actors’ strands of corporate social 
responsibility analysed in the preceding section are discussed. In the context of market 
economy, the corporate governance actors in the Nigeria cement industry have significantly 




hierarchical modes of governance (Kooiman, 2003), Type II Multilevel environmental 
governance (Hooghe & Marks, 1993, 2001) in the sector. These developments indicate the 
emergence of corporate actors as new governance actors thereby raising an important issue 
about corporate values and practice. Disclosure of corporate responsibility brings to fore 
corporate values but the practice of these values is another thing entirely. It is still agreed that 
the voluntary nature of CSR in the global south hinders its success because it is not accorded 
required practice (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2010). The case of the extractive industry can be 
argued to be different owing to the reforms of the recent past. Corporate practice in the 
Nigerian cement sector as far as this study is concerned is mainly for corporate economic 
interest protecting the company investment by relating with the host communities, make more 
profit without substantial reinvestment into alternative renewable resources. Mining of 
limestone continue in large scale piling more pressure on the environmental resources 
discernible from the rapid expansions of these companies in recent time. 
The main factors that have triggered increased corporate actors’ governance beyond the state 
regulations is the standard setting efforts of international organisations such as the 
International Finance Corporations and United Nations environmental disclosure and human 
right policy. These organisations have played significant roles in promoting corporate ethics 
where the development of corporate codes of practice will influence corporate actions beyond 
regulations. For example, the claims of both companies in their annual reports exhibit high 
degree of emphasis on being guided by the national and international codes of corporate 
governance as required by international organisations and the country of operation. One major 




the World Business Council for Sustainable Development’s (WBCSD) Cement Sustainability 
Initiative (CSI). The body facilitated the development of sustainability strategies that will 
keep the global cement industry in business in the 21st century. Another important factor 
includes the growing influence of the civil society organisations and the advancement of 
information technology and social media. The influence of civil society in Nigeria and the 
Nigerian cement industry and the media as well as how this transformed to governance is 
explored in the next section.  
6.5 CSOs intervention in environmental governance in the Nigerian cement sector 
Earlier on, I have identified civil society organisations as one of the important factors that 
have influenced corporate governance actors’ corporate responsibility in the Nigerian cement 
industry. In this section, attention is on the discussion of the background and roles of the civil 
society organisations in Nigeria and how their activities illuminate multilevel governance 
particularly in the Nigerian cement industry. As discussed earlier in this chapter and chapter 
two, Civil Society Organisations in this study are Non-Governmental Organisations and 
Community Based Organisations. The specific intervening roles of CSOs in environmental 
regulation in Nigeria have been subject of concern in recent time. As there is no clear-cut 
framework for CSOs to effectively participate in hierarchical environmental governance. 
Irrespective of this challenge, I have argued that changes in resource development and 
environmental policies in the country in the last decades gave rise to the number of civil 
society organisation as professionals and territorial stakeholders in Nigeria. This is evident in 
the increasing number of specialist environmental reporters and organisations and the 




asserting their territorial rights to relate with the corporations for socio-economic 
development and environmental projects instead of waiting on government. This points to the 
need to recognise the significance of these category of non-state actors in influencing the 
governance process in Nigeria and the Nigerian cement industry. 
 
Though CSOs have no formal powers to make policy (Schwartz, 2004), but the influence of 
social media aided by the information revolution and open resistance of the host communities 
have been used to expose government ineptitude as well as shape companies’ decisions more 
recently. As discovered in this study, this choice of protest through social media and 
environmental reporting have been found to be the best option as official letter writing and 
face to face meeting do not materialise anymore. One of the frontline participants in the media 
explains that: - 
‘... You don’t have to go and stay with them over there. Just do it and let them know 
what you are doing… We are not there to boost anybody’s ego; we are just neutral. If 
anything goes wrong, we write it the way it is (EJ1, 18thApril 2016).  
 
Also, it was explained by a community representative how the media has aided their initial 
protest.  
‘… After we called them in-house to discuss and nothing was forthcoming. Then we 
decided to call the press and let the world know what was going on’ (CCE5, 10thApril 
2016). 
 
The use of letter has been modified to the open letter idea where government cannot totally 
deny the knowledge of the issue at hand or companies would want to quickly act to protect 
their corporate image. A respondent shared his experience to this effect as follows: - 
‘I don’t know if you know about the controversy in Cross River state; there is a road 
government wanted to construct. It was to pass through national park, it was called the 




been there for centuries. There was one article we wrote, we published it and we 
shared it on social media. It’s a way of giving it more awareness and to allow traffic to 
the website. ... My point is that, they made a statement, but they are not specific on 
exactly what they want to do. They were in between. I published it the way it is. ... 
Before you know it, because I copied some environmentalist… immediately she (the 
minister) saw it she reacted. I knew she was annoyed. Another person reacted and 
asked ‘’how has the ministry sat on the fence? I didn’t reply him. Because I’m their 
friend that doesn’t mean I won’t express myself. I’ve learnt from experience that if 
you try to boost someone’s ego in this job, they won’t respect you anymore. I like to 
keep government on the line, keep them doing the right thing. Because ordinary 
people that don’t have power depend on the media too (EJ1, 18thApril 2016) 
 
Also, corporate actors like protecting the image of their companies by responding quickly to 
resolve issues before it affects their business as may be inferred from the following view: - 
 
‘I was formally based in Port Harcourt (Rivers state) and I know things that are done 
there. So, when I came down, I started fighting for them (My community). At the end 
of the day, we gathered ourselves and fight for our right. We went to quarry, very 
close to my village, where they are blasting. We shut down the quarry, then the 
management came and told us to come to round table to solve things amicably. Our 
main objective then was that we want development for our people. ... So, when we sat 
and discussed, they agreed to be engaging in developmental work yearly for the 
community’ (CCE3, 10thApril 2016)  
 
Another community representative relates that: - 
‘What happened is that XXX never thought of settlement before this misunderstanding 
and since it occurred and he came to realise that we are fighting for our right, so he 
started negotiating settlement’ (CCI 3, 30th May 2016).  
 
This choice is favoured because in the past such protest letter did not materialise. Government 
may use bureaucratic tactics to delay action or not attend to such issues and therefore use of 
open protest and the media is now favoured. Another community participant also narrates 
that:  
‘We’ve been on it for over fifteen years before the project started now. We wrote 
several letters without any response. … We went to the local government and some 
agencies of the government to inform them of our challenges and what we planned to 
do. Then we went to XXX to block their entrance hindering their activities. So, he 






The use of peaceful protests and the media have proved useful due to increasing access to 
information and interconnectedness of global actors. The CSOs work together to make their 
voice heard in issues of concern but the information revolution has continued to make 
interdependence and interrelations quite insignificant. As with the case of the Nigerian cement 
sector, it was discovered that CBOs have stood for themselves without the support of any 
significant NGOs or total reliance on the media: - 
‘… Most of them have written to us especially those that fight for human right. They 
want to have a meeting with the head of the youths here but the reply from there was 
not satisfying’ (CCI 4,30thMay 2016). 
 
Further evidence can be deduced from the statement below: - 
‘… I’ve said concerning NGOs and journalist. They all have limits, fine, they make 
their publications for the public but after the day they read it on paper or news, they 
don’t remember again. Tomorrow they are expecting another news, government don’t 
have time; all their focus is Boko haram, even if they have something to do about the 
problem of the masses. That’s their focus. That’s why NGOs, journalists etc. can’t be 
very effective’ (CCE3, 10thApril 2016). 
 
This shows how the information revolution has influenced governance process in many ways 
resulting in direct involvement of communities in matters affecting them without necessarily 
involving non-governmental organisation. The idea could be attributed to the general notion 
that most NGOs are after material wealth and their involvement may not yield required result 
as resonated in a participant’s view: - 
‘You know these our NGOs they like to go to all these politicians where they will get, 
and the ministry is not even helping, they will see on our website, we want NGO, we 
want NGO, they do not come because the NGOs are not patient they want money 
quick’ (GFRD2, 15thOctober 2012).  
 
Considering the context of this study, the civil society organisation efforts in Nigeria relates to 




depending on the nature of issues addressed (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). They exhibit Type II 
multilevel governance qualities. The roles and interests of these groups of CSOs differ based 
on their interest and functions. For example, the NGOs are particularly organised, exposed 
and knowledgeable set of actors. They function mainly to influence and complement 
government roles in the promotion of environmental protection and management (NG1, 12th 
October 2012). Though environmental NGOs are on the rise in Nigeria by the day, but there 
are formidable ones who are established for selfless interest and are evidently influencing 
environmental governance process in Nigeria. Unlike the CBOs whose interest is territorial 
and accept all community members, NGOs are globally connected and they employ 
professionals to work for the interest of the society in general. Three prominent NGOs 
considered in this case are specialists in three major areas in the country. The areas are:  
● Biological diversity and conservation 
● Environmental activism and advocacy for environmental rights and justices 
● Social and environmental research 
The non-governmental organisations (NGO) are Nigerian Conservation Foundation (NCF), 
Nigeria environmental study/action Team (NEST) and Environmental Right Action (ERA). 
The activities of the NGOs that can be related to engagement in the governance process in 
Nigeria are discussed in the section that follows. 
 
6.5.1 Background of the non-governmental organisations 
The Nigerian Conservation Foundation (NCF) is the premier environmental Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) in Nigeria. The organisation is concerned with the 




government shortcomings in the protection of the country’s pristine natural resources. NCF 
was established in 1980, registered in 1982 under the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act of 
1961 (now Company and Allied Matters Act of 1990) as a charitable organisation (About 
NCF, 2017). NCF plays a leading role as a non-governmental organisation in Nigeria through 
its many projects and strategies used to maintain ecosystem balance and meet people’s needs 
(NG7, 26thApril 2016; About NCF, 2017). This is claimed achievable by working with 
government, corporate bodies and the local communities. The organisation claims to be a 
member of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and partners with over 
80 international organisations such as the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Bird Life 
International, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), Wetlands International and 
Fauna and Flora International (FFI) (About NCF, 2017). At the local level NCF enjoys 
partnership with other environmental NGOs and the academia in the spirit of collective 
actions towards sustainable development (NG7, 26thApril 2012). 
 
Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team (NEST) is another prominent NGO with interest 
in the environment. NEST was founded on 17th July 1987, formally registered in 1989, under 
the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act (cap 98), as a non-governmental, not-for-profit, non-
partisan, research, education, and advocacy organization (NEST- About Us, 2015). The 
organisation claims to have risen out of the need to address the rising environmental stresses 
in the country and the urgent need for strong non-governmental entity to fill this vacuum. 
Among these environmental stressors are industrial pollution, loss of biodiversity and general 
resources degradation impacting most adversely on the disadvantaged group (NEST- About 




institutional framework, as well as inappropriate allocation of resources underlie these 
environmental stresses (NEST- About Us, 2015, para 4). The organisation has since 
committed to improving environmental interventions and interactions through self-supporting 
and efficient organisational background comprising of professional, selfless and dedicated 
staff.  
 
Environmental Rights Action (ERA) is an advocacy non-governmental organisation founded 
on the 11th of January 1993 to deal with environmental human rights issues in Nigeria. ERA is 
the Nigerian chapter of Friends of the Earth International (FoEI). ERA claims its main 
objective is to defend human ecosystems in terms of human rights, and promote 
environmentally responsible governmental, commercial, community and individual practice 
in Nigeria through the empowerment of local people (About ERA, 2017). The organisation is 
the coordinating NGO for the Nigerian Tobacco Control Alliance (NTCA); engages in 
environmental activism and struggles particularly in the areas of oil and gas exploration and 
Tobacco control (NG9, 3rdMay 2016). The organisation’s commitment for environmental 
human rights won it Sophie Prize (1998) for excellence and courage in the struggle for 
environmental Justice and the Bloomberg Award for Tobacco control activism (2009). ERA 
gives priority to the most urgent environmental, human rights and social issues, work with 
impacted communities across the country with the support of international organisations 






6.5.2 Roles of non-governmental organisations in the Nigerian cement industry 
governance  
The Nigerian Conservation Foundation (NCF) 
NCF as environmental NGO has practically engaged in multiple level of environmental 
interventions. For example, NCF has been at the forefront of influencing environmental 
policies in Nigeria. The organisation claimed to have played a lead role in the establishment 
of the defunct Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) now Federal Ministry of 
Environment and the drafting of Nigeria’s National Forestry Law in 2000. NCF also claimed 
to have contributed to the development of the National Conservation Strategy in 1984, the 
enactment of the Endangered Species Decree in 1985 and the development of the Vision 2010 
on the environment in 1997. In the promotion of environmental education and sensitization, 
NCF asserts that they facilitated the publication of National University Commission (NUC) 
endorsed eleven volumes of textual materials on Environmental Education as environmental 
curriculum resource for tertiary institutions in Nigeria.  
 
Also, in the areas of self-regulation NCF’s biological diversity conservation and 
environmental pollution mitigating projects is spread over the country. The organisation 
explained that the Niger-Delta Conservation and Sustainable Development (NDCSD) project 
was established in 2002 with a view to shift dependence on oil and gas to show casing the 
value of biodiversity. The environmental projects cut across Nigeria with plans to solve 
environmental problems but also improve livelihood of the communities and protect the vast 
biodiversity of the country at large. Prominent among the projects are: Akwa Ibom State: 




Obudu Cattle Ranch; Edo State: Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) Project; Gombe & Jigawa 
State: Wing Over Wetlands (WOW); Lagos State: Lekki Conservation Centre (LCC); Ogun, 
Ondo and Osun State: Omo – Oluwa – Shasha Conservation Project; Plateau State: A. P. 
Leventis Ornithological Research Institute (APLORI); Taraba State: Participatory Forest 
Management Project, Mambilla and Donga sites; Important Bird Area Programme. Further 
from these contributions, NCF supported the establishment of the Nigerian Environmental 
Study Action Team (NEST), another prominent NGO considered in this study. 
 
Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team (NEST) 
NEST’s activity is inclined towards social and environmental research to provide information 
for the benefit of the people and government of Nigeria. The organisation has played 
prominent roles in the policy development process, environmental sensitization and collective 
actions for environmentally sustainable development. Prominent among these is a six- year 
project – ‘Building Nigeria’s response to climate change’ in partnership with foreign 
organisations (NG10, 25thMay 2016). The organisation also creates environmental awareness 
through research and publications: - 
 
‘When the first Rio summit was held, NEST’s “threatened Nigerian environment’’ 
was the publication that featured in that meeting. And that was the main publication 
that came from Nigeria. That opened the eyes of even Nigerians to this organisation’ 
(NG10, 25thMay 2016). 
 
Environmental Rights Action (ERA) 





‘… what we do is environmental advocacy, the community that sued shell in Delta 
state and got judgement in 2007. ERA played a role in getting them legal 
representation. We do advocacy at the national assembly. If you are aware of the 
national tobacco control Act which was passed May 15, 2015, ERA was the spearhead 
of the campaign. So, we lobby at the national assembly, we identify people who are 
receptive to pushing campaigns on the environment we work with them’ (NG9, 
3rdMay 2016). 
 
Apart from advocacy and lobbying roles played by the organisation, the participant also 
explained their environmental education and collaboration roles. 
 
‘… we also work with the media. There is a training we are organising called 
‘’Reporting the Environment’’, it’s of two folds; the first is helping journalist to 
understand environmental issues and second is getting them to report environmental 
issues from an informed perspective… we also involve the media. Also, we do 
environmental field monitoring on communities. Any community where there are 
environmental issues, we visit and we identify people we can work with and then 
follow-up with a community network. The purpose of that is, we can’t be everywhere, 
so the community network is there to give feedback, we have it in about 25 states… 
We would have trained them on what to observe, pictures to take, questions to ask. … 
There was a massive flood across Nigeria in 2012, we were not able to visit all the 
states. … We also try as much as possible to send memos to government. We can 
come up with our positions on any issue and send memo on it’ (NG9, 3rdMay 2016).  
 
Further from the above the participant statement below affirms the organisation inclination to 
activism than the other two NGOs: -  
‘Our media advocate does a lot on that because once those issues are identified, we either call 
a press or issue a press release. Every year we do what we call National environmental 
movement of about 150 to 200 civil society and government people together to talk on 
specific environmental issues. We've talked about food, climate change, transparency and 
accountability, water, deforestation etc. Every year we pick something and talk about it’ 
(NG9, 3rdMay 2016). 
 
 
Summarily, NGOs response as governance actors in Nigeria has been impressive. Although 
they cannot make laws, they have contributed immensely into the development of a coherent 




in affecting policy directions in Nigeria in general. They have used their professional 
expertise to complement efforts of successive governments to evolve persuasive approaches 
to sensitise the public on environmental issues. They have also developed environmental 
projects to either complement or force government to take improved actions on environmental 
issues. Their research and media networking has significantly put both government and 
corporate actors on their toes in Nigeria. Though the actors have not significantly had a direct 
impact in the Nigerian cement industry but their influence is felt by the government. This is 
evidenced in the submission of a non-governmental participant: 
‘This issue of Ekuri forest, we were one of the groups that first issue press release 
asking the government to stop that project and other groups also joined quickly. The 
president does not go for the ground-breaking ceremony when he was supposed to 
because of the notice we made and still efforts are on to gather groups to further the 
system. I think they’ve not stopped, the government there are more conscious but 




However, little or no attention is focused on the growing cement sector by these NGOs 
irrespective of their knowledge of the industry’s social and environmental implications. 
NGOs intervention in environmental issues in Nigeria has been selective, it is greatly 
determined by funding and the nature of the issue. A non-governmental participant lamented 
that: - 
 
‘…One thing about this country is that once there is no fund, every initiative dies 
down’ (NG10, 25thMay 2016). 
 
Although, the effectiveness of NGOs is not studied in this work, their role as governance 




involvement of NGOs in the regulation of Nigeria’s cement industry. Another non-
governmental participant highlights the challenges: - 
‘With the federal government, the kind of thing we have tried to do is to work with 
them in terms of capacity development. We have tried to work with them in terms of 
educating student. By and large, we found out that there is so much bureaucracy in the 
system’ (NG1, 12thOctober 2016). 
 
As discussed earlier, to overcome the bureaucratic bottleneck faced in relating with 
government by the NGOs, they resorted into open letter approach to pass their message 
across. This process has evidently helped in achieving some of their important objectives. A 
major example is the Ekuri forest reserve issue in Cross river state mentioned earlier. 
 
Surprisingly, it was discovered that there is no single local NGO supported by the corporate 
governance actors in the Nigerian cement sector. Rather the companies claim to partner with 
international NGOs and self-acclaimed NGOs such as Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
WWF and Dangote Foundation (CPC1, 11thApril 2016; CPC4, 3rdMay 2016), which will not 
benefit the Nigerian environment directly. 
 
6.5.3 Community Based Organisations (CBO) as governance actors in the Nigerian 
cement industry 
Another important civil society organisation considered in the study are the Community 
Based Organisations (CBOs). As earlier indicated, CBOs are not like the NGOs in terms of 
composition and scale, but as non-profit group interested, they are in collective actions for the 
social and economic development of their communities (Abegunde, 2009). Because of their 
territorial influence (Piattoni, 2010), CBOs have become very influential stakeholders in the 




the concept of social licence to operate (SOL) has been one major reason why community 
based organisations have grown stronger in the sector (IFC, 2014). The concept of social 
licence to operate is believed to have taken centre stage in the global mining industry in the 
2000s (Gehman, Lefsrud & Fast, 2017)). The concept has received wide criticisms as not 
being a formal licence required for mining companies to operate and too ambiguous 
(Crowley, 2014; Owen & Kemp, 2013). Despite the criticism, its currency is still widespread 
and relevant in understanding mining communities’ and companies’ interactions in 
developing countries particularly from a neoliberal governance perspective. As discussed in 
chapter 4, one of the requirements to grant mining licence to cement companies is to submit a 
signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the company and host community 
along with the approved EIA from the FMENV to the Federal Ministry Mines and Steel (the 
line ministry). The MOU must entail socio-economic and environmental development plans 
for the surrounding communities, the golden rule is to involve communities within 10km 
radius to the industry (CPC1, 11thApril 2016). This requirement can be argued as a way to 
formalise to an extent the legal basis for the social licences to operate by the mining 
companies. Considering this requirement, CBOs in the Nigerian cement industry have played 
their ways into establishing informal relations with the companies operating in their domain.  
The corporate actors in turn recognise that community relations are key in protecting their 
investments and as such they have created a department of community relations to ensure that 
their social licence is maintained. Interestingly, roles and relations of the CBOs in the industry 
is much independent of government. As explained by one of the community representatives, 




laws but their involvement in the industry in to ensure their communities benefit positively in 
the activities of the companies in their domain: - 
 
‘And that’s what development association is fighting for. It’s not befitting that we 
have such a mighty cement industry and the community is still like this. And we the 
land owners we are still living behind modernisation’ (CCI1, 12thApril 2016).  
 
However, the fight for such in their communities did not just begin easily, it is because of 
government neglect of their statutory roles of ensuring that companies comply with the MOU 
signed with the communities. The CBOs experiences in the sector vary significantly, some 
communities assert that what seem to be smooth positive relations with the company 
operating in their community did not come on a platter of gold as explained earlier. 
 
As emphasised below, the community based organisations are not directly involved in the 
environmental regulation process. They are organised to use their territorial opportunity to 
foster relations with companies and ensure that they benefit from what concerns them. The 
non-state actors are arguably involved in self-governance process and collaborative 
governance in this wise. A community chief explains that: - 
 
‘We don’t have much with the government, though, before XXX started responding, 
we took the case to the state assembly. After a while state assembly backed out’ 
(CCE4, 10thApril 2016).  
 
Another community representative has this to say: - 
 
‘Government is supposed to fight for us (represent us), but what government is 
thinking is embezzlement. If the government puts the interest of the masses into 
consideration, companies will not deny the masses their right. And since government 





An important finding in the works of CBOs is the issue of power and legitimacy. As 
discussed in chapter 2, power and legitimacy have been major issues of contention in the 
multilevel governance perspectives of governance framework. While some communities are 
collectively working to benefit from the economic transition in their communities, another 
host community is confronted with internal power problems and legitimacy to the benefit of 
the company. This situation has led to an ongoing legal tussle for over five years. A key 
informant explains that: - 
 
‘There was disorder in the community around 2009/2010 till 2011. Then it was 
broadcasted on the media that there is riot in XXX and so on. But when we look at it, 
we realised that the head of this community which is the king did not support the 
community in fighting for our right and this was what made someone who is a native 
of this community and is well educated … go to the king and talk to him on the issue 
of MOU that there should be an agreement between the community and XXX before 
the establishment of the industry. So, they meet twice on how to get the agreement. 
Then they thought about settlement but the settlement will be in the name of the king 
in counsel which is not supposed to be so and … disagreed with that. …, they took the 
case to the state governor then and he told them to go for settlement but they did not 
agree with it and that was what made us to take the case to court. We are still on the 
case till now since 2011 and the government did not do anything about it’ (CCI 4, 
30thMay 2016). 
 
Aside from the corporate actors and the Civil society organisations whose roles are clearer as 
presented above particularly in the cement industry governance, some important but often not 
recognised actors in the governance process include the media and environmental consultants. 
This group of actors are contributing immensely to the polity and development process as 
professionals (Piattoni, 2010). In the case of the media, they have become the key instrument 
of change in this era of freedom of information and their roles have not been limited to the 
cement industry alone. The continued importance of environmental protection and 




activism. For example, environmental journalists play pivotal roles in the exposure of the 
environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region (NG9, 3rdMay 2016). In the last two 
decades, environmental journalists have grown to the extent that their roles and influence is 
much felt in the environmental education process. A participant from the Nigerian media 
industry submits that:  
 
‘Thank God for the free flow of information. We also need to get to some levels that 
journalists need to help unravel some of these things; but we need some form of hints 
before we can embark on such’ (EJ1, 18thApril 2016). 
 
Another media professional explains their roles in the governance process: - 
‘Example is the Ekuri Forest Highway, the Calabar issue, we posted the story on our 
website and we got people engaged to make them understand what we are going to 
lose if we lose that forest. That’s one example of how government can be put on their 
toes and made to understand the things they are doing right or wrong. And social 
media has really helped’ (EJ4, 26thApril 2016). 
 
Also, the key challenges the media has been contending with in the country is resonated in the 
response of a respondent below: - 
 
‘I used to be affiliated to the federal government owned radio station but since 
February (2016), I have been off for a while because of the story I did. I investigated a 
rich politician and my investigation was too hard for some people to bear. And I could 
not retract my position on the story because I knew I investigated well and I know the 
activities of this person. So, I can say for now I’m a freelance journalist’ (EJ2, 
18thApril2016). 
 
Environmental consultancy also has been on the ascendancy in Nigeria since the 1990s when 
the first environmental policy was launched in Nigeria. Environmental consultants are 
accredited by the Federal Ministry of the Environment and the state government before they 
can operate. They work as intermediary between the State and Businesses.  Their roles in the 





‘…most of them are using very competent Environmental consultants. Like Ewekoro 
for instance, some of their environmental consultants are so much accredited by the 
federal ministry of environment, NESREA, also by the agency here. Some of these 
consultants are professors; they are experts in air quality measure etc., so they don’t 
send anyhow consultant to that place because of the nature of their activities’ (GRST3, 
13thApril 2016). 
 
On a general note, the imprints of non-state actors in Nigeria have been growing rapidly. The 
transition to neoliberal economic policies paved way for a shift in governance to the private 
sector actors. Further from the growing of the business actors particularly in the cement 
sector, other non-state actors have evolved different interventions to participate in the 
governance process through nature. All the forms of involvement of the new governance 
actors discussed in this chapter indicate a governance approach that can complement 
government efforts towards human-environment sustainability if properly coordinated. If the 
power and authority of the state is used to provide enabling information, motivation and 
capacity needs (Lambin, 2005), the wealth of market combined with the expertise or 
professionalism of the civil society can foster development of natural resources that benefits 
the state, business and the society inclusively (Bebbington, 2013).  
 
This section shows that NGOs and CBOs as civil society organisations are active in the 
governance process in the Nigerian cement industry. The transition in the country in recent 
past indicates the significance and relevance of the new governance actors in the governance 
for sustainable development as exemplified by the cement industry case.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
An attempt has been made herein to analyse corporate actors and civil society organisations’ 




The involvement of the corporate actors identified as private for-profit actors in the study 
marks the significance entry point for the non-state actors and further entrenched the non-
hierarchical and informal institutions in the governance of the industry. Thus, when the 
corporate actors obtain formal licence to operate in the sector, they are indirectly obligated to 
review their corporate governance strategies to accommodate wider socio-economic and 
environmental responsibilities. They should assume some new political roles formerly played 
by the state where they are obligated to relate with host communities as stakeholders in the 
sector legitimised by the MOU signed with the host community. This process makes ground 
for informal institutions’ involvement in the formal governance of the industry. Thus, 
corporate governance actors engage in corporate governance practice which is a significant 
non-hierarchical governance process and an important strategy to obtaining social licence to 
operate from stakeholders beyond the community. This can be characterised as follows- the 
state devolved economic power and roles to the corporate actors (Market) and the political 
responsibilities associated with economic development devolved to the market and society 
with minimal interference. Failure of the government to ensure proper social and economic 
compensation for the local communities paved way for the community based organisations 
(CBOs) to actively interact with the corporate governance actors without the government 
actors being central to the relationship. CBOs are key societal actors directly involved in the 
governance of the Nigerian cement sector. The involvement of the community based actors 
looks promising as the host communities have defied the status quo and rise to the defence of 
their territorial, social and environmental rights. Though the experience varies between the 
host communities considered in the study but evidence shows that both communities are more 




community collectively. As evident in the case communities these rights are being agitated for 
by the stakeholders as the situation warrants. 
 
Non-state actors’ interventions in the development and environmental regulation process in 
Nigeria’s cement industry is an indication of the growing prominence of corporations and 
society in issues that were initially under the purview of government. The involvement of this 
group of actors indicates the devolvement of power from governance perspective to 
complement and strengthen the development process either by bye passing government totally 
or involving the government a little less than usual (Rhodes, 1997; Rosenau, 2002, Hooghe & 
Marks, 2003).   
 
Corporate governance actors and community based organisations are the main new 
governance actors prominent in the Nigerian cement industry. Other non-state actors have 
also been playing significant direct and indirect roles in the policies that reformed the 
extractive sector from multilevel governance perspective. Non-governmental organisations 
have been found to be actively involved in the lobbying process to make policies on the 
environment. They have also been engaging in the various forms of non-hierarchical 
governance processes such as private not for profit Biodiversity projects, environmental 
education, partnership and collaboration climate change and environmental sustainability 
programmes. Most of the NGOs in Nigeria are challenged by funding and as such they have 
focused attention on selected environmental issues. Efforts of the NGOs in working with the 
CGAs in the Nigerian cement industry have been unsuccessful so far. However, the CGAs 
boast of supporting and funding global NGOs while the local NGOs where they domicile are 




study have been massive in Nigeria and it is believed that the changing economic terrain will 
continue to strengthen their involvement. The NGOs involvement have been self-motivated 
and limited to certain areas because of funding and priority of interest as well as less 
patronage by the CBOs. Their actions have been found to complement government lapses in 
so many ways and as well put government on their toes. However, their effective participation 
is still hindered by the poor participatory framework government still work with. 
 
Other prominent non-state actors identified in this chapter are the media, the academics and 
the environmental consultants. These actors as professionals have been contributing to the 
governance of the cement sector. The media has been a major revelation in this group of 
actors; they have been able to use the information technology which has turned the globe into 
a village to participate in the governance of the extractive sector in general. Their impacts 
have also been felt by the government, the private sector actors and the public. Their roles in 
the governance process indicate that it is no more business as usual for government and 
business in the country. Though it was revealed that they are still challenged mainly by 
funding and victimisation, these have not deterred their stride to educate the masses on 
development and environmental issues that concern them. Environmental consultants work as 
middlemen between the PSAs and the government. Though their roles have been found 
promising in the governance process but evidence has shown that the actors are faced with 
challenges of favouritism and exploitation by the government. Academics believe that the 
involvement in the governance process might not be open as may be the case of other actors 
but some of the policy directions government are following are the results of their findings 




to promote sustainable development in the country. There is the need for adequate research 
funding and most importantly standard setting for all activities. Findings in this chapter 
coupled with previous chapters signify a promising avenue for the grounding of multiple 
modes of governance where inter and intra actor cooperation can be useful. 
 
The interventions of non-state actors as articulated in this chapter indicate the spatial and 
social connotations of governance through nature. In the governance of the Nigeria cement 
industry both corporate actors and the CBOS have been found to be the key new governance 
actors. The CGAs aim to operate and make profit exploiting the natural resources. They 
should contend with obtaining a legal licence and social licence to operate. Legal licence is 
obtained from government and the social licence particularly is better obtained from the 
community instead of the general society. This is evidenced in the yearly development 
projects a multinational foreign company executes for the host communities. So far, the roles 
of other non-state actors in environmental governance continue to improve thanks to the 
information technology. Interestingly, the CGAs have improved their corporate strategies and 
are involved in voluntary and semi-mandatory projects as part of their corporate governance 
practices. Corporate disclosure is about value statement and the practice of the values should 
provide the actions translating to reality.  The social licence to operate and the interactions of 
the CGAs can be translated to corporate governance practices and multilevel environmental 
governance (Piattoni, 2010). Considering this translation, it is necessary to analyse the 
corporate governance practices evidenced in the Nigeria cement industry that could be 
regarded as partnerships for development beyond the state. In the next chapter, these 




social relations in the neoliberal era and the implications for sustainable development in the 






ANALYSING PARTNERSHIPS FOR MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES IN THE NIGERIAN CEMENT INDUSTRY 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the analysis of how the state and non-state governance actors 
assessed in the preceding chapters have engaged in partnerships to reflect multilevel 
governance practices in the Nigerian cement sector. In chapter four, I set out the context in 
which the central government's privatisation policy set the governance through nature (Bridge 
& Perreault, 2009) in motion in the cement industry. Privatisation ushered in the private 
sector actors as key stakeholders in the Nigerian cement industry. The central government 
assumed the role of facilitator of investments in the extractive sector while subnational 
governments only play active role in environmental regulatory activities. This I argue shows 
tendencies toward multilevel governance that requires social explanation and learning. In 
chapter five, it was demonstrated that the state actors at the three scales of government- 
federal, state and local have since been playing the regulator roles expected of the government 
in a multilevel perspective. The changing roles of state actors was identified with the Type 1, 
hierarchical governance mode (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Kooiman, 2003), related to plane one 
in the conceptual space of MLG by Piattoni (2010). Following from that, chapter six assessed 
the ways by which the non-state actors identified as private sector actors and the civil society 
organisations have responded to the reforms in the sector. The responses of non-state actors in 




(2003). It also indicated the actualisation of new governance practice parallel to the state, a 
non-hierarchical/self-governance mode (Kooiman, 2003) found in plane two of Piattoni’s 
(2010) conceptual space of multilevel governance (MLG).  
 
It is expected that the neoliberalisation process and the quasi-devolution of regulatory 
responsibility by the central government would have transformed resource development and 
environmental sustainability compared to the past. However, the above developments only 
show the shift of responsibilities from the centre to the periphery and the emergence of 
parallel responsibilities sharing actors from the government (Jessop, 1997; Bingham, 
Nabatchi & O’Leary, 2005). Findings also point to efforts in pooling resources together for 
sustainable development in the country. Hooghe and Marks (2003) explain that every citizen 
is in a nested jurisdiction with only one relevant jurisdiction at any territorial scale under Type 
1 multilevel governance and the jurisdiction is usually stable for periods of several decades or 
more while the allocation of policy competences across jurisdictional levels is flexible. Type 
1 is unlike the Type II MLG which is composed of specialized jurisdictions; fragmented into 
functionally specific pieces operating at different scales without great fixity in their existence 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Piattoni, 2009). This means that the role of the central state remains 
foundational and fundamental to sustainable development not minding the increasing 
involvement of private sector actors and the third sector in natural resource governance. There 
are indications that different spaces of inter-actor collaborations without particularly 
involving the central state are prominent with varied implications. These inter-actor 





The concept of collaboration is considered in this case as an avenue for both state and non-
state actors to partner in achieving common goals in relatively cheaper and faster ways 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008, Paavola, 2008, 2016). Collaborative governance has developed as an 
alternative to the adversarialism of interest group pluralism and to the accountability failures 
of managerialism (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 544). Collaborative governance referred to as co-
governance by Kooiman (2003) has been praised for the opportunity of working together to 
address issues involving multiple actors of varied background through interdependency and 
pooling of resources together for the same goal (Ansell & Gash, 2008). This chapter explores 
how these claims have been applied as it relates to natural resource governance focusing on 
the case study communities and companies. The case studies offer appropriate contexts to 
explain and understand the question this chapter aims to answer: How can the state and non-
state actors’ relations and responses to privatization be understood as contestations of the goal 
of sustainable development in the Nigerian cement industry?  
 
Collaborative or co-governance is one of the most prominent defining characteristics of the 
governance modes. Kooiman (2003) describes Co-governance as a mode of governance 
which shows governance as the ‘domain of both governmental and non-governmental actors 
who can only achieve beneficial outcomes if they work together’ (Arnouts, Van Der Zorwen 
& Arts, 2012, p. 44). Ansell and Gash (2008, p.545) describe collaborative governance as a 
“A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state 
stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and 
deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or 




negotiation, public-private partnerships and networks (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Tengku-Hamza, 
2011). These variants of co-governance are conceptualized differently depending on the 
disciplines they are being applied (Bulkeley et al., 2012). As will be shown here, state and 
non-state actors have so far been working in partnership to address development issues in a 
variety of co-governance modes in the Nigerian cement industry. Considering the different 
actors’ categories, there are 3 variants of co-governance presented in this chapter; the first one 
can be identified as transnational governance (Bulkeley et al., 2012). This case example 
involves the development of sustainability initiatives by the global cement industry to 
mitigate the global cement industry impacts on the environment and the society sustainably. 
The second variant involves a public-private partnership project where the central state that 
used to be the first point of call became the last. Public-private partnership has been the most 
popular variant of collaborative governance (Tengku-Hamza, 2011). The third variant 
discussed in this chapter is the practice of corporate social responsibilities of the companies 
within the host communities. This is considered an important case because of the nature of the 
industry and recent reforms ushering in mandatory MoU with the host communities. 
 
Using interview data and secondary resources, the objective of this chapter is addressed under 
four key sections. Section 7.1, the introduction is followed by presentation of the discussion 
of the three cases of co-governance practice in the Nigerian cement industry in section 7.2. 
Section 7.3 discusses the impacts of co-governance as experienced by the case communities 






7.2. Collaborative Governance practice in the Nigerian cement industry  
This section is a description and discussion of three co-governance practice case studies 
related to the cement industry. The actors and their roles as well as the structure and nature of 
the projects are presented. As mentioned earlier, the case studies selected depict variants of 
collaborative governance at global, national/regional and local scales. The Cement 
Sustainability Initiative depicts the network of global cement producers to co-manage their 
social and environmental impacts sustainably. The second case study is a public-private 
partnership project involving the state government, a central government agency and a cement 
producing company. The third case however is a description of interrelations between the 
cement producing company and the host communities from corporate social responsibility 
perspective. It is a replication of the practice of corporate social responsibility in the new 
Nigerian cement industry. Therefore, these case studies were chosen to compare how the case 
study companies have evolved corporate practices for sustainable development of the sector 
with emphasis on understanding the roles of public and private actors in the governance 
process.  
 
7.2.1 The cement sustainability initiative  
In 1999, with the support of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) ten of the world's biggest cement producers came together on a voluntary basis to 
chart sustainable approaches for the global cement industry. WBCSD is a global, CEO-led 
organization of over 200 leading businesses working together to accelerate the transition to a 
sustainable world (Overview- About Us- WBCSD, 2017). The organisation claims to assist 




and the environment positively. The collaboration of more than one-third of the world's 
cement suppliers resulted in the ‘change management’ initiative called 'Cement Sustainability 
Initiative’ (CSI). The CSI is a non-governmental, self-governance initiative formed through 
coming together of forward looking cement producing companies. The CSI has been 
described as one of the most successful sectoral initiatives in the world of business (Klee & 
Coles, 2004; WBCSD, 2005; Cook & Ponssard, 2011). The purpose of the CSI was mainly to 
ensure maximum reduction in the ecological footprint of the industry, social contribution and 
stakeholder engagement meaningfully in the industry in practice (WBCSD, 2005). The 
participating companies recognised that as an industry that is dependent on natural resources, 
taking the initiative secures their 'licence to operate' as the world continue to clamour for 
environmental sustainability. The initiative therefore ticks one of the boxes of transnational 
governance as conceived by Bulkeley et al., (2012, p. 594) to involve “a range of actors and 
forms of authority, concerned with establishing what the ‘legitimate social purpose’ of 
responding to climate change entails” 
 
The cement sustainability initiative is a significant reference point for a global non-
governmental co-management initiative because of the processes of its evolution. It is a 
member-led initiative, which means the guidelines or report of the initiative are binding on 
registered member companies but not binding on non-member companies but are only guided 
by it. The cement sustainability initiative is an example of how business actors working 
transnationally are involved in the governance of global environmental issues concerning their 
operations. It is a significant case for understanding the transnational governance of the 




This is by examining how the objectives of the initiative have influenced corporate practices 
of the companies in Nigeria.  
 
In its process of evolution, wide consultation with different stakeholders ranging from 
governments to other non-governmental organisations spread across the world was reportedly 
made to ensure proper grounding of the initiative. Following from that, an independent 
research was also commissioned to ensure that the initiative is evidence-based. Also, an 
independent assurance group was set up to give credibility to the research outcome (Klee & 
Coles, 2004; WBCSD, 2005). The study conducted by US based Battelle Memorial Institute 
between 2000 and 2002 led to a report titled ‘Towards a sustainable cement industry’. 
Therefore highlighted key issues the global cement industry could face over the next two 
decades and solutions to develop the cement industry sustainably in the 21st century (Klee & 
Coles, 2004, WBCSD, 2005). Among the issues the report raised include climate change, land 
use, biodiversity, and determination of key sustainable development performance indicators, 
industrial ecology, environmental performance and public policy (Klee, 2002). By July 2002, 
the pioneer member companies signed the CSI Charter and a document for the 
implementation of the initiative, Agenda for Action (AfA) was released. The CSI charter sets 
out the minimum requirements for membership in terms of contribution to sustainable 
development through a summary of the implementation steps included in the Agenda for 
Action (WBCSD, 2005). Member companies are expected to sign the CSI Charter when 
joining the initiative as a form of commitment to fulfil the requirements, implement 
guidelines and report on their performance as set out in the Charter (WBCSD, 2005). Member 




assessment questionnaire and an audit every four years or when major changes are made in 
the Charter (WBCSD, 2005). The Agenda for Action presented the next stage for the industry 
towards sustainable development committing the member companies to the first five years of 
a 20-year programme (WBCSD, 2005). Key issues in the agenda the initiative expected the 
individual company or joint actions to address are: climate protection; responsible use of fuels 
and raw materials; employee health and safety; emission reductions and local impacts on land 
and communities as well as reporting and communication progress (Klee & Coles, 2004, 
WBCSD, 2005). By 2005, notable progress has been made, beginning with increase in 
membership to 18, this has further increased to 24 (About CSI, 2015). The first progress 
report, good practice guidelines for the industry and many other significant reports have since 
been published which have played significant roles in improving corporate practice in the 
industry (WBCSD, 2005). 
 
The main objective of the initiative has been to define sustainable development for the global 
cement industry and evolve ways of facilitating actions to implement the initiative. One of the 
key reports is the sectoral approach project launched in 2008 which is particularly aimed at 
reducing CO2 emissions. While the sectoral approach has been described as interesting and 
elaborate, it has been argued to be an incomplete approach (Cook & Ponssard, 2011). Cook 
and Ponssard (2011) argue that the sectoral approach project of the cement sustainability 
initiative does not address interdependent issues of competition between companies and 
implementation process that will attract different stakeholders into the deal. They particularly 
emphasise how the government as a major stakeholder could be attracted to the initiative as a 




initiative as a governance process. In terms of competition, the experience in the Nigerian 
cement industry could be summed as that the voluntary nature of the initiative gives non-
members edge over members who are mandated to comply. Similarly, as transnational 
governance initiative, (Bulkeley et al., 2012, p. 595) submit that “there is a considerable grey 
area concerning whether agenda-setting and knowledge-sharing activities are indeed forms of 
governance or are more akin to the traditional roles assigned to transnational coalitions and 
advocacy groups of seeking to influence others”. However, it is submitted in transnational 
governance literature that such activities as the CSI could be regarded as governance in as 
much they promote social learning, fulfil new roles and assume new responsibilities (Pattberg, 
2006; Bulkeley et al., 2012). Despite the limitations, the CSI represents a reference point as a 
voluntary sectoral sustainability programme ever undertaken by an important industry sector. 
As will be argued here, as a transnational governance network, its activities over time have 
leveraged the diffusion of information, knowledge and norms and the pooling and distribution 
of resources. More recently, it has led to the establishment of a set of norms, rules, and 
standards from non-governmental perspective in Nigeria (Andonova et al., 2009). The CSI 
sets out key sustainability guidelines cement companies can follow to stay in business and be 
socially and environmentally responsible. The initiative has set a major benchmark in the 
industry as non-member companies also embraced the initiative in their operations (Klee & 
Coles, 2004; WBCSD, 2005) while the benchmarks are mandatory for the initiative members.  
 
One of the case companies in this study is a key member of the cement sustainability initiative 
while the other is a non-member. LafargeHolcim (Company A) is one of the founding 




be guided by global best practice benchmark in its operations. In the corporate governance 
literature, several factors have been identified to determine the strategy a company employed 
to manage stakeholders. These include size of the firm, nature of business, corporate structure 
and country of operation (Greening & Gray, 1994; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003).  In terms of 
size, Greening & Gray (1994) argue that larger companies will put in place more strategies 
than the smaller company as the larger the size the more the challenges. In this case, company 
A is multinational company with many branches across the world and many years of 
operational experience. Company B is an indigenous company just growing transnational, 
now operating in 16 countries in Africa with close to ten years’ operational experience. In 
terms of company structure, the same analogy can be used to understand the two companies. 
Company A has a strong ownership structure that requires corporate protection while 
company B seem less concerned about that. This I argue might be due to the country of 
Operation. Company A operates majorly in developed countries before investing in the 
developing countries. This multinational background could be the reason why the company’s 
corporate practice is more evidential and beneficial compared to company B. One of the non-
state participants stated that  
 
‘… LAFARGE for example, we have more pressure from outside the country than 
from government because to them, they are the owner of the company. And what they 
can’t do in their country, they don’t want to do it elsewhere unless the country allows 
them to do it’ (CPC2, 12thApril 2016). 
 
Company B on the other hand began operation in Nigeria before expanding to other 
developing countries. This I argue has impacted on the strategy the company adopted in its 





‘Look at these (pointing at the ISO standard on the wall) these are voluntary standards 
that we decided within ourselves to follow and which we are religiously following’ 
(CPC1, 11thApril 2016).  
 
Evidently, transnational governance in the Nigerian cement industry supports the view that 
such governance approach rests on voluntary contributions and weak or non-existence 
enforcement processes (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). This section examines the commitment of 
the companies to the change management initiative of the CSI as a chartered member and 
non-member respectively. The differences in corporate strategies of the companies in the 
sector as supported by the above statements can be argued to be due to their structure and the 
country of operation of the companies. Environmental regulations are known to be very weak 
in developing countries (Dean, 2001; Dean, Lovely & Wang, 2005). The following section 
intends to articulate how these differences have impacted on the new governance actors’ roles 
to complement or collaborate with other governance actors in the industry.   
 
7.2.2 Public-Private partnership (PPP) experience in the Nigerian cement industry: The 
Lafarge Africa-Ogun state government and NSIA Agro-forestry project 
On 15th September 2015, a joint memorandum of understanding (MOU) was reportedly 
signed between the Ogun State Government (OGSG), the Nigerian Sovereign Investment 
Authority (NSIA), and Lafarge Africa PLC. The MOU signalled the beginning of a public-
private partnership programme for the joint development of Ogun state forest landscape 
restoration project, a multipurpose project. The objectives of the project exemplify a 




governance actor, Ogun state government and the federal government agency. The MOU was 
claimed to have been witnessed and endorsed by the president of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria in France.  Ogun state is one of the six states in the south west geopolitical zone of 
Nigeria.  
As discussed in the preceding chapters, Ogun state houses the major cement producing 
companies in the country. It is the largest cement producing state in the country and the 
regional government hosting the PPP project. The state’s main role in the project is to provide 
land for the project. Two of the nine forest reserves that have been highly degraded were 
identified for the project. These are Imeko and Aworo Forest reserves (See figure 7.1). The 
NSIA is a federal government agency set up to manage funds more than budgeted 
Hydrocarbon revenues to drive sustainable economic development for the benefit of all 
Nigerians (Joint Press Release, 2015). The agency claims its role is to build a saving base for 
the Nigerian citizens; enhance the development of the country’s infrastructure and provide 
stabilisation support in times of economic stress (NSIA- “About Us”, 2016). The NSIA’s role 
in the project is to provide credibility and investment security to attract foreign investment as 
the project is designed to attract large scale Agro-allied companies (GRST2, April 13th 2016). 
Lafarge Africa’s department of Biomass fuel project has been the main driving force of the 
project. The search for clean fuel to meet the set target of 30% of its energy needs by 
gradually sourcing renewable energy by 2020 motivated the initiative.  
In a bid to transform its corporate values into practice, the company approached the 
government of Ogun state for a joint project whereby rural Agricultural wastes can be used as 




Executive Officer of Lafarge Africa stated during the signing of MOU that ‘our commitment 
to the environment and social sustainability of our operations and of the communities within 
which we operate leads us naturally to support Ogun state projects that promise strong 
positive impact on these issues, particularly on climate change. The use of agro-ecology and 
agro-forestry in these projects will increase their productivity, ensuring the land becomes one 
of Nigeria’s best carbon capture areas and generating biomass that Lafarge intends to use to 
fire its kilns’ (Joint Press Release, 2015). The main role of Lafarge Africa in the project seems 
however not to provide the capital for the project but as a new governance actor attracting 
foreign investment for the project and then benefit from the waste the activities will generate 
for its own use. 
The proposed project is aimed to use about 108,000 hectares of degraded forest in Ogun state, 
Southwest Nigeria already depleted to 7% of original size for a multipurpose agro-forestry 
project. It is expected to support efficient development of staple annual crops thereby 
promoting food security in the country in general while also serving other purposes. As a 
natural resource based project, aside from transforming the degraded forest and promoting 
food security, the project will also serve as a vehicle for watershed (Catchment) management 
providing additional 150 million litres of clean water per day, this is estimated to increase the 













At the local level, it is claimed that when operational, the project will revive the economy of 
the host communities and boost their infrastructure. The main approach of integrating the 
above claims is by developing large scale agro-investment corridor which will allow nomadic 
herders to cross the region with their herds, encourage subsistence farming and lease lands to 
Agro-investors to develop large scale tree crops and annual crops (Joint Press Release, 2015). 
The Agro-forestry project is a public-private partnership initiative which points to the fact that 
collaborative governance process can aid pooling resources together to address common goals 
sustainably. The uniqueness of the project however rests in its multifunctional perspectives of 
governance through nature by combining ecosystem restoration with agricultural 
development, business development and climate change mitigation. It is expected to 
contribute to forest restoration while it is aiding food production, animal grazing and water 
resources development and above all, generate waste to be used by the cement industry as 
biofuel. This attests to the assumption of social and political roles beyond the state by 
business firms as new governance actors (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). An important issue of 
concern about the project is its operationalisation, while company A the initiator is a profit-
making organisation, the project is still being publicised to raise fund for its commencement. 
It is opined that the firm should invest in the project rather than searching for investors. This 
may delay the commencement of the project and eventually its failure because of government 
inconsistencies. It is however commendable as a multilevel governance approach engineered 
by the private sector actor arguably motivated by its membership of the cement sustainability 





The section has described the strategic response of company A as a multinational company, a 
member of the Cement Sustainability Initiative and a new governance actor with intents. 
Although the project is yet to be operational, it is an indication of a proactive corporate action 
for sustainable development rather than just being manipulative (Oliver, 1991). It is a 
significant evidence of a response to the new political and social roles of corporate actors in 
activities that were formerly ‘governmental’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). 
7.2.3 Corporate and community actors’ partnership for development in the Nigerian 
cement industry: Lafarge Africa community resettlement project 
Another local scale variant of collaborative governance experience in the cement sector is the 
corporate social responsibility of the corporate actors. Although, there are arguments and 
counter arguments whether corporate social responsibility can be viewed as a governance 
approach despite the changing roles of business in recent time (Henderson, 2001; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011; Vogel, 2007). Interestingly, business firms have continued to assume state-like 
roles (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), particularly in countries where government are unwilling to 
implement basic citizenship rights (Matten and Crane, 2005). Such roles include provision of 
social and economic infrastructures in the communities hosting them. Nigeria is not an 
exception of a country where the new governance roles of business firms is emerging in 
recent time. It has been suggested that corporate social responsibility conceptualisation should 
sufficiently integrate the new governance role of business firms to reflect the consequences of 
globalisation and devolution of responsibilities of the recent pasts (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). 
Considering the above submission, Scherer and Palazzo (2011) suggest a CSR 




role in political and economic responsibilities as new governance actor. In line with the above 
suggestion, the corporate actors and host communities’ partnership for community 
development is conceptualised and discussed as a variant of collaborative governance in this 
section. As earlier argued in chapter three, the state actors’ inclusion of a signed 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the company and host communities 
apparently set a situation where the state set the legitimacy for community based 
organisations to engage in partnership with the corporate actors for the development of their 
communities. The MoU though set in motion the opportunity for communities to engage in 
partnership with corporate actors but its successful implementation is still a subject of concern 
as witnessed in this case studies. The transformations in the Nigerian cement sector so far has 
confirmed business firms as new governance actors can no longer be conceived as ‘economic 
actors’ only (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The firms need to grasp with the fact that the 
development of the host communities should be inclusive and evidential (Hilson, 2012; 
Bebbington, 2013). It can as well be inferred that community based organisations have grown 
to understand the political and ‘disruptive’ power they possess in the age of neoliberalism. 
Business actors therefore must be taking up the social and political responsibilities in their 
areas of production to achieve their economic objectives rather than continuing to view CSR 
as philanthropic (Frederick, 1998; Windsor, 2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Evidence shows 
sharp contrast to the partnership and relationships existing between case study companies and 
communities. To elaborate this, a recent community resettlement programme by company A 
is discussed and compared with the experience in the community hosting company B. The 
resettlement project is a multilevel governance approach involving partnership between 




resource development scholars have placed corporate social responsibility in the extractive 
sector in the context of ‘Partnership for Development’ (PfD) (Van Alstine & Barkemeyer, 
2014; Arellano-Yanguas & Bernal-Gomez, 2017). By so doing, the company and community 
actors are seen as collaborators for development purposes having equal and legitimate right 
(Arellano-Yanguas and Bernal-Gomez, 2017).    
The community resettlement project is part of company A’s actions to protect their ‘social 
licence to operate’, it is a direct partnership for development project with the community 
rather than through the government. As argued earlier the, ‘erosion of the division of labour 
between business and government and the growing pressure of civil society actors’ has 
changed the orientation of CSR (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, p.903). It has recognised 
community actors and business actors as equal partners aiming to achieve development goals 
through nature. Evidence shows that the project did not start by the company willingly but 
due to resistance and pressure from the affected community using available resources at their 
disposal (CCE3, 10thApril 2016; CCE6, 31st May 2016). However, the success of the project 
epitomises commendable transformation and a reference for understanding increasing 
business-society relations in a neoliberal extractive economy. The company claims it always 
ensure good social relationship with its host communities through the execution of 
community development projects annually. This also reflected in the country’s chief 
Executive Officer of the company that “Lafarge Africa’s CSR investments are strategic and 
needs-based. Our commitment to the development of our local communities is unwavering 
because we recognise host communities as strategic partners to our business” While this can 




over 260 million Naira (about $826,000) in their host communities (Akinfenwa, 2016), the 
reluctance to carry out the resettlement project in the first place make the sincerity of the 
company somehow questionable.  
Following complaints and confrontations from two of the five villages directly affected by 
quarry operations in the study area, company A agreed to relocate them. The affected villages 
Oke-Oko Sekoni and Oke-Oko Egbado were provided with 12 units of bungalows for about 
1000 people in a new location of their choice within the study area. Over the years both 
communities have suffered the impact of mining and quarrying activities of the company. 
Their complaints however yielded results when the communities presented evidence of their 
increasing vulnerability as the activities of the company intensify. The communities presented 
a case of a cow that was killed near the village by the debris of the company’s blasting 
activities in the quarry (CCE6, 31stMay 2016). The communities argued that their people 
could be victims too, so they must be relocated this time. The project began in 2015 and was 
completed in 2016. The company also plans to use the annual community development 
projects for these communities to provide other amenities that might be needed in the new 





Figure 7.1 New blocks of bungalow in the new community 
 





Figure 7.3: New block of bungalows in the second community  
 




Generally, the cases discussed so far constitute a couple of good intentions for partnership for 
development through collaborative governance. It corresponds with new initiatives in 
governance that rely on ‘heterarchic’ or network-like relationship (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). 
Kooiman (2003) describes such relationships as co-governance, the third mode of governance. 
The evidence presented so far indicates the growing practice of collaborative governance in 
the Nigeria cement industry (Ansell & Gash, 2008) attesting to governance initiatives 
compensating for the development and regulatory lapses of the government. I argue that the 
cases described empirically exhibit the features of Piattoni’s (2010) ‘MLG analytical space’ 
discussed in the conceptual chapter. Piattoni describes MLG as a theoretical frame that should 
be couched simultaneously in political mobilisation, policy making and polity structuring. She 
argued that levels in MLG may be understood as territorial or Jurisdictional and that the 
challenges they face either in asserting jurisdictional (territorial or functional) or relational 
(legitimacy, consensus and accountability) integrity require both empirical and normative 
illumination. Evidently, the cement sustainability initiative represents a variant of multilevel 
governance in the second plane of Piattoni’s MLG’s analytical space. The second plane is one 
of the 3-intersecting planes where non-state actors such as the private sector actors in this case 
and transnational groups relate, crossing the boundary between the domestic and international 
without challenging the hierarchy of the state (Piattoni, 2010). The initiative represents a 
transnational governance initiative comprising of functional actors with the aim to assert 
functional and relational integrity in their operations. The Public-Private Partnership project 
and company-community partnerships for development show the elements of the third plane 
of the analytical space where Type 1 and II MLG of Marks and Hooghe classification are 




a highly federalised territorial system (Federal-state-local governments) to a highly 
fragmented functional system (Private sector actors and civil society organisations) (Piattoni, 
2010). The cases have exhibited the influence of the shift in the development process leading 
to voluntary initiatives of the private sector actor in some cases as the driving force of best 
practices rather than the national regulations which are below the global standards (CPC1, 
11thApril 2016).  
This section suggests that governance actors, particularly the cement companies should not 
view themselves as just economic actors in the Nigerian cement industry but instead as actors 
with political and economic roles for sustainable development. The evidences so far are 
indicative of progressive transformation in the governance of the Nigerian cement sector 
because it is now possible to address socio-economic and environmental issues in the sector 
proactively through “loose coupling” (Benz, 1998, 2000). Loose coupling means ‘that politics 
is linked not by binding decisions but by transfers of information, not by delegates with 
clearly defined mandates but by representatives who negotiate on goals and not fixed 
positions’ (Benz, 2000, p. 33). It is a shift in the logic of interaction between actors at 
different territorial levels with emphasis on information exchange and persuasion rather than 
control or decision-making (Benz, 2000). However, the flexibility of co-governance as a 
mode of governance to accommodate different institutional practices can also bring about its 
problem in addressing the challenges of governance for sustainable development (Piattoni, 
2010). This brings about the likely limitations of the co-governance process and the 





7.3 The impacts of Collaborative governance experience in the Nigerian cement industry 
In any partnership or collaboration process, it is essential that parties involved cooperate as 
they interact to achieve same goal (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Mutually, co-governance process 
should result in a win-win solution between parties using the available resources (Kooiman, 
2003; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). This section reflects on the experience of co-governance 
practice in the Nigerian Cement industry by comparing companies A and B and the 
corresponding host communities as Communities A and B respectively for easy analysis. 
Company A is the foreign Multinational Company particularly involved in the three variants 
of co-governance discussed in this chapter. Company B on the other hand is the Indigenous 
National Company that has grown massively to other parts of the continent within ten years of 
its establishment. Details of the case study companies were discussed extensively in the 
preceding chapter.  
One of the key features of the co-governance experience in this study is their voluntary 
beginnings. In two of the cases of co-governance discussed in this chapter, the private sector 
actor initiated the processes.  
‘… to begin with, the company approached the government of Ogun state for joint 
project whereby rural Agricultural wastes can be used as alternative fuel in the 
industry’ (CPC3, 28thApril 2016). 
 
The company-community partnership for development example was made possible by the 
realisation of the community’s political and disruptive power in a neoliberal era as evident in 




‘… I was formerly based in Port Harcourt (Oil-rich region) and I know things that are 
done there; so, when I came down, I started fighting for them. At the end of the day, 
we gathered ourselves and fighting for our right. We went to quarry, very close to my 
village, where they are blasting. We shut down the quarry, then the management came 
and told us to come to solve things amicably’ (CCE3, 10thApril 2016).  
 
It is important to state that the role of government for the success of the project is 
indispensable. Although the resettlement project is not necessarily a voluntary project, but it 
does not in any way involve the state actors except for formality and this I hold that it 
indicates the reality of ‘political CSR’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). The import of the above 
argument is that the binding agreement of the cement producing companies under cement 
sustainability initiative is morally important for member companies to abide by. A non-
member company may wish to abide but not binding. Company A as a chartered member of 
the cement sustainability initiative claimed that as a world class company they always ensure 
to employ best practices in their operations (CPC4, 3rdMay 2016). The company has 
consistently emphasised the adoption of global best practices in their operations in the country 
as reflected below. 
As experienced in the CSI case study, it is a collaboration of business actors on a voluntary 
basis (WBCSD, 2007). In the PPP project, it is also evident that the private sector actor 
championed it. 
‘…The compliance targets set by the regulations from the government agency 
(NESREA) is always the bases of monitoring. However, the company as a 






Company B however is not a member of the cement sustainability initiative, but they also 
ensure best practices in their operations. This reflects in a key respondent statement below 
when asked about international regulations and voluntary standards. 
‘Look at these (pointing at the ISO standard on the wall) these are voluntary standards 
that we decided within ourselves to follow and which we are religiously following’ 
(CPC1, 4thApril 2016) 
 
The competitive advantage and judicious use of resources associated with privatisation policy 
might not be achievable in the sector because government does not encourage a level 
playground by setting regulatory standards below global standards. This is because the 
companies are not fully bonded by the country’s regulation to employ best practice in their 
operations (CPC2, 12thApril 2016). While company A built a new world class plant, it is yet 
to decommission the old plant it inherited from the old owners. The company still operates the 
old plant at interval with few moderations. This means that although best practice is a 
criterion for operations in the country’s cement industry, it is not mandatory as the minimum 
standard is set far below global recommendations. So, government cannot enforce global 
standard they do not set, a participant argued. 
‘And you know Multi-nationals even their procedures are more stringent because you 
build your procedure with available technology. When you now bring your procedure, 
Nigeria will base it on what is operating in Nigeria. A multinational will put what is 
operating in international and domicile it. When Nigeria now wants to hijack what 
multinational is doing and push it in, many companies will fold up that are not 
multinationals’ (CPC2, 12thApril 2016). 
The good thing about the cement sustainability initiative is that it provides comprehensive 
guidelines for a sector whose impact is huge on the environment based on evidence. However, 




companies in developing countries can be tricky talk less of non-member companies. This 
means a company can choose to prioritise what is beneficial to the company than the society 
at large. It will be very challenging to fully ensure best practice in the Nigerian cement 
industry as the government cannot enforce compliance with best practice in the industry. In 
this case study, the voluntary nature of best practice in the industry does not contribute to the 
development of the sector effectively as the companies can relax their practices so long it is in 
line with the national standard which is far below global recommendations in the industry.  
The experience in company B tends to be the above assertion, company B as a non-member of 
the CSI is a new company that started production in Nigeria as a local company and has 
grown to over 15 countries in the continent. Company B’s claim of the use of best practices is 
associated with the regulations and requirement of the International Financial Corporations 
(IFC). The choice of best practice in company B seems more of the benefits derivable by the 
company to grow rather than inclusive corporate practices. It tends to show that company B’s 
corporate strategies to fulfil the economic objectives of neoliberal transition and its inability 
to practice the political reality of being a new governance actor in the Nigerian cement 
industry.   
In the case of the PPP project and the community resettlement project, the projects are 
evidently company A’s practice of their corporate values likely to have been motivated by the 
CSI as a participant said: 
‘Government need to explore what the multinationals are doing … It is not in law that 
you must do it but any responsible person or government will want to go in that 





The activities of company A as a foreign company compared to Company B, a Nigerian 
company show a significant difference in their corporate practices. While company A has 
continued to secure its ‘social licence’ to operate following CSI initiatives, company B has 
continued to manipulate situations to the benefit of the company. It could be argued that the 
membership of company A in the cement sustainability initiative is a driver of its public 
corporate strategies. However, company B is not a member and its corporate social 
responsibility strategies is highly questionable as experienced in community B. The use of 
available technology in company B seem to be because it is a requirement to access loan from 
the international finance organisation and only beneficial to the company. The inability of 
company B to evolve initiatives such as the PPP is corroborated by Ansell and Gash (2008, 
p.553) that “If alternative venues exist where stakeholders can pursue their goals unilaterally, 
then collaborative governance will only work if stakeholders perceive themselves to be highly 
interdependent”. Company B does not believe in the interdependence of stakeholders as such 
to drive inclusive development initiatives.  
Of particular interest in this case is community relations and partnership for development 
projects which should be based on the MoU made mandatory by the government. Community 
A are benefitting from the presence of company A annually and are asking for more (CCE1, 
14thNovember 2012; CCE2, 14thNovember 2012; CCE3, 10thApril 2016). Although the 
relationship and progress made so far in community A came at a price, at least it did not 
escalate as company A responded swiftly to their needs compared to community B. Rather 
than engage in meaningful partnership projects in community B, company B has engaged in 




shopping involves when stakeholders believe there are alternatives to collaborating with other 
stakeholders to achieve an objective (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Stakeholders who view 
themselves as having strong allies in the courts or in legislatures, for example, will often 
prefer these alternative venues (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 551). 
Community B on the other hand, have been involved in conflict within the community and 
legal tussle with the company. The community could not point to any beneficial development 
project since the establishment of company B about nine years ago, (CCIB1, 12thApril 2016; 
CCIB2, 30thMay 2016). However, company B has never stopped production since it 
commenced operation in the community in 2008 without any positive intervention from the 
government (CCIB2, 30thMay 2016).  
Ansell and Gash (2008, p.555) posit that “Where power distribution is more 
asymmetric or incentives to participate are weak or asymmetric, then collaborative 
governance is more likely to succeed if there is a strong ‘‘organic’’ leader who 
commands the respect and trust of the various stakeholders at the outset of the process. 
‘‘Organic’’ leaders are leaders who emerge from within the community of 
stakeholders. The availability of such leaders is likely to be highly contingent upon 
local circumstances”.  
The above position has been helpful to community A as expressed earlier. However, within 
community B, conflict on legitimacy and power struggles on who should benefit from the 
company have been rife and this has escalated to the benefit of the company as expressed by a 




‘…we had problem from the onset when XXX intended to establish here, he sent 
delegates to ask what the people of the community want, we talked about MOU and he 
said it will be done. But at the long run, the king said he shouldn’t border about MOU 
that he should continue with his business. In the whole of Yewa south (the region), our 
community has been without any establishment, so based on that we were full of hope 
that when the company starts running, they will treat us well. Initially we have 
community development association; we now try to make it more effective because of 
the cement industry the king was against it. He said we are going to create chaos with 
the association. We started having issues concerning XXX because of the things the 
community expect the company to be doing that are not coming forth’ (CCIB2, 
30thMay 2016). 
Contrary to Ansell and Gash’s position above, the leader in community B has been using his 
power to the benefit of selected few rather than the community. Another participant also attest 
to the challenges community B is facing. 
‘Here in XXX, the community is divided into two (because of conflicts). All the land 
of XXX has been given to XXX. Though there are some citizens of this community 
that support him. They take what belongs to the whole community and I am sure they 
only deceive them with little change. XXX is happy because we don’t agree among 
ourselves, his work is progressing. They make billions of naira every day’ (CCIB1, 
12thApril 2016). 
The internal problem of the community has been ongoing for almost ten years and yet the 
company is expanding using divide and rule tactics to the detriment of the community 
(CCIB2, 30thMay 2016). As noted further by Ansell and Gash (2008, p.552) “Incentives to 
participate are low when stakeholders can achieve their goals unilaterally or through 
alternative means. Stakeholders who view themselves as having strong allies in the courts or 
in legislatures, for example, will often prefer these alternative venues. Venue shopping can 
easily undercut collaborative processes. Conversely, the incentive for stakeholders to 
participate is likely to increase when the collaborative process is the exclusive forum for 
decision making”.  The experience in community B corroborates the argument of Ansell and 




continues to operate because of its strong political and legislative powers to shop for 
alternatives. Company B recently commenced the establishment of another factory within the 
same region, an indication of ‘venue shopping’. The arguments as exemplified by the 
Nigerian cement industry so far expose the inadequacies of government in ensuring 
sustainable development. Government is undoubtedly the facilitator and regulator of the 
stakeholders’ relations in a neoliberal economy. It can be argued that the lack of political will 
to ensure compliance with policies and regulations has continued to breed selfish interest, 
encouraging insincerity and disappointment. This gap in the expectation of the state is the 
reason why most extractive host communities are backward having taken their farmlands with 
not better alternatives. This has significantly impacted community B as experienced in the 
study. Company B seem to be interested only in the projects that will benefit the company 
within the community. A community representative lamented that:  
‘… if truly the king is well oriented, he won’t allow them to construct that kind of tiny 
road. The road is not wide enough for two trucks to pass at a time, if they try it, there 
will be accident. We can’t count the number of accidents on this road. There was a 
time one of their trucks fell here and destroyed my fence, I called them to come and 
repair it, they didn’t. the king supporters called them that when they are coming to 
carry their truck they should come with uniform men, if anybody try to stop them, they 
should discipline the person or shoot. I did the fence myself. More so they didn’t do 
drainage’ (CCIB2, 30thMay 2016). 
 
It is believed that the poor intervention of the government in their problem is because people 
in government benefit from the company. 
‘Government is aware of what is happening. You know the situation of the country, 
especially in a case like this, especially with the influence and status of XXX, some 
government officials benefit from him, so it might be difficult for government to blow 




The above comment further shows that even if the society is opportune to engage in the 
governance process, role of the state in ensuring successful win-win cooperation cannot be 
underestimated. The role of the state is important to ensure no one actor exploits the other in 
the process. In the instances presented above, co-governance process in the Nigerian cement 
industry is challenging because of the commitment of the government in ensuring cooperation 
of the parties involved. The role of government in co-governance process is discussed in the 
next section. 
7.3.1 Government roles in the co-governance process   
As discussed above, pressing issues identified in the collaborations for governance in the 
Nigerian cement industry include insincerity of the companies and conflicts between parties 
and stakeholders. There are cooperation issues between community stakeholders. In co-
governance, cooperation between parties can only be successful when there exists no division 
at all among and between parties. In the absence of cooperation, relationship might be 
impartial and one-sided. In the Nigerian cement industry, the state actors facilitate and 
regulate the activities of the sector. They make necessary policies and regulations that the 
private sector actors must abide by, this include the signing of a Memorandum of 
understanding with their host communities. To achieve the neoliberal economy objectives in a 
collaborative governance approach, cooperation among parties must be a founding factor 
(Ansell and Gash, 2008). It is imperative on the government of the day to ensure that they are 
committed to a strong and stable cooperation among parties as the custodian of territorial 
powers and authority. This is corroborated by Ansell and Gash (2008, p.550) that “conditions 




stakeholders and between agencies and stakeholders”. In this study, power imbalance has 
manifested in different ways between the communities and the cement companies.  This has 
led to weak and rather uncoordinated commitments in community A and conflicts in the 
community B. As experienced in community A, the weak commitments of the company 
manifested in the type of projects enjoyed by the community. There is no significant master 
plan than can foster sustainable regional development which is why the community are 
insisting to be involved in the company as shareholders.  
‘We are taking what we have now and fighting and hoping for the best. At least we 
have things that bring us to the round table. At least the company is doing something 
and they can’t say we don’t have right or entitled to what we are fighting for, though 
20% for now. We will get to a stage when there is understanding we will get up to 
80%’ (CCE3, 10thApril 2016). 
 
If some stakeholders do not have the capacity, organisation, status, or resources to participate, 
or to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders, the collaborative governance 
process will be prone to manipulation by stronger actors (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p.551). While 
power imbalance has been identified as recurrent problem in co-governance process, it can be 
addressed by the government playing the impartial umpire. It is therefore submitted here that 
though the interrelationships created so far in the Nigerian cement industry due to 
privatization show the creation of non-hierarchical networks, an indication that transformation 
in the sector make sense of MLG. However, the success of any collaboration in the sector will 
require sincerity of purpose coupled with timely intervention, this can only be facilitated by 
the government as the custodian of territorial powers who have ceded functional integrity to 




the evidence available, the political will to enhance level playground for co-governance is 
needed. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Beginning with the description of three case studies projecting the elements of collaboration 
and partnerships, this chapter has shown how interrelationships in the Nigerian cement 
industry due to privatization relates to the creation of non-hierarchical networks at the 
instance of MLG. It also presented how the experience in the sector have played out between 
two host communities of the major cement producing companies in the sector. The CSI is a 
collaboration of global cement industry with the backing of a transnational organisation 
(WBCSD). The initiative portrays the features of non-hierarchical network of actors in a 
climate sensitive sector evolving to drive the sector towards sustainable business that 
incorporates socio-economic and environmental concerns. The initiative has been found to be 
a useful model for sectoral approach to sustainable development (Cook & Ponssard, 2011). 
However, its limitation has been found in its voluntary nature and clear absence of 
implementation template governments can rely on to assess the practice (Cook & Ponssard, 
2011). The second case study described another variant of co-governance viewed as a sort of 
the practice of the CSI agenda. The PPP is also an initiative of a private sector actor, a 
multipurpose project initiated by a key member of the CSI. Although, the PPP is a credible 
initiative and commendable for emanating from the private sector portraying the practise of its 
corporate values, its success is dependent upon the commitment of the government actors as 
experienced in this case. The third case study described a more local negotiated partnership 




in the achievement of common goals between cement companies and the host communities. 
Although legitimacy of the relationship can be attributed to the government which require that 
MOU be signed with local communities hosting extractive industries. While the company 
engage in annual community development in the host communities based on agreement on 
community needs, it recently engaged in a resettlement project which has been long overdue. 
The community resettlement project brings to fore the lack of political will of the government 
toward inclusive development in the past. 
 
The chapter having explored the three case studies also discussed the impact of co-governance 
in the Nigerian cement industry by comparing the experience of the case study companies and 
communities. The experience provided explanations and understanding of why government as 
the ‘gate-keeper’ (Piattoni, 2010) has a significant role to play to ensure that corporate 
organisations put their corporate values into practice in an inclusive manner. Government 
seem to lack practical interest in a transition process conscious of contemporary socio-
economic and environmental issues affecting man-environment relationship in the 21st 
century. The practice of collaborations and partnerships for governance in the Nigerian 
cement industry has shown some elements of bias. While the foreign MNC tend to be 
sensitive to the protection of their social licence to operate, the indigenous national companies 
seem to be sensitive of the manipulative approaches of being protective of their investment to 
the detriment of the larger society. Due to the double standard brought about by variation in 
the regulations guiding the sector, companies seem to be selective of interactions or projects 




This insincerity of the government I argue makes the benefits accruable through co-
governance in the Nigeria cement industry insignificant. This is reflected in the approaches of 
the case study companies to the practice of their corporate values and strategies. The ‘loose 
coupling’ advantage co-governance presents seems to provide the avenue for the companies 
to truncate the partially initiated alternative development process. There is the need to 
strengthen co-governance process by the government through frameworks for its practice. 
This could include development of regional development plans for host communities as well 
as legal structures for its implementation and monitoring to prevent manipulations, venue 












CHAPTER EIGHT  
CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction and summary of thesis background 
This chapter presents the summary of findings, reflections and contributions of this study in 
four sections. In this section (8.1), summary of background issues leading to the study is 
presented, this is followed by reflections on the study findings based on the objectives of the 
thesis in section 8.2. Section 8.3 discusses the methodological and conceptual contributions of 
the study to knowledge, then, policy implications and recommendations of the study are 
discussed in section 8.4. Section 8.5 considers the limitations of the research and suggestions 
for further study.  
Contextualising the recent global transformation in environment-development-governance 
interrelations over the past four decades, I have argued that Nigeria has experienced 
significant changes in its political economy following the application of neoliberal policy 
principles by successive governments. I have argued that the changes wrought by 
neoliberalism on resource extraction in Nigeria can be most appropriately understood through 
a multiscale framing of state and non-state actors’ capacities for coordinating socio-economic 
relations for resource development. The thesis has addressed this gap using the Nigerian 
cement industry as a case example. It empirically explored what sustainable development in 
an extractive industry means, particularly in the overall context of a neoliberal extractive 
economy. Consequently, I adopted a multilevel governance framework to inform the study to 




indirectly implicated in the cement sector. This thereby offers an under-researched case for 
examining neoliberalism in transition, in turn making a meaningful contribution to 
mainstream debates in economic development and environmental governance. Transitions in 
the Nigerian cement industry in the last 17 years can be viewed as a manifestation of 
multilevel governance through nature (Bridge and Perreault, 2010, p.492), that is a situation 
where nature is regarded as the agency of social relations. Assessing social relations in the 
survival and welfare of business actors and the society respectively as orchestrated by the 
state in this case, can illuminate the spatial relevance of social relations and contribution to 
governance crossroads in resource-rich economies (Bebbington, 2013). Expectations are that 
the experience of socio-environmental issues arising as a result of poor governance 
arrangement in the Nigerian oil and gas sector should have rightly informed and guided the 
transition. But it appears that government’s interest was just to increase revenue source while 
reducing public investment while also using state resources to favour political elites. More 
interestingly as the federal government still has total control over mineral resources in the 
country. As discussed in chapter one, three specific objectives were put forth leading to three 
important questions to enable me achieve the aim of the study. In the following section I have 
discussed the summary of findings of the objectives. 
8.2 Summary of findings 
Reflecting on the first objective of the study, I noted that the environmental governance 
process in the Nigerian cement industry has experienced significant reconfiguration beginning 
with the mainstreaming of environmental concerns into the development of the sector; and the 




government levels (Fagbohun, 2012; Ladan, 2012; Amokaye, 2012). More importantly, the 
rise of regional governments in environmental regulation aided by the domestication of 
Agenda 21, indicate a Type 1 MLG. Agenda 21 emphasised the participation and delegation 
of responsibilities among stakeholders. Apparently, transformations in the institutional 
arrangements for environmental regulation evident in the country are working effectively (see 
Chapter five). However, there are challenges complicating and implicating the success of 
environmental regulation in the sector which include the following. 
● Duplication of regulatory responsibilities  
● Incoherent coordination and  
● Conflicting relations between the government actors and the cement companies.  
These challenges thus make environmental regulation processes in Nigeria less effective 
thereby defeating the normative objective of multilevel environmental governance in the 
country. Normatively, it is argued that multilevel environmental governance could be a 
solution to collective action problem and minimise governance cost (Paavola, 2008; 2016). 
The Nigerian cement industry experience shows that governments at different scales (Federal, 
state and local) are still unable to carry out their responsibilities as expected by the public 
(Kettl, 2000).  
Rather than solving collective action problems and minimising the cost of governance, the 
shared administrative responsibilities, the current state of multilevel governance experienced 
in the Nigerian cement industry escalates environmental regulation process. This evident in 
the territorial power play between state actors and prioritising economic interest over 




environmental concerns in the development process can be attributed to the increasing 
mobilisation of non-governmental organisations both within and outside the country. It can 
also be seen in efforts of successive governments just to mollify international organisations 
that the country is making progress in implementing multilateral environmental agreements. It 
is in a sense a face-saving exercise which is not supported with practicable structures to 
ensure successful implementation. Policy changes have not been adequately backed by 
political will to evolve a polity to implement environmental policies effectively in the 
country. Studies have however shown how conflicting actions between government agencies 
have led to ambiguities and conflicts in the country in the past (Lawal, 2012). This has led to 
increasing complementary but fragmented and voluntary actions from both business actors 
and civil society organisations in the sector and the country in general. A case between the 
federal Ministry of the Environment and NESREA at the federal level is another example. 
The duties of the impact and mitigation monitoring division in the Ministry overlap with the 
duties of NESREA. Similarly, conflicts are evident in the accreditation of environmental 
consultants thereby leading to exploitation of the consultants. There are also complaints of 
over exploitation by the cement producing companies because of the unorganised oversight 
functions of the government actors both at the federal and subnational scales. Subnational 
governments too have been found exercising their constitutional powers over the companies.  
Another major issue is that the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria exclusively 
reserves all mineral development rights to the federal government while the environmental 
protection responsibility is on the concurrent list in the constitution. This means that 




mineral resource development in their states. They are also only passively involved in the EIA 
approval process for intending private sector investors which has very serious implications as 
experienced in this study. 
Concerning the second objective, it was found that the non-state actors’ rise to prominence in 
development and environmental governance in the cement industry is principally because of 
policy change from a welfare state to a neoliberal state. As shown in chapter six, neoliberal 
policies brought about significant changes in economic development policies and normatively 
correspond to the rising involvement of civil society organisations. Two prominent non-state 
actors in the cement sector are the corporate actors and the community-based organisations. 
Business actors and civil society organisations’ functional expertise as against power and 
authority of the state have been employed to complement state actors’ roles in economic 
development and environmental actions. The findings testify to the globalisation and 
devolution process in practice in a natural resource sector implicating the political and 
economic roles the corporate actors and the community actors play in the sector. In the past, 
businesses have been engaging in corporate practices of social and environmental 
responsibility with voluntary or philanthropic intentions, findings show that the orientation 
has changed to a more obligatory corporate social responsibility in the sector. Civil society 
organisations’ involvement in lobbying, advocacy and biodiversity conservation as well as 
environmental information dissemination processes increased significantly and positively 
contributing to the polity. Findings also reveal there are infractions and manipulations 
inhibiting good relationship between the corporate and society actors. It was also apparent 




relations. The experience in the Nigeria cement industry corresponds with Paavola’s (2008; 
2016) ‘path dependent explanation of Multilevel environmental governance but the existing 
structure for interaction is one-sided and particularly favourable to the corporate actors. A 
major example of the one-sidedness of the structure is found in the experience of how the 
corporate actors disclose and practice their corporate responsibilities even though they are 
mandated to sign MoU with host communities. The implementation of the MoU is not 
coordinated neither is it properly enforced. Comparative evidence between case study 
companies also shows how company background affected corporate actors’ response to their 
new governance roles. The findings above, I argue defeat the purpose of the MoU which was 
meant to foster inclusive development (Bebbington, 2013). Policy change to neoliberal 
economy gave room for manipulations and corroborates existing discourse on neoliberal 
policies as being characterised by manipulations especially in countries with dysfunctional 
institutions (Jessop, 2002; Tickell & Peck, 2003; Harvey, 2005, 2006; Saad-Filho & Johnston, 
2005). The findings point to the crucial and indispensable roles of the state in the governance 
for sustainable development discourse (Migdal, 2001; French, 2002; Castree, 2008). 
In the third objective, it was admitted that no single group of actor can govern alone and there 
is bound to be collaboration between stakeholders with different resources to achieve 
common goals. Acknowledging the window of practicable collaborative, non-hierarchical 
governance opportunities in the Nigerian cement industry, the success of the practices is 
highly dependent on the structure the central government provide for its practice (Piattoni, 
2010). State actors must ensure that the multilevel governance process is impartial and its 




met (Paavola, 2008; 2016; Perreault, 2009). The freedom of interaction brought about by 
neoliberal governance transition has been abused by the corporate actors because the 
companies have deployed several corporate strategies and tactics to rather respond to their 
political corporate roles in their own ways. It has also been a source of high level conflicts 
within communities and between actors as experienced in the case study communities. This is 
because of the failure of government to sincerely engage in a complete policy change where 
structures for policy implementation are considered along with policy-making and political 
mobilisation (Piattoni, 2010).  
The practice of multilevel governance evident in the Nigerian cement industry portends good 
omen for the extractive industry but its implementation has key impediments that is eroding 
the benefits derivable from resource governance from multilevel perspective. Paavola (2016, 
p.151) explains that “the governance cost and path dependence explanations are somewhat 
subsidiary to the collective action and multi-functionality explanations: one or the other of the 
latter needs to provide the overall rationale for governance initiative, and governance cost and 
path dependence explanations can then rationalize why the initiative needs to have a multi-
level character. Both highlight that conventional governmental structures may need to be 
relied upon and that doing so may be the most cost-effective solution”. The above implies that 
changes in policies for economic development and environmental regulation may not be 
enough to promote sustainable resource governance, an improved governance structure that 
considers information, capacity and motivations factors may be needed (Lambin, 2005). This 
is where the power and authority of the state should be wielded with all sincerity rather than 




jurisdictional integrity (Piattoni, 2010) to ensure that the functional integrity (Piattoni, 2010) 
of the non-state actors complemented by devolved roles to regional governments are deployed 
effectively and efficiently for the benefit of the society in general.  
Having explored in this study the state as an empirical question rather than taking it as given 
(Kjaer, 2011), it was revealed that Type I Multilevel governance exhibits flexible allocation of 
policy competences (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The study confirms the power of the Nigerian 
central government to control the centre-periphery gates, the state-society gates and the 
domestic-foreign gates (Piattoni, 2010). The government decides the subnational formations 
deserving the legitimacy to represent their interests, select and prioritise societal demands into 
a “national interest” (Piattoni, 2010). 
The centrality of natural resource development policy also presents major setback as 
subnational governments do not have any enforcement role in the mineral resource 
development. As demonstrated in this study, the existence of multilevel governance involving 
national and subnational governments and other non-state actors portends the complexity of 
the dispersion of authority between the actors as a result of the neoliberal economic policy in 
the sector. 
Empirically the study demonstrated the fragmentation of the formal and informal institutions 
in the Nigerian cement industry without improved structure for their integration. The 
neoliberal economic policy in the sector poses the problem of ‘fragmegration’ (Rosenau, 
2002). This is exhibited in the devolvement of economic responsibility in the sector to the 




government at least to ensure strict adherence of the companies to the MoU signed with the 
host communities. Even the environmental regulation roles the subnational government plays 
bring about duplication of duties, conflict of interest and waste of resources among others 
(Paavola, 2016). The central government also partially legitimise local community 
participation in the governance of the sector with no official template for development 
projects in the communities (Ladan, 2014). These have led to the failure of the state to engage 
in sincere subsidiarity process under true federalist state where responsibilisation and 
autonomisation issues (Castree, 2010) are integrated for resource control and environmental 
regulation in the sector.  
Neoliberal governance as experienced in the case of this empiric has not been adopted as a 
programme but rather as a policy to patch-up pressing economic challenges rather than 
sustainable transition (Castree, 2010). The application of multilevel governance in the study 
therefore indicates that the central government as arbiter of sovereignty, has not couched the 
devolution of development and environmental responsibilities in the Nigerian state to 
simultaneously include political mobilisation, policy-making and polity structuring (Piattoni, 
2010). The involvement of most non-governmental organisations in governance in Nigeria 
can be attributed to the normative stance of neoliberal governance.   
In addition, it can be stated that recent economic development policies and environmental 
regulation processes in the Nigerian cement industry failed to prioritise the conditions of 
human-environment sustainability. This is because little or no attention was given to the 
social and environmental components of the development process in favour of the economic 




promoted various lock-in mechanisms to insulate economic policy from democratic rule and 
popular accountability. This situation has encouraged capital flight, authoritarianism, 
corruption, the mushrooming of the informal sector, coupled with unprecedented casualisation 
and precarisation of labour all of which are features of a dysfunctional system (Ekanade, 
2014). These have cumulatively deepened poverty and crime in Nigeria, thus undermining the 
very essence of a democratic state which ought to uphold social rights. The study hereby 
support the contention that ‘in the absence of a profound reconfiguration of the present 
regime, … there is no reason to imagine and/or expect current strategies to succeed in 
fostering sustainable development” (Fagbohun, 2012, p. 10). 
8.3 Study contribution to knowledge  
This study has employed the robust conceptual and analytical framework of governance to 
explore neoliberal governance through nature (Bridge and Perreault, 2009), in a research 
frontier (Hilson, 2014) faced with development challenges despite its natural resource wealth. 
The research has contributed to the growing body of literature on environment-development- 
governance crossroads (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003; Liverman, 2004; Agrawal & Lemos, 2006; 
Lemos & Agrawal, 2007; Bridge & Perreault, 2009, Perreault, 2009), neoliberalisation of 
nature (Hartwick & Peet, 2003; Mansfield, 2007; Castree, 2008a, 2008b; 2010a, 2010b; 2011; 
Duffy, 2006) and multilevel environmental governance (Paavola, 2008, 2016). The study has 
exposed the complexities of social relations and relevance of collective actions in sustainable 
development through the lens of multilevel governance. It focuses on the extractive industry 




and nature as the backbone of its economy. Key contributions of the research are discussed as 
follows. 
Although the study did not focus on policy change, it has illuminated the complex relations 
and challenges associated with incomplete sectoral policy reforms. As shown in the study, 
growing social and economic burden of development on the national government is being 
shared selectively with other state actors but without clear structure for successful 
implementation. There is clear evidence of changes in political and economic responsibilities 
with poor structure to coordinate relations coherently. This research has shown the need for 
and the relevance of coordinated social relations in environment and development processes. 
The findings of this study indicate that a state embedded social relation process (Midgal et al., 
1994) is imperative for sustainable development of extractive resources. The research has also 
shown the growing recognition of social relations without necessarily involving the central 
state (Piattoni, 2010). This is explained by the need for cooperation and collaboration to link 
up power and authority of the state with money and expertise of the private sector actors to 
meet the social, economic and environmental elements of resource development in developing 
countries. 
The Nigerian cement industry experience has shown that rather than for government to 
robustly effect changes in policies for sustainable development, government tend to adopt 
reactive approach. Government is more concerned with policies that increase revenue 
generation for the government to the detriment of other elements of development. This is 
evident as government promotes economic development with little or no attention to social 




structural capacity to enhance multilevel governance for sustainable development in the 
extractive economies. 
Any economic approach to promote inclusive and sustainable development requires a 
structural arrangement for its implementation. Although the present approach shows changes 
toward multilevel environmental governance on the part of environmental regulation, there 
was no significant change in resource control structure in the country. Changes in 
environmental regulation is evident in the creation of environmental agencies and 
organizations at the federal and subnational levels of government. Evidently, the existing 
state-centric resource management system is detrimental to governance for inclusive 
development. While governance failure is not a new development in the country, lessons 
learnt in the past about political and institutional failures appear not to have been of any 
benefit. It also appears that the impediments to successful transition to institutional 
arrangements for sustainable development have thwarted recent government initiatives. This 
is because despite available evidence of environmental degradation and poverty, international 
institutions cannot sanction national governments for inaction. Providing information and 
awareness-raising about issues is not enough to promote sustainable development; states must 
ensure other measures such as capacity building and enabling environment are also 
undertaken (Lambin, 2005). 
The engagement of the national government in the patchy neoliberal process evidenced by the 
experience of the Nigerian cement industry has led to insincere and manipulative corporate 
governance strategies. Neoliberalisation of nature experience in the Nigerian cement industry 




At the same time, government create opportunities for corporate governance actors to shy 
away from their new political responsibilities. The opportunities allow the corporate actors 
not to sincerely engage in sustainable corporate social responsibility practices and manipulate 
the processes by using divide and rule tactics as evidenced in the case study communities. 
These features are typical of a dysfunctional state lacking political will for inclusive 
development by using all the state resources to favour selected people within the state (Borzel 
& Risse, 2016). By inference, the patchy neoliberal reforms, conflicting relations among 
stakeholders, insincerity and manipulations of the corporate actors in the sector negate the 
goals of sustainable development.  
Another important contribution of the study based on its empirical findings is the rising 
involvement of community based organisations in addressing socio-environmental issues 
affecting them in the cement producing communities. This is contrary to the experience in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas sector where NGOs are at the forefront of addressing socio-
environmental issues on behalf of the concerned communities (Idemudia, 2009). These 
changes as revealed in this study could be attributed to improved access to information and 
the increasing loss of trust in non-governmental organisations. The study also shows that 
access to information has improved relations between media professionals and community 
based organisations. Community based organisations now collaborate with the media rather 
than with non-governmental organisations. Despite improved channels of information and 
whistle blowing by the media as revealed in this study, international organisations such as the 





Figure 8.1: Application of MLEG to the neoliberal Nigerian cement industry shows a failure 




8.4 Policy implications and recommendations 
Research findings of this study indicate that development policy in Nigeria needs significant 
structural reforms (Fagbohun, 2012; Ladan, 2014). Currently participatory framework for 
actors as experienced in the conflicting roles of government actors and duplication of 
monitoring responsibilities is very poor. The complaints of the corporate actors and the 
environmental consultants attest to the poor framework existing in the sector. Providing a 
structure which defines the participatory structure of all stakeholders is the first point of 
relevance. This will help in solving both collective action problem and reduction of cost of 
governance. Designing a participatory framework for participation is imminent to:  
● Encourage synergies for meaningful development,  
● Reduce cost and time expended on duplication of responsibilities and  
● Evolve governance approach conscious of the multifunctional roles of the natural 
environment in modern development perspective. 
● Prevent manipulative corporate practices that undermine the needs of other 
stakeholders as well as internal conflicts within communities.    
To achieve a structural reformation, the political will to do so must be there. Now, there is no 
political will for inclusive development in the country. However, this is a requirement to 
achieve sustainable development. For example, the duplication of responsibility between state 
actors, long delays in legal tussles between actors constitute serious setback to governance for 
sustainable development. Evidently, the politics of decision-making determines how 
government behaves towards a particular policy (John, 1998). The Nigerian government did 




economic burden on government to the detriment of the masses. Government seem to be 
interested in revenue from environmental regulation than environmental wellbeing and 
livelihood of Nigerians. This is apparent in the fact that most of the current regulations are far 
below global standard which then give the companies freedom to manipulate processes to 
their benefits and pay fine as imposed by the government because it is affordable. Without the 
sincere intention of government to encourage governance using current knowledge, neoliberal 
governance through nature will not deliver any improvement in the sustainable development 
of natural resources in the country. 
In the policy, politics and polity of multilevel environmental governance, the role of 
government is sacrosanct. Only the state actors have the power to exercise authority; 
formulate legitimate laws; steer and control through the hierarchical powers and authority to 
tackle serious sustainable development issues (Van Zeijl-Rozema, et al., 2008; Castree, 2010; 
Piattoni, 2010; Tengku-Hamza, 2011). No doubt the involvement of non-state actors to 
address development issues to complement state efforts as evident in the study is an indication 
of the need for multilevel governance approach to address environment-development 
challenges in Nigeria as an extractive economy. The findings in essence mean multilevel 
governance can actually address collective action problem, reduce cost governance, employed 
in a path dependent approach that can promote regional development and aid multifunctional 
development if well-structured by the government. It is my submission that multilevel 
governance without embedded state is unsustainable as the policy, politic and polity are 





8.5 Study limitations and suggestions for further studies 
Understanding the salient role of governance in environmental resources development in 
extractive economies requires much attention. This is to enhance our understanding of how 
the shift in roles and relations of the central state captured by governance can solve 
coordination, social relation and organisational challenges of sustainable development. Three 
keys areas of limitations believed to be relevant in this case are methodology; framework and 
research context.  
In terms of methodology, this study employed qualitative research approach to explore 
development-environment-governance crossroads in a neoliberal context. The application of 
qualitative approach to neoliberal resource governance has provided qualitative insights into 
the experiences and views of a myriad of government and non-governmental actors. It is 
however suggested here that studies employing either quantitative approach or mixed methods 
on the same subject matter can further provide broader details about the issue. This may 
involve a large scope of relating the perceptions of the public in the process or a focus on a 
category of stakeholders.  
In terms of framework, the multilevel actors focus of the framework employed emphasises 
assessing and articulating multiple actors’ relations in the governance process in the Nigerian 
cement industry as the case example. It is opined that studies employing frameworks focusing 
on a single group of actors can generate social learning and insights on governance and 




case study interestingly makes this study a novel one, studies focusing on the following are 
also suggested:  
● Other sectors of significant importance such as the telecommunication sector in the 
country and the oil and gas sector. The oil and gas sector is suggested considering the 
ongoing environmental clean-up in the Niger Delta region of the country and recent 
passage of the petroleum industry bill. Although, myriad of literature abound on the 
Nigerian oil and gas sector but applying the multilevel framework may further 
contribute to the governance of the sector considering the changes in the sector 
identified above. The energy sector of the country can also be explored as it also 
witnessed significant reforms in recent past. 
 
● Other developing or extractive economies using the existing methodology or new 
suggestions above can further advance contribution to knowledge on governance and 
sustainable development debates in extractive economies in transition like Nigeria. 
● Comparative studies between different resource sectors and countries could be another 
promising area. 
● It is also suggested that the changes in the Nigerian cement industry in recent past 
present geographic information and environmental changes research gap which this 
study has been unable to address.  
This study contributes to the body of knowledge and social learning in the resource 
governance discourse in the neoliberal age particularly in developing countries. It has 
employed multilevel governance to identify and analyse state and non-state actors’ relations 




adequately address resource governance issues in low and medium income countries context -





























    Appendix 3 
Consent form 
TITLE OF THE RESEARCH:PRIVATIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE IN EXTRACTIVE COMMUNITIES: A CASE OF NIGERIA CEMENT 
INDUSTRY 
Fair processing statement  
The study aims to ascertain participants’ views on the effects of privatization of the cement 
industry in Nigeria and its interrelations with the system of environmental governance now 
emerging for this sector nationally. The project is a PhD research under University of 
Birmingham, United Kingdom. The information you supply and that collected for this 
research will be stored confidentially and only accessible by the researcher. The information 
will be processed according to the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. No personal 
data will be published. 
Statement of understanding/consent 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information leaflet of this research. I have the 
opportunity to ask questions if necessary and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
I understand my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw without any reason. Also 
my data will be removed and destroyed if I withdraw within two weeks after the interview. 
I do understand that my personal data will be processed for the purposes detailed above, in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 
Based on the above, I agree to take part in this study. 
Name, signature and date 
Name of participant: ……………………………………………………………………… 
Signature ………………………….                        Date …………………………………. 
 
Name of researcher: ……………………………………………………………………….. 
 






                                                                 Government Sector Actor. 
Participant ID --------------------   Gender     Male / Female   Date    --------------    Reference 
number: 
Introduction 
I am ______________________________ from ______________________ 
✓ General purpose of the study 
✓ Aims of the interview and expected duration 
✓ Who is involved in the process (other participants) 
✓ Why the participant’s cooperation is important 
✓ What will happen with the collected information and how the participant will benefit 
✓ Any questions? 
✓ Consent 
 Can I ask some details about you and your job? 
Job Title ____________________________       Highest Educational Grade attained 
___________ ___ __            
State of origin __________________________ 
How old are you?                                                □ Under 30yrs □ 30-40yrs □ Over 40yrs  
Now that we have completed the consent form, I will now ask you to express your own views 
and experiences about your work and role ----------.  Your views and experiences can give 
insight to this study. I hope you will have time to complete this interview. I am going to turn 
on the voice recorder now. Don’t forget, you can ask me to turn this off at any time. 
Do you have any questions before we start?” 




1. What are the programmes and activities that have been developed 
specifically for extractive sector regulation and how are they implemented? 
2. What are your department’s responsibilities with regard to 




3. How have these duties/roles being carried out in terms of enforcement and 
compliance? 
4. Are there any policy and legislation on cement industry environmental 
management at the international global level that you are aware of? How do 
these policies affect the decision and action taken in your department? 
5. Have the policies of foreign countries affected your department’s policy? 
6. Does your department conduct any trainings/workshops to the public, 
companies or organizations for knowledge on current policies, technologies 
etc. 
7. What are the main challenges your department faces in environmental 








1. Has your department established any links or associations with any other 
organization, whether private or public with regard to environmental 
policies implementation? 
2. What form do these relationships take? 
3. When, How did they come about and what motivated the relationship? 
5. What is the purpose of the partnerships? 
6. How do these partnerships function? 
7. Do you share information with other parties? 
8. How do you share this information? 
9. What determines the kind of information shared and who it can be shared 
with? 




Is there anything else you think is important that we have not talked about? 
That’s all the questions I have for you.  Thank you for your patience and co-operation.  I will be 
in touch should anything come up for which I might need your expert views on, and I will also 





    Appendix 5 
 
                                    Private Sector actors (cement Manufacturers) 
Participant ID  --------------------   Gender     Male / Female   Date    --------------    Reference 
number: 
Introduction 
I am ______________________________ from ______________________ 
✓ General purpose of the study 
✓ Aims of the interview and expected duration 
✓ Who is involved in the process (other participants) 
✓ Why the participant’s cooperation is important 
✓ What will happen with the collected information and how the participant will benefit 
✓ Any questions? 
✓ Consent 
 Can I ask some details about you and your job? 
Job Title ____________________________       Highest Educational Grade attained 
___________ ___ __            
State of origin __________________________ 
How old are you?                                                □ Under 30yrs  □ 30-40yrs □ Over 40yrs  
Now that we have completed the consent form, I will now ask you to express your own views 
and experiences about your work and role ----------.  Your views and experiences can give 
insight to this study. I hope you will have time to complete this interview. I am going to turn 
on the voice recorder now. Don’t forget, you can ask me to turn this off at any time. 
Do you have any questions before we start?” 




1. What are the products manufactured by your company? 





3. What strategies are used to manage the impacts by your company?  
4. What are the influences of government legislation, international 
regulation/voluntary standards on your environmental management 
processes? 
5. Who is involved in environmental management in your company beyond 
the company? 
6. How is environmental compliance targets set and monitored within and 
outside the company? 








1. Has your company established partnership/relationship with any private 
or public organizations in relation to environmental regulations? 
2. If any, what prompted the relationship and what form do the partnership 
take? 
3. When were the links/associations established? 
4. How do these partnerships function and who controls the partnership? 
5. Do you share information with other parties? 
6. How is it shared, what type of information do you share? 
7. What is the purpose of sharing this information?  
8. Are there limits on the kind of information that can be shared and who it 
can be shared with?  
9. What other strategies do you undertake to foster transparency and 
accountability about the activities of your company?  
Closing 
Is there anything else you think is important that we have not talked about? 
That’s all the questions I have for you.  Thank you for your patience and co-operation. I will be 
in touch should anything come up for which I might need your expert views on, and I will also 







     Appendix 6 
              Civil Society Organization/community based association/research institutes etc. 
Participant ID  --------------------   Gender     Male / Female   Date    --------------    Reference 
number: 
Introduction 
I am ______________________________ from ______________________ 
✓ General purpose of the study 
✓ Aims of the interview and expected duration 
✓ Who is involved in the process (other participants) 
✓ Why the participant’s cooperation is important 
✓ What will happen with the collected information and how the participant will benefit 
✓ Any questions? 
✓ Consent 
 Can I ask some details about you and your job? 
Job Title ____________________________       Highest Educational Grade attained 
___________ ___ __            
State of origin __________________________ 
How old are you?                                                □ Under 30yrs  □ 30-40yrs □ Over 40yrs  
“Now that we have completed the consent form, I will now ask you to express your own 
views and experiences about your work and role ----------.  Your views and experiences can 
give insight to this study. I hope you will have time to complete this interview. I am going to 
turn on the voice recorder now. Don’t forget, you can ask me to turn this off at any time. 
Do you have any questions before we start?” 
Domain Questions  
Activities 
 
1. Can you briefly tell me the history of your organization and the objectives 
of the organization? 





3. Who funds your organizations?  
4. With regards to environmental policies implementation, what are the 
main activities and programmes carried out by your organization?  
5. How have your activities/programme evolved, what were the influences 
that led to this pattern of evolution (government legislation, international 
regulations)? 
6. What would you say are the main challenges your organization faces in 








1. Has your company established partnership/relationship with any private 
or public organizations in relation to environmental regulations? 
2. If any, what prompted the relationship and what form do the 
partnerships take? 
3. When were the links/associations established? 
4. How do these partnerships function and who controls the partnership? 
5. How does your organization gather information regarding environmental 
management? 
6. Do you receive any information on government’s plan and action 
regarding management of extractive industry or the environment generally?  
7. Is the transparency level of the government sufficient? 
8. What about information from private companies about their 
environmental management plans and their activities? 
9. How would you rate the level of transparency and accountability of 
government and the companies? 
Closing 
Is there anything else you think is important that we have not talked about? 
That’s all the questions I have for you.  Thank you for your patience and co-operation. I will be 
in touch should anything come up for which I might need your expert views on, and I will also 















Respondent reference as 
appeared in text 










1 GRFD1 15/10/12 GRFD1, 15th October 2012 
2 GRFD2 15/10/12 GRFD2, 15th October 2012 
3 GRFD3 14/04/16 GRFD3, 14th April 2016 
4 GRFD4 14/04/16 GRFD4, 14th April 2016 
5 GRFD5 14/04/16 GRFD5, 14th April 2016 
6 GRST1 15/10/12 GRST1, 15th October 2012  
7 GRST2 13/04/16 GRST2, 13th April 2016 
8 GRST3 13/04/16 GRST3, 13th April 2016 
9 GRST4 01/06/16 GRST4, 01st June 2016 
10 GRLG1 14/11/12 GRLG1 , 14th 
November 2012 
11 GRLG2 14/11/12 GRLG2 , 14th 
November 2012 
12 GRLG3 7/04/16 GRLG3 , 7th April 
2016 






14 CPC1 11/04/16 CPC1, 11th April 2016 
15 CPC2 12/04/16 CPC2, 12th April 2016 
16 CPC3 28/04/16 CPC3, 28th April 2016 
17 CPC4 3/05/16 CPC4, 3rd May 2016 
Environmental 
Consultants (EC) 
18 EC1 5/05/16 EC1, 5th May 2016 
19 EC2 6/05/16 EC2, 6th May 2016 







21 NG2 17/10/12 NG2, 17th October 2012 
22 NG3 27/04/16 NG3, 27th April 2016 
23 NG4 20/04/16 NG4, 20th April 2016 
24 NG5 20/04/16 NG5, 20th April 2016 
25 NG6 22/04/16 NG6, 22nd April 2016 
26 NG7 26/04/16 NG7, 26th April 2016 
27 NG8 29/04/16 NG8, 29th April 2016 
28 NG9 3/05/16 NG9, 3rd May 2016 






30 CCE1 14/11/12 CCE1, 14th November 2012 
31 CCE2 14/11/12 CCE2, 14th November 2012 
32 CCE3 10/04/16 CCE3, 10th April 2016 
33 CCE4 10/04/16 CCE4, 10th April 2016 
34 CCE5 10/04/16 CCE5, 10th April 2016 
35 CCE6 31/05/16 CCE6, 31th May 2016 
36 CCE7 31/05/16 CCE7, 31th May 2016 
37 CCE8 30/05/16 CCE8, 30th May 2016 
38 CCE9 31/05/16 CCE9, 31th May 2016 
39 CCE10 31/05/16 CCE10, 31th May 2016 
40 CCIB1 12/04/16 CCIB1, 12th April 2016 
41 CCIB2 30/05/16 CCIB2, 30th May 2016 
42 CCIB3 30/05/16 CCE3, 30th May 2016 
43 CCIB4 30/05/16 CCIB4, 30th May 2016 
44 CCIB5 30/05/16 CCIB5, 30th May 2016 




















46 CCSG2 14/04/16 CCSG2, 14th April, 2016 





48 AC1 20/09/12 AC1, 20th September 2012 
49 AC2 4/05/16 AC2, 4th May 2016 
50 AC3 10/05/16 AC3, 10th May 2016 




52 EJ1 18/04/16 EJ1, 18th April 2016 
53 EJ2 18/04/16 EJ2, 18th April 2016 
54 EJ3 19/04/16 EJ3, 18th April 2016 




   Appendix 8 
Research questions Code Category 
and family 
Subcategory and coding 
How has the state 
configured environmental 
governance of the cement 
industry and what roles do 
sub-national tiers of the 
administration play in this 
process? 
How have the non-state 
actors and stakeholders’ 
roles and relations in 
environmental governance 
been affected by 






State Actor- FG- GRFD1-5 
State Actor-SG – GRST1-4 
State Actor-LG- GRLG1-4  
Non-State-Civil Society- NG1-10; AC1-4 
Non-state- Company-CPC1-4 
Non-state-Private sector-EC1-2; EJ1-4 
Non-state-Community leaders- CCE1-10; CCIB1-5 
How has the state 
configured environmental 
governance of the cement 
industry and what roles do 
sub-national tiers of the 
administration play in this 
process? 
How have the non-state 
actors and stakeholders’ 
roles and relations in 
environmental governance 
been affected by 
privatization in the cement 
industry? 
Roles/activities of 
actors- 2  
Dissemination and Enlightenment of environmental information 
Fight the right of the community  
Reports to government  
Control pollution 
Training of staff on environmental health 
Conduct EIA 
Perform social responsibility 
Audit company facilities 
Intermediary between govt & private sectors 
Watchdog for govt/companies 
Issuance of permit/EIA 
Monitors companies compliance 
Stakeholders' meeting/seminar 
Enforces/Awards penalty to defaults 
Irregularly lectures the public 
Registration and regulation of EC 
Process of monitoring 
Advisory role to govt 
Conduct researches for Policy making 
How can the multilevel 
governance practices in the 
Nigerian cement industry 
be understood and 
explained as contestations 
to achieving sustainable 










Govt/NGO relationship-process of EIA 
Inter-Governmental relationship-Delegatory/informational; 
Training 














Inter Actor relationship-NGO/Govt-Advisory 
Inter relationship-comp./comm.-relationship 
Inter relationship-Govt/NGO- Process of EIA 
Inter-Relationship-NGO/Company-environmental consultancy 
Inter Relationship NGO/Comp.-Int'l guidelines 
Inter relationship: EC/Govt-monitors compliance 
Intra-Comm./Comm.-Meet and dialogue together 
Intra-FG/SG/NESREA- No conflict 
Intra relationship: SG/FG-monitoring 
How have the non-state 
actors and stakeholders’ 
roles and relations in 
environmental governance 
been affected by 
privatization in the cement 
industry? 
How can the multilevel 
governance practices in the 
Nigerian cement industry 
be understood and 
explained as contestations 
to achieving sustainable 





Comm. struggles with comp. to get things done 
Comp. neglects comm. needs 
Disagreement within comm. 
Divide and rule tactics by national companies 




Govt not responsive to comm. 




Lack of data base/ignorance 
Lack of job benefit for host communities 
Lack of standard in operation 
Logistics/delay 
Negligence of client (companies) 
Nepotism/Nigerian Factor 
Others 
Outdated/deficiency of environmental laws & implementation 
Overlap/Conflicts of responsibility 
Policy enforcing style 
Prioritizing economic gains 
Technological challenge 
Recommendation
s and emerging 
issues- 5 
Changed orientation/style of policy making 
Comm. should be more involved and enjoy direct benefit 
Create a national body for accrediting ECs & providing knowledge 
on Environmental mgt. 
Formulation of good policies 
Govt should be responsive and united against bad behaviours 
Regulators should give annual update to EC 
Review of Environmental Laws & constitution 
Transparency 
Right determination 
Commitment of govt in Paris agreement 
Job and more revenue generation via alternative fuel 
Employing indigenes 
Privatisation allows direct benefits to immediate communities 
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